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Introduction  
 
 
The analysis of the way in which risk and/or uncertainty affect household economic 
choices is a key issue in developing countries, where the economic environment is riskier, 
households may be more vulnerable to risk and shocks may have dramatic consequences on 
household living conditions (Morduch, 1994; Dercon , 2005c). There are two components of 
risk, to which different aspects of households decisions are associated: the possibility of 
unforeseeable future events, and the actual occurrence of shocks. The former leads people to 
try and reduce future risk and/or its consequences (ex ante risk management strategies), 
whereas the latter forces households to cope with the consequences of shocks when they 
occur (ex post risk coping strategies). This dissertation refers mainly to the effects of shocks 
faced by poor people in poor countries, and in rural areas in particular, while the problem of 
ex ante responses to risk is touched upon only in the last chapter.  
 
Banerjee (2005) posits the question “are the poor just like you and me except in that they 
have less money? Or is it useful to think of them as being subject to different pressure from 
the rest of the population and therefore sometimes making choices that are very different?” 
(Banerjee, 2005, p.2). In discussing the topic of risk, the differences between developed and 
developing countries, and between poor and non-poor people, become relevant. The sources 
of risk that affect the two types of economies are very different, as different is the ability to 
cope with shocks and the risk-management strategies adopted. Some types of risk appear to 
be much more prevalent, less protected, and to lead to more serious consequences in poor 
countries than in other part of the world (Fafchamps, 1999), and for poor people in these 
economies, especially for those living in rural areas. Rural villages have in general not only 
lower income levels, but also a higher income variability compared to non-rural areas 
(Fitzsimons, 2007).  
One of the most relevant sources of uncertainty is variation in business income. In poor 
economies incomes are much more dependent on business sources than on safe wage. 
Business activities (mainly farms in rural areas) are typically small, the production 
technologies adopted are quite simple and cannot provide insurance against economic or 
natural events. For example, most of the farms in poor rural countries are highly dependent 
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on weather variability (mainly rainfall shocks), and plant disease and pests may cause crop 
losses. Another important source of uncertainty related to business risk is the fluctuation in 
prices. Moreover, poor people are exposed to health problems caused by their scarce 
nutrition and by the environment in which they live or work (World Bank, 2000).  
 
Not only poor rural economies face a high incidence of risk, but poor people are also less 
protected against shocks (Fafchamps, 1999; Dercon, 2005b). The failure of insurance and 
credit markets (particularly in rural areas, Fitzsimons, 2007), and the fragility of social 
security, make poor people vulnerable against hardships. Low incomes limit the possibility 
to save and accumulate assets, hence reducing the effectiveness of self protection strategies, 
and the use of productive assets to smooth consumption is costly in terms of future incomes. 
Moreover, poor households may invest in safe but low return activities to reduce their 
exposure to risk, and this affects their long-term income. Nevertheless, evidence suggests 
that in some cases risk management strategies (both ex ante and ex post) offer at least some 
protection against shocks. These strategies involve mainly informal mechanisms and mutual 
support networks between households and villages. When these strategies fail, the lack of 
insurance and protection may lead to poverty traps or households may require several years 
to recover from the shock (Dercon, 2005b).  
 
To summarize, shocks are costly to households in terms of lost income, reduced 
consumption, and sale or destruction of assets. Poor households developed several 
mechanisms to both smooth income (ex ante and ex post), and protect consumption 
(consumption smoothing), and these mechanisms may be costly in their turns. This 
dissertation investigates the way in which potential and actual shocks affect household 
economic conditions and choices. We will focus on three main issues. First, we explore 
which strategies are chosen for different types of shocks. Second, we investigate  which are 
the specific mechanisms adopted in the face of the most common shock (crop loss), and the 
consequences on consumption. Finally, we analyze the consequences of risk and shocks on a 
particularly important household decision: how much to invest in children education. The 
source of data we employ is the Indonesian Family Life Survey (1993 round). A large 
amount of information on household economic conditions (income sources, consumption, 
types of assets), and household and individual characteristics were collected, as well as a 
detailed section on shocks experienced by the household during the five years prior to the 
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interview. These data provide a very useful source to analyze shocks, and to document the 
relationship between types of shocks, household characteristics, and coping strategies.  
 
We start with the review of the theoretical and empirical literature of households’ 
behaviour in the face of risk and shocks in developing countries. The theoretical framework 
that underlines the analysis is an intertemporal model of consumption and asset investment 
choices. We discuss the specificities of these choices in poor economies, where insurance 
and credit markets are less developed, and households have typically low incomes. We 
present models that account for these issues, in particular models with precautionary savings 
or liquidity constraints, and the asset smoothing hypothesis. We next discuss the main 
findings of the empirical studies that investigate consumption and asset investment choices 
in developing countries, focusing in particular on the different behaviour between poor and 
non-poor households. A descriptive analysis of the data follows. The suggestion of the 
literature are exploited to investigate the sources of shocks faced by rural Indonesian 
households, and the mechanisms they develop to deal with negative events. The focus is on 
the extent to which the effects of shocks and the coping mechanisms differ for households 
with different characteristics, and in particular between poor and non-poor. 
The second chapter models households responses to shocks. Most of the literature 
examines the role of specific responses to hardships, without examining how households 
choose between different strategies. We investigate households decisions with regard to 
coping mechanisms focusing on how households’ wealth and the type of shocks experienced 
(whether demographic or economic, idiosyncratic or common) affect the strategies used. 
Data show that the majority of shocks elicit only a single response, and some shocks elicit 
multiple responses. We thus consider a situation of non-exclusive multinomial choice, and 
propose two models which require at least one response, and account for non-exclusive and 
dependent multiple responses. In the first and simpler specification, the Poisson-multinomial, 
households first choose the number of responses to a specific shock, and then the specific 
choices are identified to maximize household utility conditional on the former choice. The 
second specification, the threshold-multinomial, generalizes the standard multinomial logit 
model by supposing that agents will choose more than one response if the utility they derive 
from other choices is “close” to that of the utility-maximizing choice. We compare these 
models with the widely used Marginal Logit Model.  
The third chapter investigates whether rural Indonesian households smooth income 
following a crop loss (i.e. whether they adopt strategies, labour supply adjustments in 
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particular, to recover the income reduction due to the shock), and how much consumption 
smoothing is achieved through income smoothing strategies (i.e. how much of the increase in 
income is transferred onto consumption). We extend the approach of Cameron and 
Worswick (2003) and construct quantitative measures of income shocks and of households’ 
responses to the shock, analyzing more than one response type, and differentiating between 
poor and non-poor farmers. We find that the model that drives household consumption 
behaviour is different for poor and non-poor households, and this leads shocks to have 
different impacts on households consumption and savings choices.   
The last chapter extends the analysis and explores the role of both ex ante income risk 
and income shock occurrence on child education, and, in particular, on school progression 
from a school level to the next one. The main original feature of the chapter is the 
assumption of irreversibility of the decision to withdraw a child from school: once the child 
drops our, he/she cannot return to school. In this way, temporary interruptions in schooling 
in the face of risk or short-term shocks have long term impacts on the child human capital. 
We underline that the impact of uncertainty on schooling decisions is more subtle that what 
suggested by much of the existing development literature.  
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Literature Review and Data Overview 
 
 
 
 
1.1 Introduction  
Many studies document the high income variability in developing countries related to 
various sources of risk (Townsend, 1994; Morduch, 1995; Kinsey et al., 1998). Several 
surveys review the relationship between risk, poverty, and household responses to shocks in 
poor countries. Alderman and Paxson (1992) review the literature on household ex ante and 
ex post strategies to insure consumption against shocks, examining the effectiveness of these 
mechanisms. Morduch (1995) investigates how risk affects household production and 
employment decisions. Townsend (1995) focuses on the ability of households to insure their 
consumption against idiosyncratic or common shocks, and on the role of various 
mechanisms in providing insurance. Fafchamps (1999) summarizes the literature on rural 
poverty and risk in developing countries, examining the limits of coping strategies and 
discussing the policy implications. Dercon (2005a) focuses on the constraints households 
face in using insurance mechanisms, and on the role of economic policies.  
This chapter summarizes the main findings regarding the way in which potential and 
actual shocks affect household economic conditions and choices, with a particular focus on 
the different coping strategies adopted and on their consequences. The theoretical framework 
that underlines the analysis is an intertemporal model of consumption and asset investment 
choices. Under the assumptions that there are no borrowing constraints, that agents are 
rational forward looking, and that utility function is separable over consumption and leisure, 
households seek to keep the marginal utility of consumption constant over time. This means 
that households spread transitory income changes over the remaining periods of their life-
cycle, and therefore consumption is substantially unaffected by these shocks (consumption 
smoothing). The life-cycle models and the permanent income hypothesis capture this 
Chapter 1 
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behaviour. However, poor households, especially in developing countries, may have no 
access to perfect credit markets, and they may find it hard to save. Moreover, the vast 
majority of people living in poor areas do not rely on wage income, rather on farm profits, 
for which the availability of some productive assets becomes crucial. This makes them 
cautious in running down assets to smooth consumption. To account for these issues, 
alternative models are developed that relax some of the assumptions of the permanent 
income hypothesis. In particular, this chapter reviews models with precautionary savings or 
liquidity constraints, and the asset smoothing hypothesis.  
The theoretical predictions of these models form the basis for several empirical studies 
that investigate consumption and asset investment choices in developing countries. Many of 
them test whether consumption is smoothed, both across space, by relying on social 
networks, and over time, by saving and borrowing, or by accumulating and selling non-
financial assets. A growing empirical literature considers a framework in which assets 
generate income and focuses on the trade off between the use of assets as a buffer against 
shocks (consumption smoothing behaviour) and their maintenance for future income and 
consumption (asset smoothing behaviour). This chapter summarizes the main empirical 
findings related to consumption and asset choices in poor countries and in the presence of 
shocks.  
A descriptive analysis of the data follows the literature review. The main objective is to 
document the sources of shocks that affect rural Indonesian households, and how types of 
shocks and household characteristics affect the use of different coping strategies, focusing on 
the differences between poor and non-poor households. Data analysis is based on the 1993 
round of the Indonesia Family Life Survey data (IFLS)1, and the focus is on the rural sample. 
An interesting feature of this database is that respondents were asked whether the household 
had experienced an economic hardship in the five years prior to the interview, the type of 
shock, when it happened (year and month), what measures were taken and the costs of 
overcoming it2. For these reasons this database is particularly suitable to examine the 
relationship between shocks and household decisions in poor countries.   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 IFLS is conducted by RAND in collaboration with UCLA and Lembaga Demografi, University of 
Indonesia. 
2
 Appendix A shows in detail the questionnaire for household economic shocks. 
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1.2  Types of shock and their consequences on household living conditions  
The extent to which shocks are costly to households (in terms of lost income, reduced 
consumption, or the sale and destruction of assets), and the ability to cope with them depend 
on the nature of the shock, on environmental and economic circumstances, and on specific 
household characteristics. As regard the nature of the hardship, shocks that affect single 
individuals or households have different consequences compared to shocks that occur at the 
village level. Health and economic shocks may be associated with different costs. Moreover, 
the frequency and intensity of shocks are important factors in determining the extent of the 
consequences. It is therefore useful to first classify the sources of risks, and then present their 
consequences, and the means households can rely on to cope with them. 
 
1.2.1  Types of shock 
Two broad classifications of hardships are proposed in the literature. The first is between 
demographic and economic shocks. The former includes mainly health shocks, the latter 
directly affect economic variables (i.e. income, assets). The second distinction, correlated 
with but not implied by the demographic-economic one, is between idiosyncratic and 
common shocks. Idiosyncratic shocks are household specific, while common shocks affect 
group of households, or the entire community. Some shocks are more likely to be 
idiosyncratic (for example illness or unemployment), others to be common (for example 
droughts or epidemics), but few risks purely belong to one category (Dercon, 2005a). 
Moreover, even commonly experienced events may produce idiosyncratic effects according 
to specific household characteristics. 
Distinguishing between economic and demographic shocks, and between idiosyncratic 
and common ones, is important because they may have different consequences on 
households’ living conditions and they may allow or require different strategies. Several 
papers document that demographic shocks are more costly than economics ones. For 
example, Kenjiro (2005) find that in rural Cambodia, the economic damage caused by 
sickness is more severe than that caused by a crop loss. Gertler and Gruber (2002) find 
evidence that in Indonesia the economic costs associated with major illness are high and 
cause a severe reduction in household consumption. Moreover, demographic shocks may 
prevent households from using some coping strategies, for example households are less 
likely to use the labour supply response to cope with health shocks because they may affect 
the ability of the households to provide labour (Kochar, 1995). 
Chapter 1 
 
4 
Aggregate variations may be more difficult to insure and to cope with because 
households cannot rely on community assistance and social networks (Dercon, 2002; 
Alderman and Paxson, 1992). Even the use of assets as a buffer against shocks may differ 
between idiosyncratic and common risks. When the majority of households try to sell assets, 
their prices fall and the gain from the asset sale decreases (Morduch, 1994; Frankenberg, 
Smith and Thomas, 2003). 
These two classifications however, do not exhaust the characteristics of the shocks that 
are relevant for the analysis of their consequences. For example, the frequency and intensity 
of shocks, and the autocorrelation over time are important features that may exacerbate the 
effect of shocks to income. High intensity and low frequency risks are in general more 
difficult to deal with than small and frequent shocks (Dercon, 2005a). Fafchamps (1999) 
points out that shocks may not be independently distributed over time: experience one type 
of risk may raise vulnerability to other shocks, and in this case coping is more difficult 
(Alderman, 1996). Moreover, some shocks may be non-stationary since they lead to 
permanent consequences.   
 
1.2.2 Direct and indirect effects of shocks, and long-run consequences  
When analysing the consequences of shocks, it is useful to distinguishing between direct 
and indirect effects, and between short-run and long-run consequences. Shocks may have 
direct impacts on incomes (income shocks) or assets (asset shocks), and indirect effects as 
consequences of the strategies used by households to deal with risk. Income shocks are more 
likely to have transitory effects, whereas asset shocks are more likely to have long term 
consequences: a shock that causes the loss of human or physical assets that are crucial for 
income production can have a negative impact not only on current well-being, but on future 
income and human capital as well (McPeak, 2004). From this point of view, the direct 
effects of demographic shocks may be severe when they affect the human capital formation 
of children. Dercon and Hoddinott (2003) find that shocks affecting child health in 
Zimbabwe and Ethiopia lead to persistence effects on the future adult human capital and 
earnings. Alderman et al. (2006) and Hoddinott and Kinsey (2001) show that the health of 
Zimbabwean children, and in particular that of children living in poor households, is affected 
by drought, and this has long term consequences on subsequent human capital formation.  
Indirect effects of shocks are consequences of both ex ante and ex post risk-management 
strategies. Ex ante strategies involve diversification across crops, the use of a variety of 
production techniques, portfolio diversification, migration, etc. They may have negative 
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consequences when, for example, the fear of risk force poor households to take safe but less 
profitable decisions (Morduch, 1990; Alderman and Paxson, 1992). Dercon (1996) finds that 
poor households in Tanzania who choose low risk activities have an income per unit of land 
that is 20 percent lower than that of rich households who choose riskier but more profitable 
strategies. Morduch (1990) suggests that Indian farmers with a low level of assets cultivate 
mostly safe varieties of rice instead of risky but high-return varieties. As suggested by 
Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1993), when risk averse farmers face borrowing constraints and 
low incomes in a risky environment they could underinvest in key productive assets. Using 
Indian data, Rosenzweig and Wolpin find that poor farmers invest more in bullocks than in 
irrigation equipment even if the return of the latter is higher. This is due to the fact that poor 
farmers prefer to invest in liquid assets (bullock), than to finance irriversible investents 
(pumps) even if the latter are more profitable.  
Ex post coping strategies may have negative consequences when they destroy or reduce 
the physical, financial, human or social capital of the household (Dercon, 2005c). This could 
increase the risk of entering poverty and could make households vulnerable to future 
hardships. In this sense, maintaining income in the short-run could come at the expense of 
long-term well-being. For example, recent empirical and theoretical papers find evidence 
that, in the presence of credit constraints and lack of assets, income shocks force children to 
be withdrawn from school or to work while remaining in school, with permanent 
consequences on their human capital (Beegle, Dehejia and Gatti, 2006; Fitzsimons, 2007; de 
Janvry et al., 2006; Guarcello et al. 2003; Jacoby and Skoufias, 1997; de Janvry et al., 2006).  
 
1.3   Risk coping strategies 
An essential part of the literature on risk is the study of the strategies developed by 
households to deal with shocks and their consequences. There are different ways to 
characterize these strategies. The World Bank (WDR 2000/01) classifies the ex post 
mechanisms according to whether they involve formal insurance mechanisms or informal 
arrangements between individuals and communities (see table 1.1). Informal strategies are 
developed at the individual and household level, or are group based (communities, villages). 
Formal mechanisms may be market based or provided by governments/NGOs. In many 
developing countries informal mechanisms appear to significantly contribute in coping with 
risk, while formal credit and insurance markets are less developed and asset poor households 
face constraints in access to these institutions. 
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Table 1.1 
Risk coping strategies  
Informal mechanisms Formal mechanisms 
 Individual and 
household 
Group based Market based Publicly 
provided 
▪ sale of assets ▪ sale of 
financial assets 
▪ social 
assistance 
▪ loans from 
money lenders ▪ workfare 
▪ subsidies 
▪ social funds 
▪ child labour 
reduce food 
consumption 
Coping 
with shocks 
▪ seasonal or 
temporary 
migration 
▪ transfers from 
networks of 
mutual support 
▪ loans from 
financial 
institutions 
▪ cash 
transfers 
Source: World Bank, World Development Report, 2000/01: Attacking Poverty 
 
Alternatively, one can choose as a classifying criterion the relationship between these 
strategies and a specific objective that the household may try to achieve, such as 
consumption or income smoothing. Households can ex ante deal with risk “making 
conservative production or employment choices and diversifying economic activities” 
(Morduch, 1995, p. 104) (income smoothing), or may perform strategies that protect 
consumption (consumption smoothing). Alderman and Paxson (1992) propose a 
classification according to whether risk coping strategies smooth consumption across 
households (risk-sharing strategies), or over time (risk-protection strategies). The former are 
collective strategies that involve the mutual support of social networks, the latter are 
individual strategies based on self-protection. Since the effects of shocks on consumption is 
one of the issues we are interested in, we follow this classification to discuss coping 
mechanisms. 
  
1.3.1 Risk sharing strategies 
Risk can be shared between household members (intra-household risk-sharing), or can be 
spread across different households (inter-households risk sharing). In the first case the 
household is viewed as a risk-sharing institution, in which individual-specific shocks in 
income can be insured by the other household members (Mazzocco, 2004; Mazzocco and 
Saini, 2006; Dercon and Krishnan, 2000).  
Many theoretical and empirical studies on risk-sharing characterize the household as a 
single unit, ignoring the intra-household decisions, and focusing on the inter-households 
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component of risk-sharing. According to this literature, units for risk-pooling are extended 
families (Foster, 1993; Witoelar, 2005), friends and relatives (Fafchamps and Lund, 2003), 
ethnic groups (Grimard, 1997), and villages (Townsend, 1994). Inter-household risk-sharing 
is more efficient within small communities, where the problems of asymmetric information 
are relatively unimportant with respect to large groups. The ways in which the risk is spread 
may be formal and informal credit transactions, social transfers and social assistance 
(Milanovic, 2000), generalized reciprocity (Sahlins, 1972), and gift exchange (Cashdan, 
1985).  
Perfect risk-sharing within a community (inter-households) implies that “total village 
resources in any time period are distributed so as to equate the weighted marginal utility of 
consumption across households” (Alderman and Paxson, 1992, p.16). Formally, consider a 
social planner who maximizes the sum of weighted utilities across households (Townsend, 
1994; Fafchamps, 1999; Morduch, 2005): 
 
[ ]
1 0
Pr ( ) ( )max
. . ( ) ( ),
it
t t
N
t
i t i it t
c i t s S
it t it t
i i
ob s U c s
s t c s y s
ω β
∞
= = ∈
=
∑ ∑ ∑
∑ ∑
 (1.1) 
where iω  is the welfare weight associated with individual i, β  is the discount factor, ts  
denotes the state of the world at time t, and )( tit sy  is the individual stochastic income. 
Defining )( tsλ  the Lagrange multiplier associated with each constraint, the first order 
condition is given by: 
[ ] )()()(Pr ' ttititti sscUsob λβω =  
where )( tsλ  depends only on aggregate income. This implies that individual consumption 
varies only with aggregate income and not with individual income. From the first order 
conditions we can derive: 
 
' ' '
'
' ' '
( ) ( )
, , , .( ) ( )
j i t i t
i j t j t
U s U s
s s i and j
U s U s
ω
ω
= = ∀  (1.2) 
If two individuals have equal welfare weights and the same utility function, they have the 
same consumption levels at any time and for any state of the world. If ,ij ωω > it follows 
that ij cc >  for every period, since perfect risk sharing implies that the ratio of consumption 
is fixed across state of nature and over time.  
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The finding that individual consumption varies only with aggregate income is the basis 
for testing risk sharing. The main form for the test is that employed by Cochrane (1991), 
Mace (1991), and Townsend (1994). Following Townsend3, constant relative risk aversion 
utility functions are assumed (CRRA): 
 
γ
γ
−
=
−
1
)(
)1(
it
it
CCU ,  (1.3) 
where itC  is the consumption of household i, and γ  is the measure of relative risk 
aversion.  
Pareto efficiency implies that: 
 )log(log1loglog ωω
γ
−+= itit Cc ,  (1.4) 
where tC  and ω are average values. This equation says that under the hypothesis of 
perfect risk sharing, individual consumption depends on average consumption and not on 
individual income. Based on this implication, risk sharing is tested regressing household 
consumption on average group consumption, household income and shocks variables. 
Household should be affected only by common shocks, whereas idiosyncratic shocks should 
be insured within the community. Most studies rejects the hypothesis of full insurance 
between communities, but supports a partial risk-sharing. Townsend (1994) finds that the 
marginal propensity to consume out of household income is no greater than 0.14 in Indian 
villages; using the same data Ravallion and Chaudhuri (1997) estimate a marginal propensity 
to consume between 0.12 and 0.46.  
Morduch (2005) extends the test presented above and regresses the growth of household 
consumption on time-specific fixed effects and on household income growth. If income 
shocks translate into consumption variations, the coefficient on income growth is expected to 
be one, otherwise if there is consumption smoothing, income growth should have no effects 
on consumption. Using Indian data, the author finds estimates of the coefficients on income 
growth between 0.19 and 0.32. The test used by Morduch does not allow to distinguish if 
consumption is smoothed inter-temporally or the risk is shared within a community or a 
village. Udry (1994) tests for risk pooling in northern Nigeria focusing on the role played by 
credit contracts in sharing the risk between households. The author develops two models: a 
competitive model of the credit market, and a bilateral model of loan contracting that permits 
imperfect information and equilibrium default. Results of both models reject the hypothesis 
                                                 
3
 While Cochrane (1991) and Mace (1991) test consumption insurance on US data, Townsend (1994) 
tests this property for a developing country (India). 
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of complete risk sharing, but find evidence that state-contingent loan transactions are 
important mechanisms for risk pooling within a community.  
The degree of risk sharing may differ for poor and non-poor households. Dercon and 
Krishnan (2000) find evidence that non-poor households are better able to insure themselves 
within the community. Similarly, Santos and Barrett (2006) find that in southern Ethiopia the 
poor are excluded from informal insurance networks, and do not receive transfers in 
response to shocks; De Weerdt (2004) shows that poor households in a village in Tanzania 
have less social networks than the rich, and often they can rely only on other poor 
households. This makes them “vulnerable in the face of idiosyncratic risk” (De Weerdt, 
2004, p.31).  
 
In summary, empirical findings show that the effects of shocks are partly spread across 
households, but that there is not complete risk sharing. The degree of risk pooling depends 
on the type of shocks. Households can rely on family, or community, assistance to cope with 
idiosyncratic, but not with covariant shocks. Moreover, poor households may be excluded 
from social networks, or have the possibility to rely only on other poor households, thus 
reducing their ability to smooth consumption through risk-sharing, and increasing their need 
to rely on self-protection strategies.  
 
1.3.2 Self-protection strategies: savings and assets 
Households can smooth consumption not only across space, but also over time, by saving 
and borrowing, or by accumulating and selling non-financial assets (Bardhan and Udry, 
1999, Dercon, 2005a). Under the assumptions that there are no borrowing constraints and 
that agents are rational forward looking, households seek to keep the marginal utility of 
consumption constant over time. This means that households spread transitory income 
changes over the remaining periods of their life-cycle, and therefore consumption is 
substantially unaffected by these shocks (consumption smoothing). The life-cycle models 
and the permanent income hypothesis capture this behaviour. However, poor households, 
especially in developing countries, may have no access to perfect credit markets, they may 
find it hard to save or be cautious in running down assets to smooth consumption. To 
account for these issues, alternative models are developed that relax some of the assumptions 
of the permanent income hypothesis: models with precautionary savings and/or liquidity 
constraints, and the asset smoothing hypothesis.  
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The permanent income hypothesis 
Consider a consumer who has a total value of financial assets at time t (At), and receives a 
labour income yt. The consumer maximizes his lifetime utility defined as  
  
1
( ) ( ) .
T
t
t
t
U u c E u cττ τ τ
τ
β −
= +
 
= +  
 
∑  (1.5) 
With complete markets, in each period agents may borrow or lend at the interest rate r, so 
that the stock of financial assets evolves according to )1)((1 rcyAA tttt +−+=+ . The 
value function for the agent’s problem is the following: 
  [ ]{ }11 ))(1()()( ++ +−+++=+ tttttttt
c
ttt ycyArVEcuMaxyAV
t
β  (1.6) 
The first order conditions imply that:  
 )()1()( 1'' ++= ttt cEurcu β  (1.7) 
Assuming a quadratic utility function (so that the marginal utility is linear) and 
1)1( =+ rβ , this equation simplifies to  
 1+= tt Ecc  (1.8) 
Equation (1.8) means that the consumption at time t is equal to the expected value of future 
consumption, that is household makes consumption plans such that expected consumption is 
constant (Bardhan and Udry, 1999). 
Since assets must be zero at the end of the last period ( 01 =+TA ), we have also that 
TTT yAc += ; therefore we obtain the intertemporal budget constraint: 
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The discounted value of consumption from t to T equals the value of assets at time t plus 
the expected discounted value of income stream form t to T (Bardhan and Udry, 1999; 
Deaton, 1992). From equations (1.8) and (1.9), and setting T to infinity, we have: 
  ( ) .1 (1 )t t t tt
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r r
τ
τ
τ
∞
−
=
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= + + + 
∑  (1.10) 
This equation describes the main implication of the permanent income hypothesis 
(Deaton, 1992), according to which current consumption is equal to the value of current 
assets plus the expected actual value of the income stream from t to infinity. Equation (1.10) 
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shows that only shocks that affect the household’s expectations about future income 
(permanent shocks) change current consumption, while transitory shocks lead primarily to 
additions to assets or to the use of previously accumulated assets rather than to changes in 
consumption (Friedman, 1957).  
 
To summarize, the assumptions required by this model are (Browning and Lusardi, 1996; 
Deaton, 1992): agents have intertemporally additive utility functions and maximize expected 
utility over an infinite time horizon, they have quadratic preferences, and a constant real 
interest rate equal to the rate of time preference; finally, agents face perfect capital markets. 
Some of these strong assumptions cannot reasonably expect to hold for poor households in 
developing countries (Deaton, 1997), where people face high income risks and credit 
markets are imperfect. Therefore, we now discuss two models that rule out some of the 
assumptions of the permanent income hypothesis, and that may be more appropriate to 
analyze household’s decisions in these contexts.  
 
Precautionary savings 
The precautionary saving model relaxes the assumption that agents have quadratic utility 
functions and assumes that marginal utility is convex. Considering the marginal utility of 
consumption as a “shadow-price” for consumption; “because there is diminishing marginal 
utility of consumption, this price is higher when consumption is low than when it is high. 
[…] It is also reasonable to suppose that the marginal utility of consumption rises more 
rapidly when consumption is low than when it is high”, making then possible to assume the 
convexity of the marginal utility of consumption (Deaton, 1997, p. 361). In the case where 
)(' tt cu  is convex, an increase in the uncertainty of future consumption (i.e. the mean remains 
unchanged but the spread around the mean increases) will increase the expected future value 
of the marginal utility. To keep equality (1.7), the current marginal utility of consumption 
must increase, and hence current consumption will decrease and savings increase. Prudent 
individuals aim to protect themselves against both long term and short-term misfortunes. The 
more individuals are prudent, i.e. the more )(' tt cu  is convex, and the more risky is the 
environment, the more agents save.  
Consider the example of an individual whose expected future income is higher than the 
current one, for example students in medical school (Browning and Lusardi, 1996). As 
shown above, under the permanent income hypothesis, and with quadratic utility functions, 
students will keep their consumption level constant over time, thus borrowing today and 
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saving in the future when their earnings will increase. In the precautionary savings model, 
with convex marginal utility of consumption, prudent students account for the uncertainty of 
future income: they will not borrow today just because future income is expected to be 
higher, but they may increase today savings to deal with future income variability.  
 
Liquidity constraints 
The precautionary saving model maintains the assumption of the permanent income 
hypothesis that capital markets are perfect. Models with liquidity constraints relax this 
hypothesis. Deaton (1991) investigates how households with borrowing constraints are able 
to smooth consumption through the accumulation and use of financial and physical assets. 
Agents are considered impatient, facing liquidity constraints and living for an infinitely 
horizon (a dynasty). Liquidity constraints are accounted for by assuming that borrowing is 
impossible and asset levels must be non-negative in each period. Labour income is uncertain, 
and a precautionary motive for saving is assumed. In this model, the “cash on hand” hold by 
the household at time t is relevant in determining period t consumption. Define xt as “cash on 
hand” (assets plus current income, i.e. ttt yAx += ); the Euler equation for intertemporal 
allocation is given by 
 





+
+
= + )(1
1),(max)( 1''' tttttt cuE
r
xucu δ , (1.11) 
where r  is the interest rate and δ  is the rate of time preference. This equation implies 
that xt is the maximum the household can consume in period t, so that ttt xxfc ≤= )( . This 
means that if the household has no assets accumulated at time t, current consumption cannot 
be higher than current income. 
The main finding of Deaton’s basic model is the following 
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where, with i.i.d. income, *x  is a little lower than mean income. Consumption is equal to 
cash-on- hand if the latter is below the critical value *x ; given the borrowing constraint, this 
implies that household will have no assets in the next period. If *xx ≥ , household saves 
some fraction of cash-on-hand in this way increasing the future level of assets. This is the 
“buffer stock” behaviour: assets are only used to buffer fluctuations in income, and even 
small levels of assets allow households to considerably smooth consumption. 
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It is important to notice that, without uncertainty and borrowing constraints, impatient 
consumers will borrow to increase current consumption. Assuming constraints and prudence 
in the face of uncertain incomes, agents have two motives for accumulating assets in good 
years, even if they are impatient (Deaton, 1991). But they do not save if their wealth is below 
a critical value, becoming vulnerable against negative shocks. Moreover, consumption can 
not be smoothed as a consequence of a series of negative hardships.  
The behaviour resulting from credit constraint and from precautionary saving are similar 
and may not be easily distinguished (Browning and Lusardi, 1996). Liquidity constraints 
reinforce prudent behaviour, since the possibility of binding borrowing constraints in the 
future is an additional reason to accumulate precautionary savings (Deaton, 1992).  
Since credit markets may be underdeveloped in poor economies, especially in rural areas, 
this model may be the relevant one for many households in these countries. However, the 
framework described above does not take into account that the vast majority of people living 
in poor areas do not rely on wage income, rather on farm profits, for which the availability of 
some productive assets becomes crucial. Therefore, we need to consider in more details the 
role of assets in this type of environment.   
 
The role of liquidating productive assets and asset smoothing 
In many developing countries, and in rural areas in particular, assets have more than one 
function: they store wealth, and contribute directly to the income generation process. A 
growing theoretical and empirical literature focuses on the role of assets as buffer stocks in a 
framework in which assets generate income. This leads to a trade off, in the sense that selling 
assets to smooth consumption today could have important implications for future income and 
hence for future consumption. This may lead households, and especially poor households, to 
be more cautious in running down assets in the face of transitory shocks. The use of 
productive assets as buffer stocks was introduced by Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1993). They 
assume that farmers cannot borrow to smooth consumption, that assets (i.e. bullocks, land, 
irrigation equipment) contribute to agricultural production and income, and that earnings are 
stochastic (shocks are both idiosyncratic and common). Farmers decide how many assets to 
purchase maximizing the expected lifetime utility under the constraint that consumption plus 
the purchase of assets must equal farm profits. Moreover, a minimum subsistence 
consumption level is required. Rosenzweig and Wolpin focus on productive assets and 
distinguish them according to their degree of liquidity. Zimmermann and Carter (2003) 
introduce the trade off between productive (see the Rosenzweig and Wolpin’s approach) and 
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unproductive assets (see the Deaton’s model), and focus on their safety and profitability. 
Productive assets (for example land) are risky but high return assets, unproductive ones are 
safe but low-return (for example grain). Households face two choice problems: they have to 
decide how to allocate resources between consumption and assets, and they have to solve the 
portfolio choice problem.  
The key issue of these models is that they capture the trade off between current 
consumption and asset accumulation for future income, and hence for future consumption. 
We present a simplified version of the Zimmermann and Carter’s model to describe the asset 
smoothing approach.  
The production function is defined as: 
 ititvtitvtititit ATDATF µθθθθ σ +⋅= )(),,,(  (1.13) 
where itθ  and vtθ  are individual and common shocks, A and T denote nonproductive and  
productive assets respectively (grain and land), D and σ are productivity parameters, and µ  
is the rate of return on grain. The budget constraint is given by: 
 )()(),,,( 11 ititititTtvtitititt AATTPATFc −−−−≤ ++θθ  (1.14) 
where TtP  is the relative price of the productive asset and the price of A is the numeraire. 
The household maximization problem can be defined in terms of the value function as: 
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β  (1.15) 
where β  is the discount factor. Solving this problem households decide how to allocate 
resources between consumption and assets, and between safe and risky assets. The two basic 
strategies identified by Zimmerman and Carter are: accumulate safe and less profitable assets 
to minimize the fluctuations on assets levels and aim to maintain these levels (asset 
smoothing), choose risky and profitable assets, and use them as buffer to smooth 
consumption (consumption smoothing). Results are supportive of the idea that poor 
households acquire a safe and less remunerative portfolio, and aim to maintain their level of 
assets to preserve their current and future income. They pursue asset smoothing instead of 
consumption smoothing. Consumption and investment strategies are very different for rich 
households. Rich households acquire a high-return portfolio which is used to smooth 
consumption.  
 
Many empirical papers focus on the trade off between the use of productive assets as a 
buffer against shocks and their maintenance for future income and consumption. Fafchamps, 
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Udry and Czukas (1998) find little evidence of livestock sales as a buffer against severe 
rainfall shocks in West Africa: livestock sales compensate only for at most thirty percent of 
village income shocks. Kazianga and Udry (2004) find that households in rural Burkina Faso 
“intentionally destabilized consumption in order to conserve livestock through the drought 
period” (Kazianga and Udry, 2004, p.24); the little consumption smoothing that households 
can do is achieved through savings in grain stocks (non-productive assets). A different result 
comes from Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1993). They show that bullock sales and purchases are 
important in allowing consumption smoothing for Indian households. This may have 
implications for the efficiency of agricultural production, in fact results suggest that poor 
farmers prefer to invest in liquid assets (bullock), and use them to smooth consumpion, than 
to finance irriversible investments (irrigation equipement) even if the latter are more 
profitable. 
Some papers suggest that consumption and asset accumulation strategies vary according 
to the initial level of assets owned by the household, and test whether there exists a threshold 
above and below which asset management strategies bifurcate. Hoddinott (2006) find that 
farmers in Zimbabwe sell livestock to protect consumption (consumption smoothing) only if 
the initial level of livestock is above a given threshold. Otherwise, below that threshold 
households do not sell productive assets and reduce consumption in the face of a shock (asset 
smoothing). Barrett and Carter (2005) find that below a given assets threshold, households 
reduce consumption in order to preserve their stock of assets, while above that threshold 
assets are sold to protect consumption 4. 
This literature suggests that consumption behaviour may be different for households with 
different endowment of assets. This issue will be explored  in detail in chapter three.  
 
1.3.3 Self-protection strategies: income smoothing via labour market  
In a framework in which assets generate income, an implication of the models described 
above is that households may cope with risk by adopting strategies that smooth income 
(Morduch, 1995; Dercon, 2005a). For example they may choose inputs and production 
techniques that reduce variability, and/or diversify income sources (as noted above). These 
                                                 
4
 A further issue related to the use of productive assets as a buffer against shocks is the correlation 
between asset prices and shocks. Productive assets may be sold to a lower price because they are less 
liquid (Fafchamps, 1999), but even if productive assets were perfectly liquid, there could be in any 
case a negative correlation between asset prices and shocks (Zimmerman, 1993). Moreover, when 
assets, livestock for example, are sold in a hurry, the selling price could underestimates their real 
value, especially if markets are not well developed (Fafchamps, Udry and Czukas, 1998). 
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strategies could have long-term consequences, since they emphasize the gap between rich 
and poor and may push poor households into a poverty trap. 
However, households may rely on income-based strategies when a shock occurs (ex 
post), through income earning activities, and in particular labour supply adjustments. There 
is empirical evidence of the use of labour supply as a response to shocks. Kochar (1999) 
finds evidence that farm households in India are able to cope with idiosyncratic crop shocks 
shifting from own-farm to off-farm work. Similarly, Cameron and Worswick (2003) find 
that the extra income generated by the labour supply response to a crop loss is important in 
allowing Indonesian households to avoid reducing consumption expenditure.  
There is a general finding that poor households rely more than rich ones on the labour 
supply response. Maitra (2001) shows that Indian farmers differ in their response to similar 
shocks and in their ability to smooth consumption according to whether they are constrained 
or unconstrained. Farmers with unrestricted access to credit (medium and large farms) deal 
with a shocks using state contingent transfers (for example credit) and without changing their 
leisure and consumption behaviour. Constrained farmers (small farms) with restricted access 
to credit are able to insure consumption against unanticipated income changes only if they 
adjust their market participation in response to the shock (shifting from own-farm to off-farm 
work, hence leaving leisure unaffected).  
This literature suggests that labour supply adjustments may be an important means to 
overcome income shocks, and that its use may differ between poor and non-poor households. 
Chapter three will explore these issues analyzing which variables influence the adoption of 
labour supply responses, and what is the role of this strategy in compensating the income 
reduction due to a specific shock (crop loss). 
 
1.4  The limit to risk coping strategies and policy interventions  
Before turning to data description we want to underline that coping strategies may be 
insufficient in protecting households or they may involve socially inefficient choices, thus 
justifying the need for policy interventions. These issues will not be examined in the thesis, 
but it is important to be aware of their existence and to keep them in mind when reading the 
results of the following chapters.  
The previous paragraphs reviewed several coping strategies available to households. We 
underlined that the effectiveness of these strategies depends on the type of shocks, as well as 
on households’ characteristics. In particular, we pointed out that poor households are 
typically less insured against shocks. Poor households have limited access to credit, they 
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have a low level of savings, and they may be excluded from informal insurance networks. 
The inability to cope with shocks, and the insurance and credit market failure, may result in 
poverty traps (Dercon, 2005b): the poor may have no resources to overcome shocks and the 
shock-induced welfare loss may push households below some poverty threshold. With 
respect to the type of shock, we highlighted that some types of shock may be more difficult 
to insure than others, because of their frequency and intensity, and because they may have 
persistent effects. Asset shocks for example are more likely to lead to long run consequences 
when they affect productive assets or human capital accumulation; a growing literature 
shows that health shocks may have permanent consequences, in particular for children.   
Even when households are able to deal with risk, the risk-management strategies they 
adopt may lead to inefficient choices. This is particularly true for ex ante strategies, and for 
poor households. We discussed this issue with regard to the income smoothing strategies, 
and to the need for precautionary savings. Poor households have to reduce risk (because of 
the lack of means to cope ex post with the shock), and hence they invest in low risk and low 
return activities. The need to use assets to smooth consumption may lead households to 
invest more in liquid assets, even if they have low returns, than in irreversible investments 
with high returns. This is costly in terms of low returns and low future incomes5, and it  may 
lead to risk-induced poverty persistence.  
However, we discussed how the problem of shock-induced inefficient choices can arise 
also with ex post strategies; for example requiring children to drop out of school or to work 
may have long-term consequence and be socially inefficient. Moreover,  productive assets 
may be sold to insure consumption, and this leads to future lower incomes.  
The cost of risk in terms of persistent poverty, long term consequences and social 
inefficient choices justifies the need for public interventions. Dercon (2005b) points out that 
“a key objective for the provision of insurance against poverty is to make sure that risk is not 
a reason for persistent poverty, by ensuring that uninsured risk does not force the poor to 
invest in activities and assets of low profitability to limit their own exposure to risk” 
(Dercon, 2005b, p. 9). Dercon classifies the policy interventions between ex ante and ex post 
measures. The former aims to support the households’ ability to protect themselves against 
shocks. They may be accomplished for example through measures that support saving 
behaviour and improve the access to credit. Ex post policies are safety net programs, like 
                                                 
5
 As suggested by  Fafchamps (1999), precautionary savings are often liquid and not very productive. 
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emergency food assistance, employment guarantee schemes, and publicly funded health care 
for the indigent (Barrett and McPeak, 2006)6. 
 
1.6 Evidence about shocks and coping strategies in the Indonesia Family 
Life Survey 
1.5.1 General description 
This dissertation uses the Indonesia Family Life Survey data, in particular the 1993 round 
(IFLS1). In 1993, about 7200 households were interviewed in 13 provinces representing 
83% of the Indonesian population. Indonesia is a country with a high variation in culture, 
geography and economic conditions. The relevant feature of the IFLS sample is that the 13 
provinces included in the survey are able to capture this heterogeneity. The IFLS is 
extremely rich and contains detailed information on a variety of topics at the individual, 
household, and community level. For each IFLS1 household, representative members 
(typically the household heads) provided household-level demographic and economic 
information, such as household composition, incomes, assets, savings, expenditures, and the 
value of household consumables that were self-produced. In addition, several household 
members aged 15 and older (the household’s head and the spouse if present, and up to three 
other members randomly selected) were asked to provide detailed individual information on 
a variety of topics, including education, employment, time allocation, marital history, 
migration, health, individual assets and non labour income. Another section provides child 
information (education and health) and was administered to selected children aged 0-147.  
In the 1993 questionnaire a specific section on household economic shocks was presented 
to collect information on whether the household had experienced an economic hardship in 
the past five years, the type of shock, when it happened (year and month), what measures 
were taken and the costs of overcoming it. Six types of shock are analyzed in the IFLS 
dataset:  
 
                                                 
6
 Safety net must be designed in order to avoid negative externalities; these programs may incentive 
participants to leave their informal risk sharing arrangements, with negative consequences for the 
other households in the network (Dercon, 2005a). 
7
 The second wave of IFLS was fielded in 1997 (IFL2), and the third wave in 2000 (IFLS3). About 
90% of all the IFSL1 individuals were re-interviewed in 1997, and all household members aged 15 or 
older were interviewed individually. In each wave of IFLS, a community survey is added to the 
individual and household questionnaires (see Frankenberg and Karoly (1995) and Frankenberg and 
Thomas (2000) for a description of the surveys). We prefer to use the 1993 round because it gives 
more complete information on shocks and individual labour income, and to compare our results with 
that of other studies that use the 1993 round (for example Cameron and Worswick, 2003) 
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• death of a household member 
• sickness of a household member  
• crop loss 
• household or business loss due to a disaster 
• unemployment of a household member 
• fall in the price of crop. 
We noted in paragraph 1.2 that different types of shock involve different coping 
strategies. From this point of view it is useful to note that death and sickness are clearly 
demographic shocks, while the remaining four categories represent economic shocks. Crop 
loss and price falls are expected to be common shocks, death and sickness are usually 
considered as idiosyncratic hardships. This is only a general distinction: as mentioned above 
each shock may have both a common and idiosyncratic component, and households 
characteristics may influence the probability of experiencing the shock. 
The 1993 round provides information also on the measures adopted to cope with the 
shocks. The survey allows us to distinguish six possible risk-coping mechanisms:  
• extra job 
• loan (including a loan from families or friends) 
• asset sale (sale of next harvest, food supply, cattle/poultry, jewelry, other assets) 
• family assistance 
• use savings 
• cuts expenditure. 
This dissertation focuses on rural households and the database used in this chapter 
includes only those households that supplied a complete set of income and demographic 
data. After dropping income outliers (about 1% of the total sample) the sample reduces to 
3601 rural households interviewed in 1993. Description of survey questionnaires, selected 
variables definition and the construction of household income and other main variables are 
shown in appendix A. In table 1.2 we show some descriptive statistics for the sample that we 
will use in the following sections of this chapter.   
In the rural Indonesia, more than half of households (58%) own a farm, 30% own a non 
farm business, and the majority of households’ heads work as self employed (60%) (see table 
1.2)8. Nearly a third of heads have a second job, and nearly half of Indonesian rural 
households have at least one adult income earner other than the head. The level of education 
                                                 
8
 The households in which the head is private worker/employee (about one out of three) have an 
household income that is statistically higher than that of households with a self-employed head. 
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is in general low: the average years of school completed by the household head are about 4 
years, where the length of the primary school in Indonesia is 6 years; the average education 
is even lower for female heads. Households have on average more than four members, two 
of whom have less than 18 years of age.   
 
Table 1.2 
Means of Household Characteristics 
 Weighted 
means 
Standard 
errors 
Farm ownership 0.58 0.01 
Business ownership 0.30 0.01 
1992 value of farm assets (excluding zeroes) 5785.46 398.86 
1992 value of business assets (excluding zeroes) 1497.77 389.53 
1992 value of non-business assets (excluding zeroes) 5112.58 520.86 
Household income 1012.98 28.66 
Age household head 46.47 0.27 
Head inactive 0.11 0.01 
Head employee 0.28 0.01 
Head self employed 0.60 0.01 
Head family worker 0.01 0.00 
Head has second job 0.27 0.008 
Head years of school completed 3.73 0.07 
Household size 4.36 0.04 
# of household members aged 0 to 5 0.61 0.01 
# of household members aged 6 to 17 1.25 0.02 
# of household members aged 18 to 64 2.26 0.20 
# of household members aged over 64 0.24 0.01 
# of income earners (other than head) 0.68 0.02 
# of male adults unschooled 0.17 0.01 
# of female adults unschooled 0.39 0.01 
# of male adults with primary education 0.65 0.01 
# of female adults with primary education 0.67 0.01 
# of male adults with secondary education 0.26 0.01 
# of female adults with secondary education 0.16 0.01 
# of male adults with high education 0.02 0.00 
# of female adults with high education 0.01 0.00 
The table reports the main characteristics of Indonesian rural households. 
Income, assets and expenditure are in thousands of rupiah. 
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The following paragraphs will examine whether the type of shock and household’s 
characteristics (wealth indicators in particular) affect the propensity to experience and report 
the shocks, the households’ ability and the cost to overcome them, and the different 
measures adopted. As pointed out in the previous sections, poor and rich households may 
differ in their exposure to risk and in their ability to insure against its effects; moreover 
different types of shock may be associated with different responses and different economic 
damages.  
 
1.5.2  Self-reported shocks and household characteristics 
To understand the extent to which shocks occur in the Indonesian rural context, table 1.3 
shows the number (and percentages) of households reporting different number of shocks. It 
must be noted that when a household experienced the same type of shock more than once 
over the last five years, only one event is reported in the dataset; this allows us to capture 
only the cross-sectional frequencies. As pointed out by Newhouse (2003), there are no 
information on which shock is reported in the case of multiple occurrences, but the 
frequencies increase as we get close to the survey’s year (1993); this suggests that recent 
shocks are more likely to be reported. 
About one household out of three (1216 households) experienced at least one shock in the 
five years reporting period (table 1.3). Not all the shocks are equally frequent (see table 1.4): 
the most frequent ones are sickness and crop loss (9.4% and 15.4% respectively), whereas 
business loss due to a disaster and unemployment affect only a few households (1.6% and 
2% respectively). It is worth noting that if we restrict the attention on farm households 
(defined as those who reported to own a farm business and at least a farm asset) about a 
fourth of them experienced a crop loss in the last five years.  
 
Table 1.3 
Number of shocks reported (previous 5 years) 
# shocks # households Weighted percentages 
0 2,385 67.39 
1 913 24.92 
2 244 6.21 
3 52 1.34 
more than 3 
 
7 
 
0.08 
 
The table reports the number of shocks experienced by Indonesian rural households 
during the five years prior to the interview 
 
 
 
 
at least one 
shock 1216 32.61 
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Table 1.4 
Reported household shocks, by type of shocks (previous 5 years)9 
Commonality of the shock10 
Type of shock # households 
Weighted 
percentages 
weighted mean weighted median 
Death 284 7.02 4.74 (0.33) 3.57 
Sickness 376 9.40 5.99 (0.44) 3.85 
Crop loss 561 15.40 8.86 (0.82) 6.89 
Disaster 63 1.60 4.38 (0.38) 3.70 
Unemployment 65 1.99 3.96 (0.24) 3.57 
Fall in price of 
crop 239 6.57 
6.10 
(0.62) 3.85 
The table reports the number of households, and the percentage of all households 
sampled, reporting shocks of each type over the five year period 1989-93. The 
commonality of the shock is defined as the percentage of households reporting the 
same shock in the same village in 1993. Standard errors are in parenthesis 
 
As noted above, an important characteristic of the shock is the extent to which it is 
common or idiosyncratic. Crop loss and price falls are expected to be more common than 
demographic shocks, even if each shock may have an idiosyncratic component, both in the 
probability of experiencing the shock, and in the extent of its effects. Looking at the 
percentage of households that experienced the same shocks in the same village in 1993 
(fourth column of table 1.4), we can see that crop loss is the most common shock, even if the 
percentage is quite small. However, it has to be underlined that this commonality variable 
may be biased because only one occurrence of the same shocks is reported.  
 
The occurrence and report of shocks may depend on household’s characteristics. Some 
households may be more vulnerable against certain hardships, or less likely to report the 
shocks they experience. Looking at the frequencies of various shocks by household’s wealth 
(per capita expenditure tercile), shown in table 1.5, we can observe however that the 
weighted percentages do not differ markedly except for sickness (for poor households) and 
disaster. With respect to the incidence of the former, the finding that poor households are 
less likely to experience/report a sickness may be unexpected if we believe that the 
probability of experiencing a sickness depends on household’s economic/sanitary conditions, 
                                                 
9
 The final sample consists of 3601 rural households. 
10
 Villages with no households reporting shocks are excluded from the median and the mean. 
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which are typically worse for poor households. To explore this idea we estimated a logit 
model to test whether these characteristics (the main flooring type used in the house, the 
main water source for drinking and cooking, where the household drain its sewage) affect the 
probability of having a sickness in 1993 (controlling for other household and village 
variables). Results are not supportive of this hypothesis. Moreover, the probability of 
experiencing this type of shock may be related to the number of children and old members in 
the household. The Pearson chi-squared tests reject the hypothesis of independence between 
having a sickness in 1993, and the number of children in the house (aged 0-5 and 6-11), as 
well as having a sickness and the number of members older than 64. These are higher in poor 
than in rich households, and this should lead to the opposite finding of the one reported in 
table 1.5.  
There may be however other elements behind this result. First, rich households may be 
more likely than poor households to report a sickness for several reasons. Sickness is 
associated with direct and indirect costs, mainly medical expenses and the reduction in 
earned incomes (Gertler and Gruber, 2002). This reduction may occur because the sick 
householder is an income earner, or because there is need for a care-giver at home, and the 
care-giver is an income earner. The higher is the earned income that is lost, the higher is the 
indirect cost of sickness (opportunity cost), and the higher could be the reporting probability. 
As suggested by Newhouse (2003), another possible explanation for the finding that the 
frequency of reported sickness is higher for rich households than for the poor is that the IFLS 
survey asked to report  a health shocks that requires hospitalization or continuous treatment. 
Higher income households are clearly more likely to report such a shocks. 
Moreover, there is consistent evidence in the literature that not only wealthier but also 
more educated households are more likely to report sickness (Newhouse, 2003; Schultz and 
Tansel, 1997). IFLS data show that the estimated proportion of households that report a 
sickness is significantly lower if the head is unschooled or if he/she did not complete the 
primary school. Since the number of households with head illiterate is higher for poor than 
for non-poor households, the former have a lower probability to report sickness, thus 
confirming the result in tale 1.5. 
With respect to the incidence of business loss due to a disaster, the probability of 
reporting this type of shock (the questionnaire asked for events that caused an economic 
damage) may be related to the economic value of the business: the higher is the value of 
business, the higher is the economic damage and the higher could be the probability of 
reporting the shock. Households in the top third of the expenditure distribution have a 
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significant higher weighted mean of business profit than households in the bottom or in the 
middle third, and this could explain why the number of households reporting a business loss 
(“disaster”) is higher for rich than for poor households. 
Similarly, large farms or households whose income strongly depends on the farm 
business may have a higher propensity to report a crop loss. Data do not support this 
hypothesis. Focusing on the farm sample, there are not significant differences in the 
frequencies of reported crop loss by the size of the farm (tercile of 1992 farm assets) and by 
the share of farm profit on total income.  
 
Table 1.5 
Reported Household Shock Experience, by Per capita consumption 
(PCC) tercile, 1989-93 
Weighted percentages Type of shock Bottom third  Middle third Top third 
Death 6.9 6.8 7.3 
Sickness 6.8* 9.9 11.8 
Crop loss 16.5 15.1 14.5 
Disaster 0.3* 1.7* 2.9* 
Unemployment 2.1 2.2 1.7 
Price falls 7.1 5.7 6.9 
The table reports the number of shocks experienced by Indonesian rural 
households during the five years prior to the interview, by per capita 
consumption tercile 
* the difference in the mean is statistically significant at the 5% level 
 
1.5.3  The economic cost of the shocks 
As noted in paragraph 1.2, beside the frequency, the intensity is another important feature 
of shocks. We discussed above that some shocks are more frequent than others. We now 
present some data on the economic cost of the shock. The 1993 survey of IFLS reports the 
cost of overcoming each type of shock, estimated by the household’s head. The variable is 
summarized in Table 1.6, for the five year period 1989-93. Leaving aside business loss due 
to a disaster and unemployment (which affect only a few households), the most costly shocks 
are the demographic ones: weighted means are 460 and 560 thousands of rupiah for death 
and sickness respectively, whereas the cost of crop loss and price falls are about 300 and 
260. The difference in the medians is less marked, but the contrast persists.  
Since the same absolute costs may have a completely different incidence on households’ 
economic situation and since we have seen that wealthier households are more likely to 
report a sickness, in the last column of table 1.6 we present also the medians of the ratio 
between the economic costs and the 1993 household income. In terms of the percentage of 
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household income spent to overcome shocks, crop loss is actually costlier than sickness. The 
implication is a greater proportional incidence of crop loss for poor households. 
Table 1.6 
Cost of Overcoming  Shocks (shocks previous 5yrs) 
 
Thousand rupiahs 
 
#  
households 
Weighted 
mean 
Weighted 
median 
1993 cost/1993 
household income 
( weighted 
median) 
Death 258 464.8 230 63.5 
Sickness 354 561.6 200 17.8 
Crop loss 500 309.5 125 29.4 
Disaster 58 972.4 200 30.0 
Unemployment 55 584.0 225 18.9 
Price falls 200 258.0 100 17.1 
The table reports the self-reported cost of overcoming different types of shocks 
experienced during the five years prior to the interview 
 
In interpreting these findings, one should keep in mind that survey respondents may not 
correctly report the costs of the shock, and there are missing values (the percentage of 
missing values varies from about 6% for sickness to about 16% for price falls). Moreover, 
the interpretation of this cost variable is not simple. As noted in paragraph 1.2, shocks may 
have both direct effects (in terms of lost income or destruction of assets) and indirect ones, as 
a result of the coping measures adopted11. It is not clear whether households report only the 
direct costs or also the indirect ones.  
Because of the problems in interpreting the self-reported cost of the shocks and possible 
measurement errors in the declared values, we will not use this variable in the dissertation. 
We will estimate in each chapter the appropriate cost of the shock which is relevant for the 
decisions we will explore.   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
11
 Direct costs may be, for example, the medical expenditures related to health shocks. Data provide 
evidence that households that report a sickness in 1993 have a mean value of 1993 medical 
expenditures  about five times larger than the mean value of those who did not report a sickness. 
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1.5.4  Risk coping strategies 
As noted in the literature review, risk coping strategies vary with the type of shock 
(demographic or economic, idiosyncratic or common) and with household’s characteristics 
(poor households may differ from rich households in their responses to shocks). This section 
examines data on households responses to shocks, differentiating for types of shocks and 
household’s wealth.  
Tables 1.7 and 1.8 report the weighted frequencies of responses to shocks by types of 
shock and by household’s per capita consumption tercile. Percentages do not add up to 100 
because households may choose more than one measure to cope with the same shock. Table 
1.8 does not report disaster and unemployment shocks because there are only few 
observations.  
Table 1.7 
Shock Responses, 1989-1993 
 Death Sickness Crop loss Disaster Unemployment Price falls 
Extra job 14.4% 13.9% 43.5% 19.4% 37.2% 39.0% 
Take loan 24.3% 30.9% 21.6% 23.2% 27.4% 16.4% 
Sell assets 32.5% 36.9% 21.0% 37.2% 8.7% 19.0% 
Family assistance 33.4% 22.0% 8.0% 7.9% 29.0% 4.6% 
Use savings 13.3% 14.6% 3.4% 5.2% 4.1% 3.3% 
Cut down on 
household expenses 4.9% 7.9% 19.9% 22.3% 15.7% 32.0% 
The table summarizes the percentages of those households which experienced each type of 
shock who identify each response mode. Because of multiple responses, percentages sum to 
more than 100% 
 
Looking at table 1.7 some interesting facts emerge. The first regards the use of labour as 
an insurance mechanism in the face of economic shocks (crop loss and price falls in 
particular): nearly half of households that experience a crop loss respond with the labour 
supply, in line with the findings of other papers (Cameron and Worswick, 2003). This 
strategy is less well used to cope with demographic shocks: table 1.7 shows that only about 
14% of households reporting sickness or death, change their labour supply choices. As noted 
in paragraph 1.2, the reason could be that these shocks may reduce the labour force both 
directly (when the sick household member is the income earner) and indirectly (through the 
need for domestic labour to take care of sick household members).  
Households may cope with shocks by taking loans: data suggest that this measure is 
important for Indonesian rural household and its use does not vary according to the type of 
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the shock. Family assistance (which includes receiving money and/or assistance in the form 
of goods from family or friends) is an important mean to overcome death, sickness and 
unemployment of a household member, while it is marginal as a response to crop loss, 
business loss due to a disaster, and price falls. A similar pattern emerges for the sale of 
assets, even if in this case its role in coping with economic shocks is not so marginal12. A 
possible explanation, as suggested by the literature and as pointed out in the previous 
paragraphs, could be that informal risk-sharing strategies and asset sales are able to protect 
against idiosyncratic shocks, but provide little insurance against common shocks (when all 
households in the same village try to sell assets, their prices fall).  
The last issue regards the role of savings and expenditure cut. Savings are more used to 
cope with demographic than with common shocks, even if the percentage of households that 
use this measure is in general low. Cut down on household expenses follows the opposite 
pattern: 20% and 30% of households reporting a crop loss and a price fall respectively 
reduce consumption in the face of such shocks. The percentage is much lower for 
demographic shocks (between 5% and 8%), suggesting that consumption is better protected 
against these hardships.  
The coping strategies adopted depend not only of the type of shocks, but on households’ 
characteristics as well. Focusing on the distinction between poor and non-poor (defined on 
the basis on per-capita consumption), table 1.8 shows that poor households are more likely to 
use the labour supply response to cope with economic hardships (as pointed out by other 
authors, Cameron and Worswick, 2003, Newhouse, 2003, Maitra, 2001), whereas rich 
households are more likely to use savings, sell assets and take a loan.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12
 The variable “selling assets” is constructed aggregating the following measures reported in the 
questionnaire: selling next harvest in advance (below market value), food (rice) supply, cattle/poultry, 
jewelry, and other assets. Future research may consider to disaggregate the single measures, and to 
examine the different behaviour of productive and non productive assets, liquid and non-liquid assets, 
as suggested by the literature reported in the previous sections.  
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Table 1.8 
Shock Responses, 1989-1993, by PCC tercile 
PCC in bottom/middle/top  
third Death Sickness Crop loss Price falls 
7.7 20.0 48.3 45.6 
20.7* 14.6 48.6 42.4 Extra job % 
15.1 10.1 32.0** 28.7** 
24.0 35.2 18.4 19.7 
25.9 35.9 19.5 13.5 Take loan % 
23.1 23.9* 27.8* 15.3 
30.8 28.0 22.3 20.8 
30.1 35.8 20.2 19.8 Sell assets % 
36.3 43.5** 20.3 16.4 
40.8 23.8 7.8 1.6 
30.0 20.7 7.1 2.7 Family assistance % 
29.0 21.9 9.2 9.6* 
13.8 10.4 1.7 0.0 
6.5** 11.3 1.2 2.2 Use savings % 
19.3 20.2** 8.0** 7.8** 
5.1 6.4 15.8 28.3 
6.9 7.7 22.8 32.1 Cut down on household 
expenses % 2.7 9 21.8 35.9 
The table summarizes the percentages of those households which experienced each 
type of shock who identify each response mode, by per capita consumption tercile.  
** the difference in the means is statistically significant at the 5% level 
* the difference in the means is statistically significant at the 10% level 
 
 
The definition of poor and non poor households is a crucial aspect in the context of the 
thesis’ theme. Rural households may be poor in terms of income, but relatively rich in terms 
of wealth (wealth is defined as the difference between the value of assets and liabilities 
owned by the household, UNECE et al., 2007). Current income is often a poor-proxy for 
long-run resources, while wealth measures are important to understand household economic 
well-being dimension (Juster et al, 1999; Mishra et al., 2004; UNECE et al., 2007). For 
example, some households may have low incomes and relatively high wealth because their 
incomes are only temporarily low. In the presence of sufficiently developed capital and 
insurance markets, assets owned by the household significantly affect the stringency of the 
households’ liquidity constraints (as suggested by Deaton, 1992). In the context of 
developing economies, this may not happen because credit markets often fail. Moreover, 
many rural households own assets not only to accumulate wealth, but also to provide the 
basis for generating income. In this framework, households with a low level of assets may 
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aim to maintain that level, and their consumption behaviour may be more sensitive to current 
income than to wealth.  
In the descriptive analysis of this chapter we used per capita consumption to identify poor 
and non poor households. In chapter two and four we estimate permanent income as a proxy 
for household’s wealth, while chapter three focuses on farm households, and defines poor 
and non poor households on the basis of their level of farm assets (as a measure of wealth 
and a proxy for credit constraints)13.  
 
1.7 Conclusions  
Indonesian households, as in many developing countries, have volatile incomes 
(Newhouse, 2003), especially in rural areas where household economy is highly dependent 
on  family business (mainly farm business). In a framework in which insurance and credit 
markets are less developed, and incomes are typically low, risk may lead to inefficient 
economic choices. This chapter discussed households’ behaviour in the face of risk, on the 
basis of both the review of the literature and the analysis of Indonesian data.  
The theoretical framework that underlines the analysis is an intertemporal model of 
consumption and asset investment choices, that accounts for the fact that poor households, 
especially in developing countries, may have no access to perfect credit markets, and they 
may find it hard to save. Moreover, the vast majority of people living in poor areas do not 
rely on wage income, rather on farm profits, for which the availability of some productive 
assets becomes crucial.  
Both the literature review and the descriptive analysis of Indonesian data, presented in the 
second part of this chapter, highlight that household responses to shocks depend on the 
nature of the shock (whether demographic or economic, idiosyncratic or common,…), and 
on household characteristics. For example, the most frequent shocks reported by Indonesian 
households are sickness of a household member and crop loss; crop loss is also the most 
common one, in terms of the percentage of households that experienced the same shocks in 
the same year in the same village. Households responses to these hardships are quite 
different: for example, households are less likely to use the labour supply response to cope 
with health shocks because they may affect the ability of the households to provide labour. 
More generally, family assistance and asset sale are important means to overcome 
                                                 
13
 Since poverty is a multi-dimensional phenomenon, another dimension that is really important in 
identifying poor versus non poor households is human capital owned by members of the household. 
However, in this thesis we adopt a more restrictive definition of poverty which focuses on economic 
conditions. 
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demographic shocks, while they are marginal as a response to economic hardships. On the 
other hand, households are more likely to take an extra job to cope with economic shocks. 
Relatively few households draw down savings as a coping strategy, and the percentage is 
even lower for economic shocks, in the face of which a higher percentage of households cut 
expenditure. The link between types of hardships, households’ characteristics and coping 
strategies will be explored in detail in chapter two.  
A characteristic that has important consequences on the way in which households respond 
to shocks is clearly household’s wealth (and the presence of liquidity constraints that may be 
related to it). Indonesian data shows that poor and non-poor households differ in the choices 
of coping strategies: the former are more likely to use the labour supply response, while rich 
households are more likely to sell assets (for demographic shocks) and to use savings. This 
result is in line with the finding of the theoretical and empirical literature that when liquidity 
constraints are binding, households need to rely on autarchic savings, both to build a buffer 
stock of assets and to self-finance profitable investments. This implies that households below 
a certain threshold of assets reduce consumption in order to preserve their stock of assets, 
while above that threshold assets are sold to protect consumption. Chapter three will focus 
on consumption/saving behaviour of poor and non-poor households in the face of a specific 
shock (crop loss), investigating whether households follow a consumption smoothing 
strategy or the need to accumulate assets prevails. 
The final point highlighted in this chapter is that the need to reduce risk and to build a 
buffer stock may be costly in terms of low returns and low future incomes (safe assets have 
typically low returns, and precautionary savings are often liquid and not very productive, as 
suggested by Fafchamps, 1999). This addresses another important issue highlighted in the 
literature: whether shocks and the coping strategies adopted to overcome them cause long-
run effects. This may happen also when children are withdrawn from school in the face of 
shocks, since they may not be able to restart school or to recover the educational gap: in this 
way temporary schooling interruptions have lasting impacts. This issue will be explored in 
chapter four, looking at the effects of both ex ante risk and ex post shocks on child 
education.  
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Models for Non-Exclusive Multinomial Choice, 
with Application to Indonesian Rural Households 
 
 
 
 
2.1  Introduction 
Textbook discussions of discrete choice modelling focus on binomial and multinomial 
choice models in which agents select a single response. We consider the situation of non-
exclusive multinomial choice. One possibility, extensively used in the sociology literature, is 
to adopt the so-called Marginal Logit Model (MLM) which posits an independent binomial 
model for each choice (Agresti and Liu, 1999). The MLM is simple to compute but it has 
two disadvantages: it allows the possibility of null response which may not always be 
realistic, and, in a way which we will make clear below, it models choice outcomes rather 
than the choice process. We propose two alternative models which require at least one 
response and give rise to estimates which are interpretable within the standard stochastic 
utility framework. 
 
The analysis of the way uncertainty affects poor households, and their responses to this 
uncertainty, is a key issue in developing countries. We apply the choice models that we 
develop to the responses of Indonesian rural households to demographic and economic 
shocks. The structure of the interviews from which we take our data requires a shock to have 
a response. While the majority of shocks elicit only a single response, some shock instances 
elicit multiple responses. It appears that multiple responses are to a large extent associated 
with particular interviewers employed in the survey process. 
 
We develop two models. In the first and simpler specification, choices are modelled as 
sequential: a household first chooses the number of responses to a specific shock, and then 
the specific choices are identified to maximize household utility conditional on the former 
Chapter 2 
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choice. In our particular case, we may think of the interviewer as selecting the number of 
responses and the interviewee identifying the particular responses. In the second 
specification, we generalize the standard multinomial logit model by supposing that agents 
will choose more than one response if the utility they derive from other choices is “close” to 
that of the utility-maximizing choice. In effect, this supposes selection of a utility 
maximizing band, which will contain at least one choice but may contain more than one. 
This specification makes choice of the number of responses joint with choice of the 
particular responses. We believe this will generally be the most realistic specification. 
 
The chapter is organized into eight sections. The second reviews how the literature treats 
non-exclusive multinomial choice and presents the models we propose. The third section 
reviews how households cope with shocks and why coping strategies may have long run 
negative consequences. Section four and five discuss the data and the empirical 
methodology. Section six presents empirical results, and section seven tests the model 
specification. The final section concludes.  
 
2.2  Non-exclusive multinomial choice 
The standard multiple choice model is posed in terms of maximization of a random utility 
function. Our application is to adjustment to shocks. Any such adjustment imposes costs. We 
adapt the random utility framework by modelling choice as resulting from minimization of a 
random cost function. We suppose that households may experience one of a number S  ≥ 1 of 
shocks and respond to each shock experienced from a choice set comprising M ≥ 2 of 
adjustment modes. Our data, in which all responses are available for all shock types, 
therefore allow a total of MS shock-response pairs. 
Interviewees are asked to report which responses did they make, not by how much they 
responded for each possible response. In a neoclassical framework it is natural to suppose 
that all “consumptions” (i.e. all goods that enter the utility function) will adjust to shocks 
since these affect the marginal utility of money and hence disturb the entire set of first order 
conditions. However, in our data many interviewees report one or only a few response 
modes. The survey results can be interpreted in either of two ways: 
a) agents report the single or the few most important responses because this is how the 
interview is structured or interpreted by the interviewer, even though other responses are non 
zero 
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b) discreteness of choices or fixed costs of adjustment imply that some responses are 
not made.  
Let us interpret the adjustment cost in terms of fixed costs. In the extreme case in which 
there are high fixed costs, respondents would choose only a single response mode, the one 
that minimize such costs. If fixed costs are not high, and marginal utilities change 
substantially when households adjust consumptions (i.e. the second derivatives of the utility 
function are large), it may make sense to make multiple adjustments (making one large 
adjustment may be worse than making two small adjustments because of the curvature of the 
utility function).   
The resulting optimization problem is complicated. There are two sets of optimality 
conditions. The first requires marginal utilities to be proportional to prices for each mode in 
which a positive adjustment is made. This determines the size of the adjustment conditional 
on the adjustment mode being selected. The second condition relates to the choice of 
adjustment modes, given that the scale of the adjustments determined by the first condition. 
This defines a discrete choice problem with the complication that the characteristics of each 
choice depend on the other choices made.   
We do not observe the size of adjustments and so we are unable to investigate the first 
optimality condition. We therefore simply look at the second condition. Write chms for the 
cost of adjustment mode m to shock s for household h. These costs, which may be 
interpreted as the fixed costs of adjustment, will depend on a vector xh of household 
characteristics. There are H households in the sample. Following the random utility 
approach, we assume that adjustment costs have a deterministic and a stochastic component 
and write 
 .hms hms hmsc f ε= +                      (2.1) 
The household chooses its adjustment mode(s) to minimize adjustment costs. Satisfaction 
of the budget constraint forces at least one response. Standard microeconomic theory 
suggests that it will be optimal for the household to make multiple responses such that 
marginal adjustment cost is equalized across modes. Either discreteness (for example, in 
taking an extra job) or fixed costs may result in zero adjustment in one or more modes.  
 
Multinomial logit 
This model is appropriate for data which only permit a single response. Write 1hmsr = if 
household h chooses response {1, 2,..., }m M∈  in response to a shock of type s. Define 
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( )Pr 1|hms hms hp r x= =  as the probability that response m is the cost-minimizing response to 
shock s. For simplicity, focus on the first response ph1s.  Henceforth, we omit the shock 
subscript s where this does not result in ambiguity. Ignoring the possibility of ties 
 ( ) ( )1 1 1Pr 1 Pr , 2,.., |h h h hm hp r c c m M x= = = < =  (2.2) 
and similarly for the remaining M-1 choices. Following Domencich and McFadden 
(1975) assume that the stochastic cost components εhm follows an extreme value (Gnedenko) 
distribution. Then hm hm hmc f= + ε  also has the same distribution as does the cost of the 
minimizing choice * {1,.., }minh m M hmc c∈= . Hence the probabilities phm are logistic:  
 ( )
1 1
1,2,..,
hm
hj
f
hm
hm M Mf
hj
j j
aep m M
e a
−
−
= =
= = =
∑ ∑
 (2.3) 
where ( )1,2,..,hmfhma e m M−= = . (The minus signs reflect the fact that we are 
minimizing costs rather than maximizing utilities as in the standard random utility model). 
 
The Marginal Logit Model 
In many circumstances it will be possible for agents to have multiple responses. The 
simplest approach is to consider the marginal probability of choosing each response:  
 
1 1
hm
hm
f
hm
hm f
hm
aep
e a
−
−
= =
+ +
 (2.4) 
This is the Marginal Logit Model (MLM) of Agresti and Liu (1999) – see also Loughin 
and Scherer (1998), Agresti (2003, chapter 11) and Liu and Agresti (2005). Marginalization 
allows us to estimate the probability of each response separately.  
 
Although authors are not explicit in this regard, the MLM is best seen as a reduced form 
model responding to the question “Which responses are selected?” rather than a structural 
model responding to the question “Which responses do respondents select?” To see the 
difference between these two questions, note that there are 2M-1 distinct sets of non-null 
choices from M elements. The answer to the former question is obtained from an H by M 
matrix of zeros and ones for each of the household-response pairs, while the answer to the 
latter question derives from a matrix of H by 2M-1 matrix of zeros and ones, with a single 
one in each row corresponding to each of the possible response sets available to each 
household. Because the questions are different, the likelihoods are also different – the MLM 
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likelihood is the likelihood of the vectors of responses while the structural likelihood is that 
of the household choices. 
 
Despite the fact that the standard interpretation of the MLM is in terms of marginal 
probabilities, it is possible to give the model a structural interpretation in terms of stochastic 
utility theory. To see this, suppose that respondents compare the cost chm of adopting 
response m with a benchmark cost 0 0 0h h hc f= + ε  where the stochastic element εh0 also 
follows an extreme value distribution. The MLM specification (2.4) results if the fixed cost 
component fhm is identically zero.   
 
In what follows, we develop two models that account for non-exclusive and dependent 
multiple responses: a Poisson model and a threshold model, which both generalize the 
random utility approach. The Poisson model supposes that the household makes a sequential 
decision, first choosing the number ( )#h hm = Ω  of responses to a shock, and then 
identifying the best (i.e. cost-minimizing) mh response, i.e. the set hΩ  conditional on this 
choice mh. By contrast, the threshold model supposes that the number mh of responses is an 
outcome of the response identification decision.  
 
The Poisson-Multinomial Model14 
The survey design obliges households to identify at least one response to any shock. 
Hence the number mh of responses is a non-zero integer: { }1, 2,..,hm M∈ . If 1hm −  
follows a Poisson process with mean ( )h hxµ = µ , where the unit displacement reflects the 
impossibility of a null response, we may write 
 ( )
( ) ( )
( )
1
Pr |
1 !
hh mx
h
h h
h
e x
m x
m
−
−µ µ
=
−
 (2.5) 
Consider first the case in which mh = 1 and response j is selected. In the logit framework 
                                                 
14
 There exists a literature on so-called multinomial-Poisson models in which individuals make 
multiple responses across a range of response modes. An example is transport mode frequencies for 
different transport modes in which households may use different modes on different occasions – see 
Terza and Wilson (1990). These models replace the multinomial response probabilities with Poisson 
frequencies. Our models adopt the polar opposite case in which responses remain categorical but the 
number of responses is variable and is modelled as Poisson. 
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Combining equations (2.5) and (2.6) 
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 (2.7) 
where hh e
−µθ = .  
 
Turning to the case in which mh = 2 with responses i and  j selected, we need to consider 
the probability that j is the overall cost minimizing choice and that i is the next best, and the 
converse situation in which i is the overall cost minimizing choice and that j is the next best. 
Following the derivation shown in Appendix 2B, the probability of choosing responses i and 
j given that mh = 2 is given by: 
 { }( )
1 1 1
1 1Pr , | . .hi hj h hh h hij M M M
hm hm hj hm hi
m m m
a a
i j x p
a a a a a
= = =
 
 θ µ
 Ω = = = +
    
− −    
    
∑ ∑ ∑
 (2.8) 
The argument is similar in the case that three responses are selected - see Appendix 2B.  
 
The Threshold Multinomial Model 
As previously, let Ωh be the set of responses made by household h to a particular shock. 
We generalize the random utility framework by introducing a household-specific threshold 
( ) 0h ht t x= ≥ . Within this framework, the household may choose the first response to 
shock s either because this is the cost-minimizing choice or because one of the other choices 
is cost-minimizing but the cost of the first choice is sufficiently close.  
 
First consider households which make a single response. Define 
 { }( )1 Pr 1h hp = Ω =  
To fix ideas, consider the case in which 1 2 ...h h hMc c c≤ ≤ ≤ . If { }1hΩ = , it must be the 
case that response 2 is not “close” to response 1, i.e. 1 2h h hc c t< − . It follows that  
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If the errors have the extreme value distribution, and generalizing to the case in which 
response j is chosen:  
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where 1hth eλ = ≥ .  
 
Now consider a household which responds using two modes, say 1 and 2:  
{ }( )12 Pr 1, 2h hp = Ω =  
We need to consider two cases, that in which choice mode 1 is cost minimizing while 
mode 2 is sufficiently close to be also chosen, and the converse case in which 2 is cost 
minimizing and 1 is also chosen. Using the same notation 
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In the general case for two choices in which { },h j kΩ = , this probability is given by  
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See Appendix 2B for derivation of this result and also for the case in which three 
responses are selected.  
 
Independence from Irrelevant Alternatives 
As is well known, multinomial logit suffers from the independence from irrelevant 
alternatives (IIA) property. From an algebraic standpoint, IIA states the relative odds of any 
two response choices m and n are independent of the characteristics of other possible 
responses. This can be seen from the multinomial logit model in which equation (2.3) 
implies 
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Within the multinomial logit framework, IIA can be resolved by allowing for unobserved 
heterogeneity in household utility (here cost) functions, reflected in an unobserved error 
component ηhm so that hm hm hm hmc f= + η + ε . On this specification, equation (2.3) becomes 
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 (2.14) 
This defines the Mixed Multinomial Logit (MMNL) model – see Brownstone and Train 
(1999) and McFadden and Train (2000). The MMNL model can be estimated by simulated 
maximum likelihood once a distribution is specified for the error ηhm. 
 
Moving away from the algebra, the IIA “thought experiment” asks us to conceive of an 
additional response, say a new mode of transport. In multinomial logit, the new response will 
attract customers from the existing modes such as to leave the relative probabilities of 
choosing the existing modes unaffected. The MMNL model allows the new mode to be 
correlated with existing modes, breaking this prediction. However, IIA ceases to be so 
problematic once we translate this thought experiment to the case of non-exclusive choice 
since choice of the new mode does not preclude choice of the existing modes. Indeed, if the 
characteristics of the new and existing modes are similar, it is likely that both will be chosen 
even without allowing for an explicit correlation structure as permitted by the MMNL. 
 
This argument applies directly to the MLM even though equation (2.4) implies that the 
ratio of the marginal probabilities of any two responses are independent of the properties of 
the other responses.  By contrast, the Poisson-multinomial model is closer to that of the 
standard multinomial since the number of responses is independent of the response 
characteristics. IIA continues to apply to a respondent who chooses to make a single 
response. Although equation (2.8) shows that, for respondents who make multiple responses, 
the odds of any two choices do depend on the properties of the entire response set, this is in a 
manner which makes it difficult for the model to reflect correlations among responses. 
Finally, by endogenizing the number of responses chosen, the threshold multinomial model 
becomes closer to the MLM in this regard – if a new mode is similar to an existing mode, it 
is likely that their expected costs (or utilities) will differ by less than the threshold. This is 
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reflected in equation (2.12) which makes the probability of each response depend on the 
characteristics of the entire choice set. 
 
The IIA issue does not arise in the application we consider in the following sections since 
we lack variables which vary both by household and response mode. For this reason, we do 
not further pursue mixed models. 
 
2.3 Shocks, household responses and their consequences  
As noted in chapter one, the analysis of the uncertainty affecting households, and their 
responses to this uncertainty, is a key issue in developing countries, where poor people are 
exposed to risks that affect household living conditions (Morduch, 1994; Dercon, 2005c). 
Shocks can have a major impact on the possibility of the household escaping poverty or may 
induce a non-poor household to enter poverty. Uncertainty is therefore central to our 
understanding of poverty. World Bank (2000) notes the importance of policies that help poor 
people to manage the risks they face.  
 
A growing theoretical and empirical literature focuses on the analysis of income 
variability and on the ability of households to overcome income risks. Poor people have 
developed mechanisms to deal with hardships. Often these involve informal insurance 
arrangements between individuals and entire communities. Although these strategies offer 
some cushion against shocks, they are not always sufficient with the consequence that 
shocks may push households into poverty or exacerbate their existing poverty status. Even 
when households are able to deal with risk, the strategies they adopt may have negative long-
run consequences (Dercon, 2005c). This is particularly true for ex ante risk-management 
mechanisms. These strategies may involve diversification across crops, the use of a variety 
of production techniques, portfolio diversification or migration. Negative long term 
consequences may arise when, for example, risks leads poor households to choose safe but 
less profitable choices (Morduch, 1990; Alderman and Paxson, 1992; Rosenzweig and 
Wolpin, 1993). However, the problem of shock-induced inefficient choices can arise also 
with ex post strategies that deal with the consequences of shock; for example requiring 
children to drop out of school or to work may have long-term consequences and be socially 
inefficient (de Janvry et al., 2006). Moreover,  productive assets may be sold to maintain 
consumption, resulting in lower incomes in the future. In this sense, short run income 
maintenance may be at the expense of longer-term well-being. Hence, if we are to design 
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appropriate income protection frameworks, it is important to understand how households 
cope with actual shocks and the possibility of future shocks, and to evaluate which responses 
are costlier for households. Our application is a contribution to this literature. 
 
2.4 Data 
The data used for this study are from the 1993 Indonesia Family Life Survey data 
(IFLS1). 7224 households were interviewed over a wide range of issues. Our focus is on the 
section of the survey relating to demographic and economic shocks. Respondents were asked 
whether their household had experienced an economic shock in the past five years, the type 
of the shock, when it happened (year and month), what measures were taken and the costs of 
overcoming the shocks.  
 
As noted in chapter one, six types of shock are analyzed in the IFLS dataset:  
i) death of a household member 
ii) sickness of a household member  
iii) crop loss 
iv) household or business loss due to a disaster 
v) unemployment of a household member 
vi) fall in the price of a crop. 
We distinguish between demographic and economic shocks – demographic shocks are 
death and sickness, while economic shocks are the remaining four categories.  The nature of 
the shock is important because it has implications for the ability to cope with its 
consequences (see Dercon, 2002), and influences the response adopted. A related distinction 
is between idiosyncratic and common shocks which is correlated with but not implied by the 
demographic-economic distinction. 
 
Turning to the measures adopted to cope with the shocks, the survey allowed us to 
distinguish six possible responses:  
i) extra job  
ii) loan (including a loan from families or friends) 
iii) asset sale (sale of next harvest, food,  cattle or poultry, jewellery or other 
assets) 
iv) family assistance 
v) use of savings 
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vi) reduction of expenditures. 
The survey questionnaire was not explicit as to whether single or multiple responses to a 
shock were sought.15 
 
The responses identified in the survey are all ex post risk-coping strategies.16 They can be 
divided into two categories: risk sharing strategies that smooth consumption across 
households, and intertemporally smoothing strategies that smooth consumption over time. 
Risk sharing responses involve either formal institutions, such as formal credit transactions, 
or informal mechanisms, such as transfers between families or friends. Alternatively, 
households can smooth consumption intertemporally by saving and borrowing, or by 
accumulating and selling non-financial assets (Alderman and Paxson, 1992; Bardhan and 
Udry, 1999; Dercon, 2002). 
 
Table 2.2 
Reported Household Shock Experience 
1989-93 1992-93 Type of shock # rural households  per cent # rural households  per cent 
Death 254 7.8% 111 3.5% 
Sickness 325 10.0% 169 5.2% 
Crop loss 544 16.8% 340 10.5% 
Business loss 60 1.8% 35 1.0% 
Unemployment 54 1.7% 28 0.9% 
Price falls 231 7.0% 147 4.5% 
The table reports the number of households, and the percentage of all households sampled, 
reporting shocks of each type over the five year period 1989-93 and the two year sub-period 
1992-93 used in the subsequent analysis. 
 
We include only those households in our dataset that supplied a complete set of income 
and demographic data. After dropping income outliers (1% of the total sample), and 
considering only rural households, the sample reduces to 3246 households. 1116 households 
(34.4% of the total sample) experienced at least one shock in the five year reporting period, 
697 of them (21,5% of the total sample) experienced at least one shock in the final two years, 
1992-93.  Table 2.1 reports the number of households that experienced each type of shock 
over the five years 1989-93 and the two years 1992-93.  
                                                 
15
 The survey also includes an explicit question on the costs associated with each shock. We do not 
use the answers to this question in this chapter for two reasons. First, response is partial. Second, it is 
unclear whether this variable measures the pre- or post-response (i.e. gross or net) costs associated 
with shocks. (The variable we have defined in equation (2.1) is on a gross basis). 
16
 Ex ante risk-management strategies shape the risks households face by choosing particular activities 
(diversification across crops, the use of a variety of production techniques, etc). 
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The most frequent shocks are sickness and crop loss. Business loss and unemployment 
affect only a few households. In view of the low incidence of these shocks in our data, we 
aggregate these into a single category reducing the number M of shock types to five for the 
purposes of econometric analysis. 
  
Table 2.2 shows the percentage of multiple responses for each shock. The majority of 
households report a single response. This is consistent with the view either that responses are 
interdependent - the fact of having chosen (or reported) one response mode reduces the 
probability of choosing (or reporting) others – or that many interviewers interpreted the 
survey question as requiring a single response. 
 
Table 3.2 
Percentage of Multiple Responses Reported 
 1989-93 1992-93 
Death 19.7% 22.5% 
Sickness 19.7% 16.6% 
Crop loss 18.6% 17.4% 
Business loss due to a disaster 15.0% 8.6% 
Unemployment 24.0% 21.5% 
Price falls 15.0% 17.7% 
The table reports the percentage of those households which experienced each type of 
shock who reported multiple responses over the five year period 1989-93 and the two 
year sub-period 1992-93 used in the subsequent analysis. 
 
Table 2.3 shows the percentage of households that responded in each manner for each 
shock. These statistics suggest that household responses differ between demographic shocks 
(death, illness) and economic shocks (crop loss, business loss or unemployment, price falls). 
The data suggest an important role for family and community assistance in the case of 
demographic shocks, while this measure appears relatively less important as a response to 
crop loss and price falls.  
  
Cameron and Worswick (2003) have argued that labour supply responses help Indonesian 
households to smooth consumption in the face of a crop loss. This response appears 
particularly important for economic shocks. It is also apparent that economic shocks are 
more likely to lead to a decline in consumption than are demographic shocks. 
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Table 2.4 
Shock Responses by Household (1992-93) 
 Demographic  Economic 
 
Death Sickness Crop loss 
Business loss 
or 
unemployment 
Price falls 
Extra job 13.5% 7.7% 47.9% 34.4% 42.2% 
Take loan 28.8% 36.0% 18.8% 29.5% 17.0% 
Sell assets 27.0% 27.2% 15.6% 23.0% 17.7% 
Family assistance 36.0% 21.9% 7.0% 13.0% 4.0% 
Use savings 15.3% 17.7% 5.0% 3.3% 4.0% 
Cut down on household 
expenses 4.5% 4.7% 22.6% 14.7% 32.6% 
The table summarizes the percentages of those households which experienced each type 
of shock who identify each response mode the two year sub-period 1992-93 used in the 
subsequent analysis. Because of multiple responses, percentages sum to more than 100%. 
 
We turn now to the explanatory variables we will use in the econometric model. 
Microeconomic theory indicates that two variables are potentially important in explaining 
shock responses. The first is the extent to which shocks are common across households. 
Standard discussions indicate that informal insurance mechanisms are better able to cope 
with idiosyncratic shocks than with common shocks. The dataset allows us to identify the 
village in which a household is resident. We define a commonality variable as the weighted 
percentage of households (other than the household in question) that experienced the same 
shock in the same village. Let hsZ  be the percentage of families that experience shock s in 
the village in which household h is resident. The commonality variable, modifies to exclude 
the household in question, is defined as 1
1 1
h
hs hs hs
h h
n
z Z
n n
= − δ
− −
, where hn  is the number 
of households surveyed in the village and hsδ  is a dummy variable equal to one if the 
household h has experienced shock. The modification is important because the unmodified 
variable hsZ  will not be independent of hsδ  in villages in which there is a small number of 
reporting households giving rise to potential simultaneity bias.  
Some shocks are more likely to be idiosyncratic (for example illness or unemployment) 
or common (for example droughts or epidemics), but few risks purely belong to one category 
(Dercon, 2005a). Each shock may have an idiosyncratic component, both in the probability 
of experiencing the shock, and in the extent of its effects. The data shows that crop loss is the 
most common shock, followed by price fall and sickness of a household member. 
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Commonality is on average lower for demographic than for economic shocks (the median of 
commonality is 4.5 for economic and 4.1 for demographic shocks, averages are respectively 
8.8 and 5.4, and the difference is statistically significant).  
 
The second potentially important variable is household permanent income. Certain shock 
responses are more easily available to rich households than to poor households. We should 
therefore expect that the probability of choosing a specific mode will be affected by the 
household’s wealth. For example, poor people are less able to save and accumulate assets, 
and they have restricted access to credit because of lack of collaterals. Poor households are 
thus more vulnerable and have limited means to deal with risk. We measure household 
wealth through estimated permanent income. Construction of the permanent income variable 
is discussed in Appendix 2A. 
 
In addition to these economic variables, the survey design (in particular, incomplete 
instructions) may allow the identity of the interviewer to play a role in determining the 
number of responses chosen by the household. Since we are able to identify the interviewer 
for each respondent, we relate the number of responses chosen by each household to the 
average number of responses elicited by the same interviewer, excluding responses given by 
the household in question. 
 
2.5 The empirical model 
We define the cost associated with a certain measure and a certain shock as a random cost 
with a stochastic and a deterministic component – see section 2. We assume that households 
choose the response mode that minimizes this adjustment cost or, in the case of multiple 
responses, that has a cost sufficiently close to the best choice. To implement the models we 
need to specify the deterministic cost component ( hmsf  in equation (2.1)), the household 
specific threshold ( hst ), and the Poisson parameter hsµ . Hence the empirical strategy has 
two components: the first is the definition and estimation of the deterministic cost, and the 
second involves the adjustment of the multinomial model to account for non-exclusivity of 
responses. 
 
The three variables we use vary across households and shocks but not across response 
modes. This implies that the response probabilities to a particular shock all depend on the 
same three variables. Alternative models imply different nonlinear mappings of these 
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variables into the unit interval. In principles, each such mapping might depend on a large 
number of parameters, but with a limited number of observations it is difficult to identify all 
parameters. (In particular, a number of shock-response pairs are poorly represented in the 
data). We impose structure on these mappings by jointly estimating the response 
probabilities across shocks and by imposing a degree of response homogeneity. Agresti and 
Liu (2001) refer to this approach in the context of the MLM as a Simultaneous MLM. 
 
We adopt a linear specification for the deterministic cost component: 
 
P
hms ms m hs ms hf z y= κ + γ + α  (2.15) 
hsz  is the variable defined in section 4 that captures the commonality of the shock in each 
village, and Phy  is the estimated household permanent income. We impose homogeneity on 
the intercepts for the demographic and economic shocks respectively 
 
( )
( )
1, 2
3,4,5
d
ms m
e
ms m
s
s
κ = κ =
κ = κ =
 (2.16) 
In the Poisson model we posit  
 exp( )hs s s hsvµ = µ + β  (2.17) 
where vhs is the average number of responses elicited by household h’s interviewer to 
shock type s. Similarly, for the threshold model we suppose that the threshold, beneath 
which response costs are regarded as indistinguishable, is influenced by the identity of the 
interviewer, motivating the specification 
 exp( )hs s s hst v= τ + ϕ ,  (2.18) 
where s ={d,e} (demographic and economic).  
 
The estimated cost functions are latent and therefore have an arbitrary zero. This implies 
that we need to normalize the parameters. We do this by setting the adjustment costs ch1s to 
zero for each shock type s. The implied parameter restrictions are  
 ( )1 1 1 0 1,..,s s s Sκ = γ = α = = . (2.19) 
 
To evaluate the importance of modelling multiple responses as interdependent, we 
compare the results obtained from these models with those from the MLM which treats each 
response as an independent decision. Both the threshold and the Poisson-multinomial models 
use the identical adjustment costs expression (2.15) but substitutes the MLM probability 
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(2.3) for the threshold and the Poisson probabilities. Note that parameter normalization is not 
required in the MLM case – the alternative to responding in a particular manner is not 
making that response. The implication is that it is only the intra-response mode differences 
that are comparable across the two models. To obtain comparability between the MLM, the 
threshold and Poisson probabilities, we can re-normalize equation (2.15) for the MLM 
model, as  
 1 1 1( ) ( ) ( ) Phms s ms m hs s ms h s hsf k g z a y v= + κ + + γ + + α + β  (2.20) 
in conjunction with the restrictions given by equations (2.19).  
 
2.6 Results 
We have estimated the parameters of the deterministic component of the cost function 
(2.15) using the MLM, the Poisson-multinomial and the threshold multinomial models. 
Results are reported in Table 2.4 (see end of the chapter). 
• There are marked differences between the reactions to demographic and economic 
shocks. In the case of economic shocks, the labour supply response is associated with the 
lowest costs, holding other variables in the model constant. Relative to this, demographic 
shocks increase the probability of taking a loan, sale of assets and family assistance with 
respect to the labour supply response. Use of savings and expenditure reduction remain 
the least favoured responses . These results reinforce the findings of the literature that 
poor households use the labour market to smooth income more than they use financial 
assets to smooth consumption (Maitra, 2001; Kochar, 1999; Cameron and Worswick, 
2003). However, the results are qualified by the fact that adjustment of labour supply is 
less likely in the face of demographic shocks. As suggested by Kochar (1995), 
demographic shocks, such as loss of family members and sickness, may affect the ability 
of the household to provide labour, making labour income ineffective as a source of 
insurance.    
• The estimated models provide clear evidence that the probability of responding to 
shocks through use of savings increases with permanent income (i.e. the cost of 
responding through the use of savings is significantly negatively related to permanent 
income)17. Only the richest households are able to use savings to smooth consumption. 
                                                 
17
 We ran the Poisson and threshold models with the full set of α coefficients. All apart from α5 (“use 
savings”) were close to zero. Even in the MLM model we cannot reject the hypothesis that all the 
coefficients on permanent income except α5 are equal to zero (χ2(5) = 3.81, tail probability 0.58).  
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• Shock commonality increases the probability of a labour supply response. In the 
MLM specification  the estimated coefficients on commonality are only significant for 
the responses “extra job” and “asset sales”. These results provide strong evidence of both 
the importance and limitations of informal insurance arrangements for poor 
communities. Shock commonality is likely to be lower for demographic than for 
economic shocks accounting for the lower probability of adjusting labour supply in the 
face of demographic shocks. 
• The average number of responses for the interviewer is highly significant for 
economic shocks, and fairly significant for demographic shocks irrespective of model 
specification confirming that interviewer identity plays an important role in determining 
the number of responses. In the Poisson-multinomial model, an increase in the average 
number of responses elicited by the same interviewer, excluding responses given by the 
household in question, increases the expected counts, holding other variables constant. 
Similarly, in the threshold-multinomial specification the interviewer variables has a 
positive effect on the threshold, thus increasing the number of responses chosen by the 
household.  
These results are all in line with the qualitative conclusions drawn from Tables 1-3 in 
section 4. 
 
2.7 Testing the model specification 
As noted in section 2, the MLM and the multinomial specifications answer two different 
questions and maximize different likelihood functions. The MLM likelihood is defined in 
terms of the probability of each response being selected. If household h selects response m to 
shock s, rhms = 1. This outcome occurs with probability phms. Similarly, the outcome and 
rhms= 0 occurs with probability (1-phms). The overall probability can be written in the 
binomial form hmshms rhms
r
hms pp
−
−
1)1(  and the log-likelihood is 
ln (1 ) ln(1 )hms hms hms hmsr p r p+ − − . The overall log-likelihood function is  
 [ ]
1 1 1
ln (1 ) ln(1 )
H S M
hms hms hms hms
h s m
LB r p r p
= = =
= + − −∑∑∑  (2.21) 
 
In the multinomial specification the likelihood function is maximized over the entire set 
of all the possible combinations of responses. The entire set of possible combinations up to 
three choices is given by Q = 41 possibilities and we index these by q such that { }1 1hsΩ = , 
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…, { }6 6hsΩ = , { }7 1, 2hsΩ =  …, { }11 1,6hsΩ =  etc. Define 1hqsr =  if the combination qΩ is 
chosen, 0 otherwise, with q = 1,…,Q and let hqsp  and 1 hqsp−   be the associated 
probabilities. The log-likelihood for the Poisson and the threshold models is defined as: 
 
1 1 1
ln (1 ) ln(1 )
QH S
hqs hqs hqs hqs
h s q
LJ r p r p
= = =
 = + − − ∑∑∑      (2.22)  
 
The MLM and multinomial likelihood functions are not directly comparable although 
either can be transformed into the other. Given the MLM choice probabilities phms estimated 
from the MLM model, the corresponding multinomial probabilities qhsp  may be computed as  
 ( )1
q q
hqs hms hms
m m
p p p
∈Ω ∉Ω
= −∏ ∏  (2.23) 
Equivalently, given the multinomial probabilities qhsp  we may compute the associated 
probabilities phms associated with each choice as  
 ( )
1
1
Q
q
hms hqs
q
p m p
=
= ∈Ω∑   (2.24) 
where the function ( )1 v  returns the value unity if v is true and zero if false. 
 
We use expressions (2.23) and (2.24) to calculate the structural (choice-based) likelihood 
based on the estimated MLM probabilities and the MLM (response-based) probabilities for 
the two structural multinomial models.  Table 2.5 lists the maximized log-likelihoods on 
both bases for all three specifications. The two multinomial models have higher log-
likelihoods irrespective of the choice basis. On the MLM choice basis, the threshold-
multinomial model slightly out-performs the Poisson-multinomial model, but the ranking is 
reversed on the choice basis. 
 
Table 2.5 
Log-likelihoods 
 MLM basis LB Structural  basis LJ 
  Marginal logit model 
  Poisson-multinomial 
  Threshold-multinomial 
-2125.75 
-2124.66 
-2123.93 
-2518.34 
-2454.87 
-2456.67 
The table records the results maximized log-likelihoods from equations 
(2.21) and (2.22) for the three models considered .  
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The three models we have considered are not nested and comparison of likelihoods is 
therefore at best a criterion for good fit and not a test. In what follows, we first use a version 
of the paired J test introduced by Davidson and Mackinnon (1981).18  
 
Index the three specifications as (b,p,t) for the MLM, Poisson-multinomial and threshold-
multinomial models respectively. Write the estimated individual choice-based probabilities 
as ( ), ,jhmsp j b p t=  and the estimated joint choice-based probabilities as 
( ), ,jhqsp j b p t= . Construct the two sets of differences  
 ( ),j j bhms hms hmsd p p j p t= − =  (2.25) 
To perform the J-type test we include these differences jhmsd additively in the augmented 
MLM model. The J test statistic for the MLM null against alternative j is the one-sided t 
statistic on the coefficient λj of the variable jhmsd .   
 
The procedure for testing the two multinomial models is identical. We construct the four 
set of differences19  
 ( )( , ) ( , ), ( , ), ( , ), ( , )jk j khqs hqs hqsd p p j k p b t b p t t p= − =    (2.26) 
Regarding model j as the null, we re-estimate the model including the difference jkhqsd  as 
an additive regressor. The J test statistic for null j against alternative k is the t statistic on the 
coefficient λjk. Monte Carlo evidence has established that J tests have a pronounced tendency 
to over-reject in finite samples – see McAleer and Pesaran (1986) and McAleer (1987). 
 
Test outcomes are listed in Table 2.6. At the 5% level, neither of the multinomial models 
rejects the MLM model whereas the two multinomial models reject each other with the 
threshold model also being rejected by the MLM model. These outcomes are not easy to 
reconcile with the likelihood values reported in Table 2.5. We note that the properties of the 
J-style test have not been established for nonlinear environments and it also seems possible 
that our sample, although large, is insufficient to give reliable results. 
 
                                                 
18
 A “paired” non-nested test is a test between a pair of two hypotheses from a larger set of hypotheses 
(McAleer, 1995). Our test should be thought of as a J-type test rather than a pure J test since our 
models do not fall within the linear regression class. 
19
 In effect three since tp pthqs hqsd d= −  . 
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Table 2.6 
J Test Results 
Alternative hypothesis  
Marginal 
logit model 
Poisson 
-multinomial 
Threshold 
-multinomial 
Marginal logit model - 1.80 [3.60%] 
1.41 
[7.93%] 
Poisson-multinomial 1.20 [11.5%] - 
2.94 
[0.16%] 
Null  
hypothesis 
Threshold-multinomial 2.23 [1.29%] 
2.58 
[0.50%] - 
The table records the results of the J tests for each pair of models. The test statistics are 
distributed as Student t. Tail probabilities are given in parentheses. The hypotheses tests 
are all one-sided so rejection of the null at the conventional 95% level is appropriate if 
the tail probability is inferior to 5%.  The tests are calculated using equations (2.25) and 
(2.26).  
 
We obtain clearer results from an alternative approach using a linear probability (LPM) 
framework. To test the MLM null, consider the six regressions 
 ( ), , , ;j k jkhms j hms k hms hmsr p p u j k b p t k j= δ + δ + = ≠  (2.27) 
If the MLM model (Hj say) is valid, we should find 1jδ =  and 0kδ = . Conversely, if 
hypothesis k (Hk) is valid we should find 0jδ =  and 1kδ = . Similarly, in the multinomial 
framework, we consider the six regressions 
 ( ), , , ;j j k jkhqs j hqs k hqs hqsr p p u j k b p t k j= δ + δ + = ≠     (2.28) 
The tests have the same form. As is well-known, the LPM suffers from heteroscedasticity 
and so in all cases we use a heteroscedasticity-robust estimate of the variance-covariance 
matrix. 
 
Results are reported in Table 2.7. The upper block of tests relates to the MLM repose  
basis. The tests fail to discriminate between the alternative models even though the estimated 
coefficients give a greater weight to the Poisson and threshold probabilities than to those 
from the MLM itself. By contrast, using the joint choice basis (Table 2.7, lower block) the 
two multinomial models decisively reject the MLM model. Although it remains true that 
neither multinomial model is able to reject the other, the estimated coefficients give a higher 
weight to the threshold model in line with the log-likelihoods reported in Table 2.5. 
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Table 2.7 
Linear Probability Model Test Results 
Individual choice 
basis bδ  pδ  tδ  Hj versus Hk  Hk versus Hj 
Hj 
Marginal logit 
model 0.398 0.603 1.21 0.53 
Hk  
Poisson-
multinomial (1.03) (1.55) 
- 
[29.9%] [59.0%] 
Hj 
Marginal logit 
model 0.315 0.692 1.77 0.42 
Hk  
Threshold-
multinomial (0.86) 
- 
(1.88) [17.0%] [65.9%] 
Hj 
Poisson-
multinomial 
0.334 0.672 0.83 0.24 
Hk  
Threshold-
multinomial 
- (0.64) (1.29) [43.7%] [78.3%] 
Joint choice basis      
Hj 
Poisson-
multinomial 0.011 1.005 0.10 32.7 
Hk  
Marginal logit 
model (0.09) (8.09) 
- 
[90.8%]  [0.00%]  
Hj 
Threshold-
multinomial 0.049 0.975 0.26 36.8 
Hk  
Marginal logit 
model (0.42) 
- 
(8.58) [77.0%]  [0.00%]  
Hj 
Poisson-
multinomial 0.287 0.733 2.18 0.43 
Hk  
Threshold-
multinomial 
- 
(0.78) (2.01) [11.3%] [65.0%] 
The table reports the results of the test based using the linear probability (LPM) 
framework, described in equations (2.27) and (2.28). Hypothesis test statistics 
(column 4 and 5) are heteroscedasticity-corrected F tests. Heteroscedasticity-
robust t-statistics are in “(.)” parentheses and tail probabilities in “[.]” parentheses. 
 
In summary, the test outcomes depend on the way the model is framed. If the question is, 
“Which response modes will be adopted?”, this motivates an individual choice approach. In 
this case, the standard MLM model appears adequate. If, instead, the question is, “How will 
households respond?”, a joint choice is required. In this second context, it is important to 
explicitly acknowledge the joint nature of multiple response choices and the MLM model is 
clearly inadequate. The evidence is less decisive in relation to the choice between alternative 
multinomial specifications although there is some suggestion that the threshold-multinomial 
model is slightly superior to the Poisson-multinomial model. Since the threshold model is 
also to be preferred in relation to the IIA critique, this is the model we recommend. 
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2.8 Conclusions 
Multinomial choice models have traditionally focussed on exclusive choice. Survey 
design may however permit multiple responses. One possibility is to model such responses 
using the MLM, but this allows the possibility of null response and, in general, fails to fully 
reflect the structure of the choice process. We have developed two models which generalize 
the McFadden’s now standard random utility framework to allow for the possibility of 
multiple response. In the first of these models, the respondent first decides on the number of 
responses and then chooses the actual responses to maximize utility conditional on that prior 
choice. In the second, threshold, model, the two decisions are made jointly, with the agent 
choosing multiple responses if utility outcomes are sufficiently close.  
 
These models are both relatively straightforward from a computational standpoint 
provided the number of responses selected remains small. From a theoretical standpoint, the 
models are an advance over the standard MLM approach in that they see respondents as 
comparing response with each other rather than with a common benchmark. A disadvantage 
of the Poisson multinomial model is that it inherits the IIA property from multinomial logit. 
Both the MLM and threshold multinomial models, which make the number of responses 
endogenous to the respondent’s decision process, are less vulnerable to this problem. 
 
We apply this framework to modelling the responses of households in rural Indonesia to 
demographic and economic shocks. The survey design obliges respondents to nominate at 
least one response to any such shock. A minority of households nominate multiple responses. 
The incidence of multiple responses appears to be primarily a function of the identity of the 
interviewer, and it appears that interviewers may have interpreted the survey instructions 
differently. Both the Poisson and threshold multinomial models outperform the MLM model. 
Choice between the two multinomial models is less clear but the data appear to be 
marginally more favourable to the threshold model. 
 
There are also substantive conclusions. Macroeconomic theory emphasizes the role of 
individual household savings as a device for smoothing consumption in the face of income 
shocks. Our data for rural Indonesian households demonstrates the importance of this 
mechanism but only for the richest households. By contrast, the theoretical literature on 
shock response in development economics has emphasized the role of labour supply and 
informal insurance arrangements at the family and village level, but has noted that informal 
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arrangements only work well when shocks are idiosyncratic. We develop a measure of the 
commonality of shocks and show that response choice does indeed depend on commonality. 
Shock commonality increases the probability of a labour supply response with respect to all 
other coping mechanisms. Results provide confirmation of the importance of labour supply 
as a strategy to cope with economic and common shocks, and of the role of informal 
arrangements in coping with demographic and idiosyncratic hardships.   
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Table 2.4 
Estimated Models 
  Marginal logit 
model 
Poisson-
multinomial 
model 
Threshold-
multinomial model 
   Coeff. t Coeff. t Coeff. t 
κ (demographic)       
extra job  2.81 6.91     
loan 0.93 2.51 -1.54 -6.89 -1.49 -6.75 
sell assets 1.13 2.99 -1.40 -6.05 -1.34 -5.89 
family 
assistance 
1.17 3.04 -1.36 -5.56 -1.33 -5.46 
use savings 2.94 6.27 0.24 0.71 0.15 0.41 
cut expenses 3.41 7.53 0.64 1.83 0.62 1.82 
κ (economic)       
extra job  1.54 5.46     
loan 2.05 6.88 0.40 2.13 0.34 1.92 
sell assets 2.05 6.73 0.38 1.93 0.34 1.83 
family 
assistance 
3.22 8.91 1.40 5.10 1.28 4.84 
use savings 4.71 10.26 2.82 7.45 2.63 7.26 
cut expenses 1.94 7.09 0.31 1.78 0.24 1.44 
γ  (commonality)       
extra job  -0.29 -4.18     
loan 0.08 1.17 0.27 3.32 0.26 3.40 
sell assets 0.20 2.22 0.37 4.04 0.36 4.06 
family 
assistance 
0.12 0.97 0.31 2.53 0.31 2.63 
use savings 0.11 0.72 0.31 2.00 0.30 2.01 
cut expenses 0.01 0.15 0.20 2.72 0.19 2.79 
α  (permanent 
income) 
      
use savings -0.55 -5.03 -0.52 -5.52 -0.47 -5.43 
β interviewer       
   demographic -0.30 -1.05     
   economic -0.69 -3.46     
µ, τ (intercept)       
   demographic   -2.84 -4.74 -3.00 -3.04 
   economic    -5.12 -10.05 -6.29 -9.27 
µ,τ  (interviewer)       
   demographic   1.09 2.31 1.56 1.90 
   economic   2.73 7.29 4.01 7.84 
log likelihood -2125.7444 -2454.87 -2456.67 
The table reports the estimated parameters of the deterministic component of the 
cost function (2.15) using respectively the MLM, the Poisson-multinomial and the 
threshold multinomial models. In the Poisson and threshold models, parameters are 
normalized setting the adjustment cost ch1s to zero for each shock type s 
( ( )1 1 1 0 1,..,s s s Sκ = γ = α = = ). The estimated threshold hst and Poisson parameters 
hsµ  are also reported. 
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Appendix 2A – Income Equation Estimation 
We adapt the methodology used by Paxson (1992) and Cameron and Worswick (2003) to 
decompose household income20 into permanent and transitory components. We estimate the 
following equation:  
 0 1 2
P T
h h h hY X X= α + α + α + ν  (2A.1) 
where hY  is the income of household h and 
P
hX and
T
hX  are variables viewed as 
determinants of permanent and transitory income respectively. This allows us to decompose 
income as:  
 0 1
ˆ
ˆ ˆ
P P
h hY X= α + α  (2A.2) 
 ( )2ˆ ˆT Th hY X= α . (2A.3) 
The fitted residual includes both a permanent component not captured by PhX  and 
transitory income shocks not captured by ThX  (Cameron and Worswick, 2003). 
The variables included in PhX  are the number of household members in each age 
categories, the number of adult members (age 18-64) in each education/gender category, 
dummies variables that indicate the occupation of the household head21, a dummy that 
identifies if there is a householder who has a non-farm business, the value of land and 
provincial dummies. ThX  includes dummy variables for the shocks experienced in the 
previous two years. There are two complications. First, not all shocks can be treated as 
transitory. For example, death of a household member may affect income in a permanent 
way. Hence, deaths occurred in the previous five years are included in the estimation of the 
permanent component22. Second, households with a non-farm business are more likely to 
experience a household or business loss due to a disaster. This motivates the inclusion of an 
interaction term between the dummy business loss and a dummy that equals one if the 
household owns a non-farm business.  
                                                 
20
 Household income ( hY ) is calculated as the sum of the following variables: wages earned by each 
household member, net profit generated by the farm, net profit generated by the household business, 
household income other than from business or employment (pension, scholarship loan, insurance 
claim, winnings, gift from family or friends, other), total income from household assets (other that 
farm and business assets). Appendix A shows the survey questions used to construct income.  
21
 Self employed workers, employees or family workers. 
22
 IFLS survey asked to report a sickness that requires hospitalization or continuous treatment. This 
may suggest that sickness of a household member can be treated as a permanent shocks. I constructed 
two measures of permanent income, with and without sickness, but results do not change.   
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Table 2A.1 
Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean s.d. Min Max 
Household income 1080 1598 - 104 20130 
Death 0.08 0.27 0 1 
Sickness 0.05 0.22 0 1 
Crop loss 0.11 0.31 0 1 
Business loss 0.01 0.10 0 1 
Business loss*non farm business 0.01 0.08 0 1 
Unemployment 0.01 0.09 0 1 
Price falls 0.05 0.21 0 1 
Household owns a non-farm business 0.32 0.47 0 1 
Land value 3062 11077 0 200000 
# household members aged 0 to 5 0.65 0.81 0 5 
# household members aged 6 to 11 0.71 0.84 0 4 
# household members aged 12 to 17 0.64 0.83 0 5 
# household members aged 18 to 64 2.32 1.06 0 12 
# household members aged over 64 0.20 0.50 0 8 
# males 18-64 without education 0.17 0.40 0 3 
# females 18-64 without education 0.37 0.54 0 3 
# males 18-64 –  primary school only 0.63 0.65 0 5 
# females 18-64 –  primary school only 0.64 0.62 0 5 
# males 18-64 up to secondary school 0.29 0.55 0 4 
# females 18-64 up to secondary school 0.19 0.44 0 4 
# males 18-64 high school 0.03 0.17 0 3 
# females 18-64 high school 0.01 0.11 0 2 
Head employee 0.29 0.45 0 1 
Head self-employed 0.69 0.46 0 1 
Head family worker 0.02 0.12 0 1 
The table summarizes the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the income 
equation. “Death” refers to the death of a household member occurred in the five 
years prior to the interview. All other negative shocks refer to the two years 1992-
93. Household income and land value are in thousands of rupiah. 
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Table 2A.2 
Income decomposition equation estimates 
Dependent variable: Household income 
Permanent components  Coefficient t 
Death -267.32 -3.41 
Household owns a non-farm business 587.00 10.11 
Land value 0.02 4.17 
# household members aged 6 to 11 83.00 2.31 
# household members aged 12 to 17 97.73 2.95 
# household members aged over 64 -37.40 -0.57 
# males 18-64 up to secondary school 591.78 9.00 
# females 18-64 up to secondary school 570.48 5.72 
# males 18-64 high school 1737.66 6.23 
# females 18-64 high school 1913.40 4.63 
Head employee 736.84 4.5 
Head is self-employed  11.90 0.08 
Intercept 242.10 1.21 
Transitory components Coefficient t 
Sickness -52.54 -0.51 
Crop loss -88.20 -1.21 
Business loss 340.17 0.98 
Dummy own business*business loss -351.90 -0.76 
Unemployment -424.54 -2.32 
Price falls -57.82 -0.51 
N 3246 
 F34,3211    25.61 
 R-squared   0.317 
The table reports the OLS estimates from equation (2A.1). The 
household income is regressed on a set of variables that determines 
the permanent and the transitory income  components. The dummies 
“Head employee” and “Head is self-employed” refer to the work 
status of the household head, head does not work or is a family 
worker is the omitted category. “Death” refers to the death of a 
household member occurred in the previous five years. All other 
negative shocks refer to the two years 1992-93. Income equation 
also contains controls for the number of children in the house aged 
0-5, the number of adult males and females (aged 18-64) unschooled 
and graduated only from the elementary school, and provincial 
dummies. 
Robust t statistics in parentheses. 
 
 
. 
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Appendix 2B – Calculation  of multinomial probabilities 
Poisson-multinomial model 
In the case in which mh = 2 with responses i and  j selected, we need to consider the 
probability that j is the overall cost minimizing choice and that i is the next best, and the 
converse situation in which i is the overall cost minimizing choice and that j is the next best. 
Hence, using the notation already established: 
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Combining equations (2.5) and (2B.1),  
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The argument is similar in the case that three responses are selected. We obtain 
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Threshold Multinomial Model 
In the case of double responses, equation (2.11) gives the probability of choosing modes 
1 and 2: 
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 Consider the first term in this expression. We may split this into two further components as  
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where δij is the Kronecker delta, 
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This is illustrated in terms of the distribution function of c2 for the case of M =3 in Figure 
2.1.  
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Figure 2.1: Distribution function of c2 
 
Using equation (2.10), this probability becomes 
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The second component of equation (2.11) follows directly as 
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Combining equations (2B.4) and (2B.5), we obtain 
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Generalization to the case in which three modes are chosen is yet more complicated. For 
notational simplicity, let { }1,2,3hΩ = . Then 
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As previously, we analyze the three components separately. Consider the first 
component: 
( )1 2 3 1 1Pr , & , 4,..., .h h h h h h hm hc c c c t c c t m M< ≤ + ≤ − =  
This probability depends on the values of both c2 and c3 which are taken as following 
independent and identical Gumbel distributions. 
 Hence 
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Using equation (2.8), we may write this joint probability as 
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It follows that: 
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Income Shocks, Coping Strategies, and Consumption 
Smoothing 
 
 
 
 
 
3.1 Introduction and literature review 
As reviewed in chapter one, a growing theoretical and empirical literature analyzes the 
effects of shocks on households’ living conditions in developing countries, and on the coping 
strategies adopted to overcome them. Ex post coping mechanisms include risk-pooling 
strategies, that spread the effects of shocks across households in a community, and self-
protection strategies. The latter involve taking loans (Udry, 1990, 1994; Fafchamps and 
Lund, 2003), selling financial or non-financial assets (Deaton, 1991; Rosenzweig and 
Wolpin, 1993; Zimmerman and Carter, 2003), and increasing the labour supply to cope with 
shocks (Kochar, 1999; Maitra, 2001). 
 
This chapter focuses on self-protection strategies23. The use of assets as a buffer to cope 
with shocks has been widely explored in the literature. Recent studies give primary attention 
to asset choices in the face of shocks in a framework in which assets contribute directly to 
the income generation process. The use of assets both to generate income and to smooth 
consumption leads to a trade off, in the sense that selling assets to smooth consumption 
today could have important implications for future income and hence for future 
consumption. This could lead households, and especially poor households, to be more 
cautious in running down assets to smooth consumption. Barrett and Carter (2005) suggest 
that below a given assets threshold, households reduce consumption in order to preserve 
                                                 
23
 This chapter focuses on the most frequent shock in rural Indonesia, crop loss. Since Indonesian data 
suggest that risk sharing strategies are less used than self-protection strategies in coping with crop 
loss, we will underline the role of the latter mechanisms, labour supply response in particular, and we 
will not take into account inter-household transfers and network.    
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their stock of assets (asset smoothing), while above that threshold assets are sold to protect 
consumption (consumption smoothing). Zimmerman and Carter (2003) find that rich 
households acquire high-return portfolios and run down assets to smooth consumption. On 
the other hand, poor households choose safe but low-return portfolios and reduce 
consumption in the face of shocks in order to defend their asset base (asset smoothing). 
Hoddinott (2006) shows that the probability of selling assets (animals) in the face of a 
negative income shock depends on the prior level of assets: households with more than two 
animals are considerably more likely to sell them than households with only one or two 
animals. This literature points out that households may respond differently to income shocks 
depending on the level of their asset ownership.  
Self-protection strategies may also involve the use of labour markets as insurance 
institutions. In this way consumption smoothing is achieved through ex post income 
smoothing (Morduch, 1995; Dercon, 2002). Kochar (1999) finds evidence that farm 
households in India are able to cope with idiosyncratic crop income shocks shifting from 
own-farm to off-farm work. In this way households reduce their income variability and 
smooth consumption in response to shocks without relying on savings or assets. Similarly, 
Cameron and Worswick (2003) find that the extra income generated by the labour supply 
response to a crop loss is important in allowing Indonesian households to avoid reducing 
consumption expenditure. Maitra (2001) finds that Indian farmers differ in their response to 
shocks and in their ability to smooth consumption according to whether they are constrained 
or unconstrained. Farmers with unrestricted access to credit (medium and large farms) deal 
with shocks using state contingent transfers (for example credit) and without changing their 
leisure and consumption behaviour. Constrained farmers (small farms) with restricted access 
to credit are able to insure consumption against unanticipated income changes only if they 
adjust their market participation in response to the shock, shifting from own farm work to the 
labour market.  
 
Most of the empirical studies on risk coping through self-protection strategies consider 
two questions. The first explores the role played by coping strategies in mitigating the effects 
of shocks. Many studies investigate how responsive the risk-coping strategies are to shocks, 
without estimating how much of the income shock is compensated (by regressing a variable 
which indicates a specific risk coping strategy on measures of shocks (Pan, 2007)). For 
example, Udry (1995) regresses savings (overall saving, grain, livestock and cash saving) on 
a measure of shocks to income defined as a weighted average of the number of self-reported 
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negative events; Hoddinott (2004) regresses the net number of sales of oxen on a measure of 
rainfall shocks; Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1993) estimate an ordered probit of purchase and 
sale of productive assets on income variations; McPeak (2004) estimates a tobit model to 
analyze how rainfall shocks influence livestock sales; Kochar (1999) analyzes how market 
labour hours respond to income shocks.  
 
The second question explores whether consumption can be smoothed against transitory 
income changes. This literature refers to the permanent income hypothesis (PIH) according 
to which the marginal utility of current consumption is equal to the discounted expected 
marginal utility of future consumption (Deaton, 1992). In this model only permanent income 
innovations are completely reflected in consumption changes, whereas transitory shocks are 
smoothed. Empirically this may be tested by regressing household consumption, or savings, 
on the permanent and transitory components of income. If households are able to smooth 
consumption, the coefficient on transitory income should be near zero, and the coefficient on 
permanent income should be near one in the consumption equation. Paxson (1992) tests for 
consumption smoothing in Thailand. She finds that the propensity to save out of transitory 
income is quite high, suggesting that savings are used to buffer consumption from income 
shocks. Gertler and Gruber (2002) test whether Indonesian households insure consumption 
against health shocks regressing the growth in log per-capita consumption on change in 
health. They do not find evidence of full consumption insurance against illness. Kochar 
(1999), Maitra (2001) and Cameron and Worswick (2003) show that households can smooth 
consumption by adjusting labour supply. Using data from rural Burkina Faso, Kazianga and 
Udry (2004) find that about 50% of changes in transitory income are passed onto 
consumption, with no significant differences for poor and rich households. Jalan and 
Ravallion (1997), who regress changes in consumption on changes in per capita income, 
show that poor households are less well insured against shocks: 40% of an income shock is 
being passed onto current consumption for the poorest households, while rich households are 
protected from almost 90% of an income shock. 
 
These results suggest that, for some households, consumption choices may not be based 
on the permanent income model, but rather be driven by current income and the need to 
accumulate savings. In order to understand which model drives household consumption 
behaviour, we should estimate the income variation due to coping strategies and examine 
how much of this income gain is passed onto consumption. Few papers estimate a 
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quantitative measure of the increase in income due to ex post responses to shocks. 
Fafchamps et al. (1998) estimate how much of the income fluctuation is compensated by 
sales of livestock by multiplying the predicted number of livestock sold when facing with 
shocks by their median price. However, since the actual price may be different for different 
households, this measure is only an approximation of the actual income recovery. Cameron 
and Worswick (2003) base their measure on self-reported income. More precisely, they 
estimate the size of the crop loss and of the income generated from the labour supply 
response by including controls for the labour supply response in the income equation. 
However, none of these papers examine how much of the increase in income due to coping 
strategies is passed onto consumption.  
 
This work investigates whether rural Indonesian households smooth income following a 
crop loss (i.e. whether they adopt strategies, labour supply adjustments in particular, to 
recover the income reduction due to the shock)24, and how much consumption smoothing is 
achieved through income smoothing strategies (i.e. how much of the increase in income is 
transferred onto consumption)25. We extend Cameron and Worswick (2003) approach and 
construct quantitative measures of income shocks and of households’ responses to the shock, 
analyzing more than one response type, and differentiating between poor and non-poor 
farmers. Indeed, as several papers argue, the cost and ability to deal with risk may differ 
between poor and non-poor households (Zimmerman and Carter, 2003). Non-poor 
households may have access to several coping mechanisms, such as borrowing or selling 
assets, whereas poor households are more likely to be constrained, and hence they may have 
to rely on the labour supply response to mitigate the effects of shocks.  
 
In summary, there are two questions this chapter seeks to answer. First, which variables 
influence the adoption of income smoothing strategies and whether these strategies 
completely or partly recover the income reduction due to the shock. Quantitative measures of 
                                                 
24
 “Employment and wages are likely to be more flexible in largely agricultural societies in which a 
high proportion of the workforce is self-employed or works in the informal sector” (Manning, 2000, p. 
130). The case of Indonesia is consistent with this framework. The flexibility of Indonesian labour 
markets and the availability of alternative employment opportunities for those who lose their jobs, 
mostly in small-scale enterprises and the informal sector, supported the adjustments in labour supply 
as one important aspect of the response to shocks, even in the face of the economic crisis of 1997-98 
(Manning, 2000).   
25
 The question of how much consumption smoothing is achieved trough income smoothing strategies 
may depend on whether income is pooled within the household and on how resources are allocated 
within the household (Mazzocco, 2004; Witoelar, 2005). This chapter does not examine the intra-
household behaviour. This aspect may be taken into account for future model developments.  
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income shocks and household’s ability to cope with the shock are estimated for poor and 
non-poor households, and using these measures we can explore whether the increase in 
income due to income-smoothing strategies partially offsets, or exceeds, the income loss due 
to the shock. Second, this chapter investigates whether households smooth consumption and 
the role played by different coping strategies in mitigating consumption reductions. The 
analysis is conducted distinguishing between consumption behaviour of poor and non-poor 
households. These issues are explored using the Indonesian Family Life Survey data.  
The chapter is organized as follows. The theoretical model is presented in section II. 
Section III discusses the data, and section IV summarizes the methodology and main results 
of Cameron and Worswick (2003), establishing the motivation for the extensions proposed in 
this chapter. Section V and VI presents respectively the empirical methodology and results. 
Section VII concludes.  
 
3.2 Theoretical Framework 
The model developed in this section is a simple intertemporal model with a household 
farming production function subject to exogenous income shocks. Leisure and asset 
investment decisions are included in the household optimization problem. Assets are defined 
as productive (farm assets) and non-productive (financial assets). They have direct effects on 
income levels, and can also serve as a buffer to smooth consumption against shocks 
(Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1993; Zimmerman and Carter, 2003; Newhouse, 2005). 
Household members may work in the family farm and/or as salary workers.   
The farm profit function is defined as ),,( 1 tfttft sh−Φ=Π pi , where fth  is the labour 
input, 1−Φ t  is the level of productive and unproductive assets owned by the household at 
the end of the previous year, and s is a transitory random shock. Shocks are assumed 
exogenous, and uncorrelated over time. The farm profit increases with positive shocks, and 
decreases as a consequence of negative shocks, such that 0/ >∂Π∂ s . Total income of the 
household comes from the farm and off-farm labour. There is evidence that in the face of a 
shock household members reduce the hours worked in the farm and increase the hours of 
work in the wage employment sector (Kochar, 1999; Maitra, 2001; Cameron and Worswick, 
2003). In this chapter, we are not interested in examining the trade-off between farm and 
non-farm labour, and hence we assume that household members work a fixed amount of 
hours in the family farm, so that fth  is exogenous, and it varies with s (negative shocks 
reduce fth ). The remaining time endowment ( fs tT T h= − ) can be allocated to either leisure 
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( tl ) or off-farm work. Let wty  be the income earned by family members on wage 
employment. It is defined as ( )wt t s ty w T l= − .  
Total household income can be written as:  
  1( , , ) ( )ft ft t t t t s tI h s w T l−= Π Φ + − . (3.1) 
Assets26 evolve according to: 
 ttt φ+Φ=Φ −1  (3.2) 
where tφ  is the amount of assets purchased, or sold when 0<tφ ,  by the household at 
time t (for simplicity we assume no depreciation and no interest rate).  
The budget constraint the household faces is given by: 
  ttt Ipc =+ Φ )(φ    (3.3) 
where the price of the consumption good is normalized to one, and Φp  is the price of 
assets. Households can either sell productive assets or decrease financial assets to increase 
consumption. However, we assume that households face a constraint on assets defined as: 
  ),( 1−Φ≥ tt Zgφ    (3.4) 
i.e., there is a borrowing limit that depends on the level of assets previously accumulated 
and on household characteristics (Z) 27 (Newhouse, 2005).  
The farm profit equation written above shows that future productivity is a function of 
current asset accumulation strategies. Today’s sale of assets has important implications for 
future income and hence for future consumption. This form of non separability between 
current and future consumption leads households, and especially poor households, to be 
more cautious in running down assets in the face of transitory shocks. Hence the trade off 
captured in this model is not only between consumption and off-farm labour, but also 
                                                 
26
 As mentioned above, assets are a broad definition and include both productive and non productive 
assets. However, considering a sample of farm households it is reasonable to suppose that productive 
assets constitute the majority of total assets owned by the households.  
27
 The assumption is that )(Zt Φ≥Φ , the level of assets at time t must be greater than or equal to a 
household specific threshold which is a function of household characteristics. For productive assets 
this threshold is assumed  to be positive, 0)( >Φ Z . Subtracting 1−Φ t  from both sides, the 
constraint becomes 11 )( −− Φ−Φ≥Φ−Φ ttt Z , that is  1)( −Φ−Φ≥ tt Zφ . The reduced form 
becomes ),( 1−Φ≥ tt Zgφ  (equation (3.4)).  
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between current consumption and asset accumulation for future consumption (Zimmerman 
and Carter, 2003). 
Each period utility function is defined as ( , )t t tu c l , where we allow for consumption and 
leisure choices to be non-separable (Kochar, 1999; Kazianga and Udry, 2004); more 
precisely we assume that 0/2 >∂∂∂ lcut .  
The household’s Bellman equation is defined as: 
 { }1 1 1 1
,
( , ) max ( ( , ) ( ) , ) ( , )
t t
t t t ft t t t s t t t t t t tl
V s u s w T l p l E V s
ϕ
ϕ β
− − Φ + +Φ = Π Φ + − − + Φ    (3.5) 
The first order conditions for households for which the constraint is not binding are the 
following28: 
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t
t t
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Vu E a
c p
u u b
c w l
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Φ
∂∂
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∂ ∂
 (3.6) 
Equations (3.6a) and (3.6b) solve respectively the trade off between consumption and 
assets purchase, and between consumption and leisure. Looking at the equation (3.6a), a 
negative shock that decreases the farm profit will increase the marginal utility of income all 
else equal. Assuming the value function as concave in assets29, to keep equality household 
must increase consumption and decrease tΦ , i.e. the household will choose a lower level of 
tφ . A similar result comes from equation (3.6b). A negative shock increases the marginal 
utility of income all else equal, and decreases the marginal dis-utility of off-farm work30. To 
                                                 
28
 We do not consider for simplicity the time constraint.  
29
 The first derivative of the value function with respect to tΦ  is: 
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30
 This derives from 0/2 >∂∂∂ lcut  and from the effect of a negative shock on Ts. 
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keep equality (3.6b) household reduces tl . Hence, in the face of a negative shock households 
reduce the amount of assets (by either buying less or selling productive assets or by reducing 
financial assets), and/or increase the labour market participation to overcome the hardship. 
Equation (3.6) holds only if the household is not constrained in period t, i.e. if 
),( 1−Φ> ttt Zgφ 31. If the constraint is binding, ),( 1−Φ= ttt Zgφ , the first order conditions 
take the form:  
  
11 ( )
1 ( )
t
t t
t t
t t t
Vu E a
c p
u u b
c w l
β γ+
Φ
∂∂
= +∂ ∂Φ
 ∂ ∂
=
∂ ∂
 (3.7) 
where tγ  is the multiplier for the constraint. Equation (3.7a) means that the marginal 
utility of consumption for constrained households is greater than the marginal utility that 
would be optimal without constraints. 
Substituting (3.7b) into (3.7a), we have that  11 1 tt t
t t
Vu E
l w p
β γ+
Φ
∂∂
= +
∂ ∂Φ
. This implies 
that 
t tc u
u u
l l
   ∂ ∂
>   ∂ ∂   
, where the subscripts c and u identify respectively the constrained 
and unconstrained framework. The marginal utility of leisure and of consumption are both 
greater when households face constraints. This implies that in general constrained 
households consume less and work more than if they were unconstrained, and these effects 
are even more pronounced in the face of a negative shock.  
In the empirical analysis we will not estimate the structural model presented in this 
section, rather we will use the theoretical prediction of this model to guide the specification 
and interpretation of the reduced form equations that will be estimated.  
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
31
 Applying the Kuhn-Tucker conditions, the multiplier for the constraint has to be equal to zero when 
the constraint is not binding. 
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3.3 The Data 
The data used for this study are from the 1993 Indonesian Family Life Survey (IFLS1). 
7224 households were interviewed over a wide range of issues. Only those households that 
supplied a complete set of income and demographic data are included in the dataset. After 
dropping income and assets outliers (about 1% of the total sample), and focusing on the rural 
area, the sample includes 3601 rural households; of these, 2183 are farm households, defined 
as those who reported to own a farm and at least one farm asset in the year of the survey. 
Respondents were asked whether their household had experienced an economic shock in the 
past five years, the type of the shock, when it happened (year and month), what measures 
were taken and the costs of overcoming the shock. The survey permits only one occurrence 
of the same shock in the period 1989-93 to be reported by the same household, and there is 
evidence that the most recent shocks are more likely to be reported32. Nearly 34% of the total 
rural sample has experienced at least one shock in the past 5 years. The incidence of the 
different types of shocks is reported in table 3.1. The most frequent shocks are sickness and 
crop loss, whereas business loss and unemployment affect only a few households. Focusing 
on the farm sample, the percentage of households that suffered a crop loss is nearly 24%. 
Column six of table 3.1 reports the medians of the percentage of farmers that experienced the 
same shock in the same village in 1993, considering only villages in which there is at least 
one household reporting the shock. As expected, crop loss is the most common shock, with a 
median percentage of 6.7 (and a maximum of 40%).   
Table 3.1 
Number of households reporting shocks by type of shock (1988-93) 
Rural sample Farm sample 
Type of shock # 
households per cent 
# 
households per cent 
Commonality - 
medians33 
Death 284 7.9 174 7.9 3.7 
Sickness 376 10.4 232 10.5 3.9 
Crop loss 560 15.6 538 24.3 6.7 
Disaster 63 1.75 41 1.9 3.7 
Unemployment  65 1.81 25 1.1 3.9 
Price falls  239 6.64 215 9.7 4.2 
The table reports the number of rural and farm households, and the percentage of all 
households, reporting shocks of each type over the five year period 1989-93. The 
commonality of shocks is reported for shocks occurred in 1993 and for the farm 
sample, where the commonality is the percentage of households reporting the same 
shock in the same village in 1993.  
                                                 
32
 For example, 31% of the crop loss experienced in the period 1988-93 are reported to occur in 1993, 
and 63% in 1992-93. 
33
 Villages with no households reporting shocks are excluded from the median.  
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Since crop loss is the most frequent shock in rural Indonesia, and one of the major 
sources of risk in poor rural areas, in the empirical analysis we will focus on this type of 
shock. This choice clearly raises some issues about which sample to use. Cameron and 
Worswick (2003) use the entire sample of rural households. This sample selection poses 
some problems since the crop loss is a shock that should affect only those who have a farm 
production. Table 3.1 shows that only a few rural non-farm households report a crop loss. In 
order to avoid to include households that cannot report a crop loss because they do not own a 
farm, we prefer to drop some observations and to restrict the sample to farm households.  
Table 3.2 shows the percentage of farm households that use different measures in 
response to crop losses reported in the period 1988-93 and in 1993 only. Nearly 40% of the 
total respondents report taking an extra job to overcome a crop loss. Other important 
responses are “cut down on household expenses”, “take a loan” and “sell assets”. Indonesian 
data confirm the suggestion in the literature that informal insurance mechanisms, such as 
family and community assistance, may be used less in the face of common shocks, like for 
example crop loss (Alderman and Paxson, 1992). As the percentage of households that 
experience the same shock in the same village increases, the community may provide less 
insurance against it.  
The importance of different responses may vary according to the wealth/size of the farm 
and hence table 3.3 reports the percentages of responses by 1992 farm assets quartiles, where 
the bottom 25% of the asset distribution identifies small farms. The entire set of the previous 
five years crop losses is used to increase the number of observations. As pointed out by other 
authors (Kochar, 1999; Newhouse, 2005, Maitra, 2001), labour supply adjustment is a 
measure used particularly by poor farmers. Indeed, the percentage of households that take an 
extra job decreases as we move from poor to rich farmers. Owners of large farms (measured 
in terms of farm assets) are more likely to run down assets and to use savings than owners of 
small farms, even if the percentage of households that use savings remains low.  
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Table 3.2  
Responses to a crop loss 
 1988-93 1993 
Measure Taken % of households 
% of 
households 
Extra job 45.0 39.2 
Loan 21.2 20.0 
Sell assets 20.0 17.5 
Family assistance 6.9 7.2 
Savings 4.5 5.4 
Cut down on household expenses 20.8 29.0 
The table reports the percentage of farm households that adopted 
each type of coping strategy  in the face of a crop loss experienced 
in the period 1988-93 and 1993. Because of multiple responses, 
percentages sum to more than 100% 
 
Table 3.3 
Responses to crop loss experienced in the past 5 years, by 1992 farm assets 
percentiles 
 crop loss responses – 1988-93 
Measure Taken Bottom 25% 25-50% 50-75% Top 25% 
Extra job 54.6 50.0 43.9 30.7 
Loan 24.8 18.0 13.0 29.2 
Sell assets 14.2 15.6 25.2 25.4 
Family assistance 3.5 9.4 8.6 6.2 
Savings 0.7 2.3 3.6 11.4 
Cut down on household expenses 22.0 23.4 22.3 15.4 
The table summarizes the percentages of those households which experienced a 
crop loss over the five year period 1989-93 who adopted each response mode. 
Because of multiple responses, percentages sum to more than 100% 
By examining the main differences between small, medium and large farms reported in 
table 3.4, it is possible to observe that the higher propensity of small farms to use labour 
supply is not correlated with a significant larger household size or other demographic 
characteristics. Indeed, the only significant difference (except the obvious one related with 
assets and income) is in the number of household members with secondary and high 
education. Therefore, it seems that the adoption of different strategies is more related with 
the values of assets (maybe because of borrowing constraints) than with other household 
characteristics. This descriptive evidence suggests that it is important to distinguish small 
and large farms in the analysis of income and consumption smoothing behaviour.  
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Table 3.4 
Sample means of household characteristics by 1992 value of farm assets 
 Bottom 25%  25-75%  Top 25%  
1993 Crop loss 0.08 (0.27) 
0.07 
(0.26) 
0.07 
(0.26) 
Labour supply as a response 
to a 1993 crop loss 
0.51 
(0.51) 
0.37 
(0.46) 
0.30 
(0.46) 
Own farm land 0.45 (0.50)* 
0.97 
(0.17) 
0.99 
(0.07) 
Business ownership 0.23 (0.42) 
0.26 
(0.44) 
0.28 
(0.45) 
’92 value of business assets 
(excluding zeroes)  
489.70 
(1467.00) 
482.20 
(1674.23) 
4460.96 
(29347.50)* 
’92 value of non-business 
assets 
1907.59 
(4198.26)* 
3050.02 
(6488.73)* 
5819.95 
(16482.29)* 
Household income 676.29 (1049.87)* 
793.12 
(1174.43)* 
1624.23 
(2159.15)* 
Head inactive 0.04 (0.20) 
0.06 
(0.23) 
0.04 
(0.19) 
Head employee 0.17 (0.38) 
0.13 
(0.33) 
0.11 
(0.31) 
Head years of education 3.53 (3.40) 
3.82 
(3.58) 
4.62 
(4.19)* 
Household size 4.57 (2.03) 
4.48 
(1.96) 
4.87 
(2.09) 
Number of income earners 
(other than head) 
0.67 
(0.91) 
0.68 
(0.91) 
0.75 
(0.92) 
Number of male adults with 
secondary education 
0.20 
(0.40) 
0.26 
(0.51) 
0.42 
(0.67)* 
Number of female adults with 
secondary education 
0.10 
(0.40) 
0.16 
(0.40) 
0.27 
(0.50)* 
Number of male adults with 
high education 
0.01 
(0.09) 
0.02 
(0.13) 
0.05 
(0.23)* 
Number of female adults with 
high education 
0.003 
(0.06) 
0.01 
(0.10) 
0.02 
(0.15)* 
The table reports mean characteristics of farm households, by the size of the 
farm (quartiles of 1992 farm assets distribution). Standard errors are in 
parentheses. * the difference in the means is statistically significant at the 5-
percent level. Income and  assets are in thousands of rupiah. 
Since the role of labour supply in the face of a crop loss in rural Indonesia has been 
analyzed also by Cameron and Worswick (2003), the next paragraph reviews their approach 
in order to highlight the main differences with the aim and methodology of this chapter.   
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3.4 The approach of Cameron and Worswick (2003)  
Cameron and Worswick (2003) analyze the role of the labour supply response in allowing 
Indonesian rural households to smooth consumption in the face of a transitory shock. They 
consider two cases: the constant labour supply case (CLS), and the variable labour supply 
case (VLS) in which they permit changes in labour market behaviour following crop loss. In 
the CLS case, quantitative measures of permanent and transitory income components are 
constructed in two steps. First they estimate the following equation (Paxson’s (1992) 
method): 
 h
T
h
P
hh XXY εααα +++= 210  (3.8) 
where Yh is household income, PhX  and 
T
hX  are vectors of variables that determine 
permanent and transitory income respectively. The estimated coefficients are then used to 
construct the permanent ( PhYˆ  ) and transitory ( ThYˆ  ) income components as follows:  
 
P
h
P
h XY 10 ˆˆˆ αα +=  (3.9) 
 
T
h
T
h XY 2ˆˆ α=  (3.10) 
The variables used to identify permanent income are the number of adults in several 
education/gender categories, the occupation of the household head, the value of farm land, 
and provincial dummies. The variables used to identify transitory income are a dummy for 
reported crop loss, and the same dummy interacted with the value of the farm land, to 
account for the fact that larger farms may have larger transitory income. Note that this 
measure of transitory income includes both the income loss due to the crop loss and the 
increase in income due to coping strategies, labour supply response in particular. To estimate 
the size of the crop loss net of any labour supply income (VLS), equation (3.8) becomes: 
 h
LS
h
T
h
P
hh uXXXY ++++= 3210 γγγγ  (3.11) 
where LShX  captures the increase in income due to the labour market changes following 
crop loss. This is a dummy that equals one if the household had a labour supply response, 
interacted with the number of household members aged 12-64. Because of the endogeneity 
of labour supply response, equation 3.11 is estimated including the selection terms for those 
who respond with the labour supply and those who do not34. The predicted income 
components constructed from equations 3.8 and 3.11 are then used to estimate the 
                                                 
34
 Selection terms are computed from a probit regression of labour supply response to crop losses 
over the period 1989-93, on the number of members aged 18 to 64 with secondary education, the 
number of household members aged 65 and over, and the land value.  
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households’ marginal propensity to save out of permanent and transitory income. The saving 
equation is 
 hhh
T
h
P
hh eZYYS +++++= 43210 ˆˆˆ βεββββ  (3.12) 
where hS  are household savings, 
T
hYˆ  is the measure of transitory income derived either 
from the CLS case or from the VLS case, hεˆ  is the fitted residual from income equation 
(3.8) in the CLS case, and from (3.11) in the VLS case ( huˆ ); Z is a vector of variables that 
control for the lifecycle characteristics of the household (Paxson, 1992).  
Results show that in the CLS case, the marginal propensity to save out of transitory 
income is not statistically different from one (the estimated coefficient is 1.90 with t = 2.4), 
and the marginal propensity to save out of permanent income is statistically different from 
one (the estimated coefficient is 0.16 with t = 2.8). These findings are supportive of the 
consumption smoothing behaviour. In the VLS case, where ThYˆ  is defined as the crop loss 
net of any labour supply income ( ThX2γˆ ), the marginal propensity to save out of transitory 
income is about 0.21, statistically significant, and statistically different from one. Cameron 
and Worswick conclude that the increase in income due to the labour supply response is 
important in allowing rural households to smooth consumption: households that do not 
change their labour supply when facing the shock reduce their expenditure by about 79% of 
the loss in income due to the crop loss.  
 
Note that these results imply that for all households, whether poor or non-poor, 
consumption is closely related with permanent income, and that the transitory income 
generated by the labour-supply response is partly transferred onto consumption (the amount 
needed to compensate for the crop loss) and the remaining part (if positive) is saved.  
However, as suggested by the previous descriptive analysis and by various papers in the 
literature, both the importance of labour supply as a response to shocks and the link between 
consumption and permanent or transitory income may be quite different for poor and non-
poor households. Rich households are less likely to adjust their labour supply because they 
can insure consumption through alternative coping strategies (taking out a loan, selling 
assets, use of savings, etc). on the other hand, poor households may face borrowing 
constraints and they may need to build a stock of assets to protect themselves from future 
risk and/or to finance investments. As a consequence, their marginal propensity to consume 
out of both permanent and transitory income may be quite different from that of rich farmers. 
Chapter 3 
 
 
77 
Indeed, using the same methodology of Cameron and Worswick, on farm sample instead of 
the entire rural sample, and distinguishing between small and medium/large farms, we find 
that non-poor farmers insure consumption without having to rely on the labour market, 
whereas owners of small farms are found to reduce consumption both in the constant labour 
supply case (CLS) and in the variable labour supply case (VLS). In the CLS case the 
marginal propensity to consume out of transitory income is 1.7 (t=3.2) for poor farmers and 
0.2 (t=0.5) for owners of medium and large farms, and we cannot reject the joint hypothesis 
that the former is equal to one and the latter equals zero. The same results can be obtained 
for the VLS case (see appendix 3.A for details). Furthermore, poor farmers have a lower 
marginal propensity to consume out of permanent income (estimated coefficients are 
respectively 0.5 and 0.9 for poor and non-poor farmers, and are both statistically significant). 
 
Given these findings, it seems important to examine in more detail the differences in 
labour supply and consumption behaviour between small and large farms, trying to identify 
whether households follow a consumption smoothing strategy or the need to accumulate 
assets prevails. We propose a different empirical methodology to estimate a quantitative 
measure of the income reduction produced by the crop loss, and of the household’s ability to 
recover from the shock. In particular, the impact of the shock is allowed to differ for poor 
and non-poor farmers, and more than one coping strategy is considered in evaluating the 
income recovery from the shock. Then we use these estimates to obtain more information of 
the consumption behaviour of different households.  
 
3.5 Empirical Methodology 
The aim of this section is twofold. The first is to construct quantitative measures of 
income shock and of the household’s ability to cope with the shock, in order to estimate how 
much of the income loss is compensated by different coping strategies. Second, we explore 
whether households actually follow a consumption smoothing strategy in the face of shock 
and the role played by different coping mechanisms. 
 
3.5.1 Income Equation and Measures of Shock  
This section estimates a quantitative measure of the income loss produced by the crop 
shock, and of the household’s ability to recover from the shock. Several methodologies have 
been used to measure income shocks. Rosenzweig (1988) uses the difference between a 
household current income and its mean income over a nine-year panel. Jacoby and Skoufias 
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(1997) define the idiosyncratic shock as the deviation of the change in log full income from 
the change in the village-season-year mean and the aggregate shock as the mean change 
itself. Beegle, Dehejia, and Gatti (2003) measure transitory crop shocks using the reported 
values of crop loss (due to insects, rodents, and other calamities). Kochar (1999) measures 
income shock as the residual from a regression of crop profits on variables determining the 
household’s expectations of profits (a set of household dummy variables, reflecting all time-
invariant factors, and a set of time-varying demographic variables). Paxson (1992) measures 
the transitory income component  regressing total household income on a set of variables 
that affect transitory income (in her study this set consists of deviations of rainfall from its 
average level).  Similarly, Cameron and Worswick (2003) estimate transitory income 
regressing household income on self-reported shocks (crop loss). 
 
This section describes the empirical methodology we propose, which leads to consistent 
estimates under the assumption that the crop loss is exogenous. This issue will be explained 
in detail below. The predicted income for households that do not report a crop loss in 1993 is 
estimated first. With no crop loss, this predicted income would be an appropriate estimate of 
the household’s income for all  households35.  
For households that experienced a crop loss in 1993 the difference between the observed 
income and the predicted income is constructed. This difference is regressed on a set of 
variables that  affect the magnitude of the income shock (e.g. farm assets) and the 
household’s ability to cope ex post with the hardship.    
Income for households that do not report a crop loss is defined as: 
 0 1 2
P T
h h h hY X Xα α α ε= + + +   (3.13) 
where Yh is the 1993 household income, PhX  is a vector of variables that determine 
permanent income, and ThX  is a set of other variables that may affect household income in a 
transitory way. In this analysis, PhX  are demographic characteristics, location dummies, and 
wealth indicators. The latter includes the value of household’s assets held at the end of the 
year prior to the interview, distinguishing between farm, business non farm, and non 
business real and financial assets. To account for the non-linearity of the income function, 
the coefficient on farm assets is interacted with dummies that indicate whether the farm is 
small, medium and large (defined according to quartiles of 1992 farm assets distribution). 
                                                 
35
 It is worth noting, however, that estimating permanent income using cross-sectional data instead of 
panel data does not allow to model the dynamics of predicted income, and to solve the problem of 
unobserved heterogeneity (Abul Naga and Bolzani, 2000).    
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Other variables that may contribute to permanent income are head’s characteristics 
(education, occupation type), the family size, and village-province specific information. 
Dummies for non labour income sources (pension, winnings, and gift from family/friends) 
are also included in the income equation. Winnings and gifts ( ThX ) are omitted from the 
estimation of permanent income and included in a positive transitory income component. 
The parameters in (3.13) can be consistently estimated by applying OLS on the sub-sample 
of households with no crop loss under the assumption that the crop loss is exogenous.  
 
For households that reported a crop loss in 1993, the difference between actual and 
predicted income is constructed:  
 
ˆ
CL
h h hY Y Y∆ = −  (3.14)
     where CLhY  is current income for households that reported a crop loss, and hYˆ  is the 
predicted income for these households, on the basis of the parameters estimates from 
equation (3.13). This difference can be explained by the sum of the loss produced by the 
shock and the gains from the ex post coping strategies that are reflected in the income 
measure (plus the effects of unobservables). To estimate the size of the crop loss and of the 
increase in income given by coping strategies, the following regression is estimated: 
 h
A
h
L
h
LS
h
S
hh uXXXXY +++++=∆ 43210 βββββ  (3.15) 
where ShX  are shock variables that will be explained below, 
LS
hX  and 
L
hX  are vectors of 
variables that determine the size of the increase in income due to the following strategies: 
“labour supply” and “sell assets or take a loan” respectively. AhX  is the value of 1992 non-
productive assets owned by the household36.  
The income shock caused by a crop loss has two components: the constant term in (3.15), 
and the farm specific component estimated using the vector ShX , which includes the value of 
1992 farm assets. This second component allows us to link the income loss with the size of 
the farm: the larger is the farm, the larger may be the crop loss. To account for possible non-
linearity in the functional form, the coefficient on farm assets is interacted with dummies that 
                                                 
36
 As a check for the validity of using the estimates of equation (3.13) to construct the dependent 
variable in (3.15), the following equation is estimated: 
h
L
h
LS
h
A
h
S
h
CL
h uYXXXXY ++++++= ˆ543210 ββββββ ; 5ˆβ  is found to be non statistically 
different from one (F(1,148)=2.46, Prob>F=0.12).  
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indicate whether the farm is small, medium and large (defined according to quartiles of 1992 
farm assets distribution).  
The extra labour income given by the labour supply response is estimated using the 
dummy labour supply (self-reported strategy) interacted with the number of household 
members aged 13-64 (following Cameron and Worswick (2003) and Kochar (1995), 
households with more people of working age may increase their labour supply by more). In 
order to control for possible effects on reported income of other strategies, (e.g. “take loan” 
or “sell assets”), we include dummy variables for whether the household used at least one of 
these coping mechanisms, and the value of 1992 non-business assets ( AhX )37.  
    
Least squares estimation of (3.15) may lead to biased estimates of the parameters because 
of the endogeneity of the labour supply response. Let us assume that the decision to respond 
with the labour supply to the crop loss can be described by a probit equation 
 hhh ZLS ηδ +=*  (3.16) 
with LSh=1 if 0* >hLS  and zero otherwise. LSh is a dummy that equals one if the 
household reported labour supply as a response to the crop loss and zero otherwise, and Z  is 
the set of independent variables that explains the probability of taking an extra job. If we 
believe that the outcome equation depends upon the regime (LS=0 or LS=1), then we should 
split the sample into “labour users” (LS=1) and “non-labour users” (LS=0) and estimate an 
income equation corresponding to (3.15) for the two sub-samples (switching regression 
model). If it is the case, the problem with the labour supply response can be treated as a 
sample selection problem. The error terms on the income equations for the two sub-samples 
would have variances 20σ and 
2
1σ and covariances 02σ and 12σ   with hη .  From the probit 
equation, we can derive the selection terms defined as: 
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where f  is the standard normal density function and F  is the cumulative distribution 
function. CLh is a dummy that equals one if the household reported a crop loss in 1993, zero 
                                                 
37
 Non business and non farm assets are added as additional regressors because the measure of 
household income includes the income from the rent/lease/profit-sharing of non-business assets. 
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otherwise. To have consistent estimates, each income regression should be augmented with 
the corresponding selection term.  
If all coefficients but the one on LShX  are the same for LS=0 and LS=1, it follows that we 
can pool the entire sample of “labour users” (LS=1) and “non-labour users” (LS=0) and 
augment this regression equation with the selection terms. Equation (3.15) thus becomes: 
 
0 1 2 3 4 12
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h h h h h h
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h
h h h
h
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F Z
δβ β β β β σ
δ
δ
σ
δ
∆ = + + + + +
+ − +
−
  (3.18) 
We conducted a Chow test to check whether all coefficients are the same for LS=0 and 
LS=1, and we cannot reject this hypothesis (F(6,149)=0.84, Prob>F=0.54). Therefore we use 
(3.18) to estimate the total effect of the shock (the sum of income loss and income gains), the 
contribution of labour supply response, and the income loss net of any recovery. Shock 
measures are defined as: 
 1 0 1 2 3 4
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆˆ
S S A LS L
h h h h hY X X X Xβ β β β β= + + + +   (3.19) 
 2 0 1 3
ˆ ˆ ˆˆ
S S LS
h h hY X Xβ β β= + +  (3.20) 
 3 0 1
ˆ ˆˆ
S S
h hY Xβ β= +  (3.21) 
where 1 ˆ
S
hY  represents the total effect of the income shock, and it may be positive or 
negative according to whether the increase in income generated from coping mechanisms is 
higher or smaller than the income loss caused by the shock. 2 ˆ
S
hY  is the effect of the income 
shock when only labour supply response is considered, and 3 ˆ
S
hY  is the measure of income 
loss net of any recovery. These measures allow us to answer to the first question of the 
chapter: whether households partly or completely offset the income loss by using labour 
supply and/or different coping strategies.   
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3.5.2 Consumption equation 
The second question this chapter seeks to answer is the extent to which farmers smooth 
consumption in the face of short-term shocks (like for example the crop loss) or allow 
consumption to vary in order to build a stock of assets. Consumption is measured by non 
durable annual household expenses38. As suggested by Deaton (1997), a way to test for 
consumption smoothing is to write consumption as a function of permanent and transitory 
income components, together with other variables, for example the demographic structure of 
the household: 
 htht
T
ht
P
htht uZYYC ++++= θγβα  
In a “strict” version of the permanent income hypothesis, the parameters β  and γ  would 
be one and zero, respectively, but even the evidence that β γ>  would suggest that 
households smooth their consumption relative to income (Deaton, 1997)39. Following this 
approach, the consumption equation can be written as:   
 
0 1 2 3 3 4 5
6 7 8
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( )
ˆˆ (1 )
P S LS A L
h h h h h h h h h h
h h h h h h
C Y Y CL Y CL Y CL Y CL
u CL CL Z
γ γ γ γ γ γ
γ γ ε γ ν
= + + ⋅ + + +
+ ⋅ + ⋅ − + +
 (3.22) 
where ˆ PhY  is the permanent income component, 3 ˆ
S
hY  is the measure of the income shock 
net of any recovery (as reported in equation 3.21), ˆ LShY  is the extra labour income, and 
ˆ ˆ
,
A L
h hY Y  are the predicted income gains due to other coping strategies (non-business assets 
and “take a loan or sell assets” respectively). huˆ  and hεˆ  are the fitted residuals from income 
equations (3.18) and (3.13) respectively, and hZ  is a set of variables that measure the life-
cycle stage of the household. Following Paxson (1992), the variables included in hZ  are the 
number of household members in each age categories40.  
                                                 
38
 The expenditure variable used in this chapter includes the total value of goods self-produced by the 
household. Durable goods are not included because it is difficult to impute the appropriate measure of 
the service flow derived from that. 
39
 This approach has been used by Paxson (1992) and Cameron and Worswick (2003). They estimate 
the level of household savings as a linear function of permanent income, transitory income, the 
residual from the income equation (unexplained income), and a set of variables that measure the life-
cycle stage of the households. Paxson includes also the variability of the household’s income. 
40
 All the regressors in (3.22) but hZ  are estimates, consequently coefficient standard errors may be 
biased (Davidson and MacKinnon, 2004). 
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The inclusion of income measures of the shock (net of any recovery) and of the coping 
strategies allows us to analyze the impact of the crop loss and of different responses to the 
shock on consumption. To examine the different behaviour of constrained and unconstrained 
households, both the permanent income and the measure of the crop loss are interacted with 
dummies to identify small, medium and large farms.  
 
3.6 Results 
3.6.1 Income equation estimates 
Income equation for households that did not report the crop loss 
Estimates of the income equation (3.13) are reported in table 3.541. The R2 (0.37) 
indicates that independent variables explain a fairly high proportion of income variability. 
Results are in line with standard income equation estimates. It should first be noted that 
coefficients on 1992 farm assets confirm the non-linearity of the income function. 
Coefficients on all the other 1992 assets are highly significant42. Households with head 
employed in the private and government sector are expected to have a higher income than all 
the other households, all else equal. Households with the head self-employed have a higher 
income than households with head inactive or family worker. Head’s education is positively 
and significantly related to income only for secondary and high levels, whereas the 
coefficients on head’s primary education (both complete and incomplete) are not statistically 
different from zero. Other variables that have a significant effect on household income are 
the number of income earners, other than the head, and non labour income sources (such as 
gifts and winnings, and the presence of a household member that receives a pension). 
Finally, provincial dummies are also included in the income equation. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
41
 Sample characteristics of the main variables included in the income regressions are shown in table 
3B.1. 
42
 Recall that the profit function is expressed in the theoretical model as a function of assets at time t-
1, therefore we use the previous year’s level of assets. Non business and non farm assets are added as 
additional regressors because the measure of household income includes the income from the 
rent/lease/profit-sharing of non-business assets. Appendix A explains in detail the survey questions 
used to construct household income. 
Chapter 3 
 
84 
Table 3.5 
Income equation estimates  
Variables Coeff. t 
Permanent income variables    
1992 farm assets*dummy small 
farm -0.44 -1.99 
1992 farm assets*dummy medium 
farm 0.02 0.94 
1992 farm assets*dummy large 
farm 0.02 4.41 
1992 business non-farm assets 0.01 3.87 
1992 non business assets 0.03 3.14 
Head employee 1207.49 8.71 
Head self employed 171.95 1.93 
Head complete primary educ 84.78 1.44 
Head secondary educ 819.31 6.20 
Head high educ 1899.87 4.20 
Nr. of income earner  151.55 4.32 
Pension (if someone receives a 
pension) 1279.46 3.60 
Household size  140.95 3.32 
Household size^(2) -10.91 -2.80 
electricity in the village 83.07 1.48 
Intercept -262.86 -1.51 
Positive transitory  income variables   
Winnings 381.71 3.99 
Gift 146.27 2.01 
Number of obs= 2020 
F( 28,  1991) =   16.34 
R-squared=  0.37 
The table records the results from equation (3.13) and 
estimates the predicted income for households that did not 
report a crop loss in 1993. Dependent variable is 1993 
household income. This regression includes also provincial 
dummies. Both income and assets are measured in thousands 
of rupiah. Standard errors are robust.  
 
 
Income equation for households that reported a crop loss 
The difference between the observed income and the estimated income ( hY∆ ) is 
calculated for households that report a crop loss in 1993. Table 3.6 shows some descriptive 
statistics of hY∆  for the sub-sample with CL=1. The mean value is -45 (thousands of 
rupiah), but there is a high variability around it. Differentiating for those that report labour 
supply response and those who do not, the former have a positive mean value of hY∆  (175), 
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while the mean is negative for the group with LS=0 (-187). The difference in the means of 
hY∆  for the two groups (LS=0 and LS=1) is statistically significant at the 1% level.  
Table 3.6 
Descriptive statistics of the difference in incomes  
Variable Obs. Mean p25 p50 p75 
CL
hY∆  163 -44.57 -627.51 -219.32 221.84 
CL
hY∆ *LS 64 175.01 -653.88 -125.87 374.12 
CL
hY∆ *(1-LS) 99 -186.52 -600.46 -302.18 136.30 
The table presents the descriptive statistics of the difference in incomes for 
households that reported a crop loss in 1993. The difference in the means is 
statistically significant at the 1% level 
Equation 3.18 allows us to identify the different determinants of hY∆ . In order to control 
for the endogeneity of labour supply we have added selection terms obtained from a probit 
equation that estimates the probability of using the labour supply to deal with the shock43. 
Before presenting the results for equation (3.18), we discuss the probit estimates (table 3.7). 
A first important finding is that proxies for the household’s access to the credit market 
(such as the value of the land and the presence of at least one financial institution in the 
village) have a negative and significant effect on the probability of adopting a labour supply 
response, whereas the probability increases significantly with the commonality of the shock, 
measured by the proportion of households that experienced a crop loss in the same village44. 
The probit equation controls also for the soil quality in the village. Households living in 
villages with a poor or average soil quality are more likely to respond with the labour supply 
                                                 
43
 Following Cameron and Worswick (2003), the probit model is estimated over the sample of 
households who reported a crop loss over the past five years instead of in 1993 only to increase the 
number of observations. There is no universally accepted goodness of fit measure for probit 
(Kennedy, 2003). Table 3.7 reports McFadden’s pseudo-R2, and the percentage correctly predicted.  
The McFadden’s R-squared is a transformation of the log-likelihood. Define *  the maximized log-
likelihood using probit, and 0  the log-likelihood using the same model but with only the intercept. 
R2 is defined as 
0
*
2 1


−=R . Another goodness of fit measure is the percentage of correct 
predictions. According to this measure, an observation is predicted as y=1 if the estimated probability 
is greater or equal than one-half. Otherwise the observation is predicted as y=0. The fit measure is 
given by [ ]∑
=
−−+
n
i
iiii yyyy
n 1
)ˆ1)(1(ˆ1 . The percentage of correct predictions is 64.85% and pseudo 
R-squared = 0.11. Cameron and Worswick (2003) reported a percentage of correct prediction of 
59.14. 
44
 Several studies link the possibility of relying on coping strategies to the shock commonality. For 
example, informal insurance mechanisms and asset sales are less useful as risk coping instruments 
when the extent to which shocks are common across households in the same area is high. This may 
force households to use other coping strategies, such as increasing labour supply. 
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to a crop loss than households living in villages in which the soil quality is high. A possible 
explanation is that farmers that cultivate a high soil quality have higher farm profits45 and 
hence they may rely on strategies other than extra job to cope with the crop loss. 
As regards demographic variables, the probability of varying the labour supply decreases 
with the age of the household head (older heads are expected to be less likely to take an extra 
job) and with the number of adult members with secondary education (educated adults are 
more likely to be active in the formal job market, hence they are less likely to change their 
work time allocation). Households in which the spouse of the head is inactive are less likely 
to adopt a labour supply response. This evidence would suggest that labour supply responses 
affect the leisure choices of working people, but do not induce non-working individuals to 
enter the labour market. Another significant variable is the number of female household 
members aged 13-17, suggesting a possible incidence of transitory shocks on girls’ labour 
supply. The coefficient relating the presence of  boys in the same age category is not 
significantly different from zero. 
Table 3.7 
Probit equation for the labour supply response 
Variables Coef.  z 
Land value -0.00004  -3.44 
Dummy if credit in village -0.30  -2.43 
Proportion of other households experiencing 
a crop loss in the same village  1.17  3.64 
Age household head  -0.02  -3.43 
# of adult members with secondary education  -0.14 -1.81 
# of female with age 13-17 0.22 1.95 
Spouse is inactive -0.36 -2.69 
Poor soil quality in village 0.38 2.03 
Average soil quality in village 0.41 2.79 
intercept 0.25 0.91 
Number of obs=532 
Pseudo R-squared = 0.11 
Percentage correctly predicted = 64.85 
The table records the results from the probit regression that 
estimates the probability of responding with labour supply to a crop 
loss. Dependent variable is a dummy that equals one if the 
household had a labour supply response in the face of a crop loss 
over the period 1989-93 
                                                 
45
 Farmers living in villages with a high soil quality have farm profits that are statistically higher (at 
0.01% level) than other farmers.  
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Table 3.8 reports the results of estimating equation (3.18). The income loss produced by 
the crop loss is the sum of the intercept and of a household specific term related to the value 
of 1992 farm assets, i.e. to the size of the farm. The estimated coefficient on farm assets 
decreases, in absolute value, as we move from small to large farms. This finding may be 
explained with the nonlinearity of the profit function. With decreasing returns on farm assets, 
the marginal effect of an increase in assets on the income loss is larger for low than for high 
levels of assets46.  
The size of the increase in income as a result of labour supply responses is estimated by 
interacting the labour supply dummy with the number of household members aged 13-64. 
The income gain due to the extra job as a response to 1993 crop loss is found to be 
statistically significant and to have a high impact on household income. In particular, each 
member aged 13-64 allows households to gain about 433 thousands of rupiah of extra labour 
income after a crop loss47. In order to control for possible effects on household income of 
other coping strategies, we include the dummy “take a loan/sell assets”, which has a  positive 
effect on hY∆ , but it is not statistically significant (t=1.29) (when entered separately, the 
dummies “take a loan” and “sell assets” had statistically similar coefficients, hence we pool 
them to increase the number of observations). Finally, the 1992 value of non business and 
non farm assets has a positive coefficient, meaning that rich households have a higher ability 
to recover from the shock (even if the t statistic is not very high; t=1.52) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
46
 Estimating equation (3.18) on the value of farm assets and the value of farm assets squared, the 
latter has a negative coefficient confirming the non linear relationship between income and farm 
assets. 
47
 Kochar (1995) suggest that “the segmentation of labour markets by gender may make a household’s 
vulnerability to crop income shocks a function of its demographic composition” (Kochar, 1995, 
p.159), so that households with a higher number of males in the working age with respect to females 
are more likely to smooth crop shocks. This hypothesis seems to be confirmed by our data: the 
dummy labour supply interacted with the number of males aged 13-64 is significant 
(coefficient=449.07, t=2.07), while the interaction with the number of females 13-64 is non 
statistically significant (coefficient=412.24, t=1.14). 
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Table 3.8 
Income equation estimates  
Dependent variable: h
CL
hh YYY ˆ+=∆  
Variables Coeff. t 
Measure of income loss  
  
1992 farm assets*small farm 
-2.03 -2.11 
1992 farm assets*medium farm 
-0.12 -2.13 
1992 farm assets*large farm 
-0.02 -2.62 
Recovery’s measures 
  
1992 non-business assets 0.05 1.52 
LS*N_1364 432.71 2.34 
  Dummy sell assets or take a loan 353.97 1.29 
Other variables 
  
1st selection term* LS 
-121.35 -0.23 
2nd selection term* (1-LS) 
-1130.89 -2.40 
 Dummy cut expenditure 140.04 0.72 
Intercept 
-1001.04 -2.66 
Number of obs= 163 
F( 9,  153) =   3.05 
R-squared=  0.21 
The table records the results from equation (3.18), and 
estimates the size of the income reduction due to the crop 
loss and of the increase in income due to coping strategies. 
The sample is households that had a crop loss in 1993. 
Both income and assets are measured in thousands of 
rupiah. Standard errors are robust. 
 
From this regression we construct the measures of the income reduction caused by the 
crop loss and of the income gains due to labour supply response and other coping strategies. 
Predicted measures are summarized in tables 3.9a and 3.9b. The income reduction caused by 
the crop loss does not vary significantly with the size of the farm, and the mean is about 
1260 thousands rupiah. If we add the extra labour income, the average value of income 
variation ( 3 0 1 3ˆ ˆ ˆˆ S S LSh h hY X Xβ β β= + + ) is about -750, suggesting a significant impact of the 
labour supply response. Indeed, when only households that used extra labour are considered, 
the mean value of the income loss plus the extra labour income is 87.61, i.e. on average they 
recover all the income loss (the mean value of the extra labour income is about 1298, 
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somewhat larger than the crop loss)48. The income recovery given by holding a higher initial 
level of non-business assets is small, and, as expected, higher for large farms. 
 
Table 3.9a 
Descriptive statistics of predicted variables 
Variable Obs. P25 Mean p50 p75 
CL
hY CL*   163 165.00 924.27 442.00 1006.00 
CL
hYˆ CL*  163 323.21 924.27 754.64 1361.52 
0 1
ˆ ˆ( )*ShX CLβ β+   163 -1378.13 -1261.42 -1169.49 -1104.70 
A
hX2ˆβ CL*   163 23.65 152.99 74.82 186.02 
LSCLX LSh **ˆ3β   64 865.41 1298.12 12.98.12 1730.83 
L
hX4ˆβ LCL ** a 62 353.97 
The table presents the descriptive statistics of the predicted income for 
households that had a crop loss in 1993, and the estimated measures of 
income loss caused by a crop loss and of income gains due to coping 
strategies.  
a
 L is a dummy that equals one if the household reported sell assets or take 
a loan as a repose to the 1993 crop loss 
 
Table 3.9b 
Means of predicted measures of shocks, by size of the farm 
 Averages 
Variable 
Small 
farms 
Medium 
farms 
 Large  
farms All farms 
1 0 1 2 3 4
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆˆ
S S A LS L
h h h h hY X X X Xβ β β β β= + + + +  -368.87 -533.83 -370.30 -461.68 
0 1 2
ˆ ˆ ˆS A
h hX Xβ β β+ +  -1122.65 -1160.09 -986.90 -1109.98 
2 0 1 3
ˆ ˆ ˆˆ
S S LS
h h hY X Xβ β β= + +  -639.84 -771.47 -832.83 -750.28 
3 0 1
ˆ ˆˆ
S S
h hY Xβ β= +  -1253.68 -1260.26 -1280.63 -1261.42 
N=163 
The table presents the mean values of the predicted measures of income loss and gains 
(for households that reported a crop loss in 1993), considering each coping strategy 
separately and distinguishing for poor and non-poor farmers. 
 
 
 
                                                 
48
 The mean values of the income reduction caused by the crop loss and of the income gain due to the 
labour supply response estimated by Cameron and Worswick (2003) are respectively -1235 and 838 
thousands rupiah. 
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3.6.2 Consumption equation estimates 
On the basis of the theoretical model presented in section 3.2, constrained households 
consume less and work more than if they were unconstrained, and these effects are even 
more pronounced in the face of a negative shock. Moreover, as previously suggested, for 
some households, consumption choices may not be based on the permanent income model, 
but rather be driven by current income and the need to accumulate savings. Consumption 
equation (3.22) is then analyzed focusing on the differences between constrained (small 
farms) and unconstrained (medium and large farms) households. Results are reported in table 
3.1049. The first difference between poor and non-poor farmers is related to the income 
measure which appears to be relevant for consumption choices. According to the permanent 
income hypothesis, consumption is determined by permanent income and not by current 
income: this implies that consumption should be unaffected by transitory income changes50. 
Our estimates suggest that consumption of medium and large farms is indeed determined 
by permanent income, while the crop loss has no impact on non-durable expenditures51. 
Consumption of small farms is instead influenced by both permanent and transitory income. 
The implications of this result for consumption smoothing are better grasped if we consider 
the difference in the estimated marginal propensity to consume out of permanent and 
transitory income. As suggested by Deaton (1997), a statistically positive difference between 
these two coefficients would represent evidence that households are willing/able to smooth 
consumption relative to income. This result is confirmed for medium and large farms (p-
value=0.000), but not for small farms. Indeed, the estimated coefficients on permanent 
income, crop loss, and extra labour income on consumption for small farms are statistically 
equal (test for the equality of the three coefficients: F(2,2162)=0.84, Prob>F=0.43)52. 
 
                                                 
49
 Five outliers which belong to the top percentile of the expenditure distribution are excluded from 
the expenditure regression. OLS estimates of (3.22) may be biased because households choose 
simultaneously consumption levels and coping strategies in the face of a shock. To control for the 
endogeneity of labour supply response, we included the selection terms, calculated from the probit for 
the labour supply response, in the consumption equation. They are not statistically significant and 
estimates do not significantly change. 
50
 Precisely, consumption smoothing means that short-term fluctuations in income are spread over a 
long time horizon, which can be defined as the lifetime (life-cycle model), or as an infinite horizon 
(which would be appropriated for a dynasty, according to the permanent income hypothesis).  
51
 We cannot reject the hypothesis that the effect of the shock on consumption is the same for medium 
and large farms (F(1,2161)=0.80, Prob>F=0.373). Hence we pool the two groups.  
52
 Flavin (1985) explores whether the empirical rejection of the permanent income hypothesis occurs 
because agents are myopic, or because some agents face liquidity constraints. She finds that the 
observed excess sensitivity of consumption to current income is due to liquidity constraints. The 
extent to which consumption is affected by the presence of borrowing constraints is examined also by 
Zeldes (1989).   
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A second distinction between poor and non-poor households is the magnitude of the 
marginal propensity to consume out of the relevant income measure. Rich farmers and 
owners of medium farms consume more than 70% of their permanent income53. The 
marginal propensity to consume out of current income for poor households is about 0.554, 
with the consequence that about one half of the current income is transferred into savings. 
This seems to confirm what suggested by the literature: in the face of exclusion from 
financial markets, poor households have to perform an autarchic saving strategy, to build a 
buffer stock of assets and to self-finance profitable investments (Carter and Barrett, 2005; 
Fafchamps, 1999).  
 
The third result that emerges from table 3.10 is that different coping strategies that change 
current income have different impacts on consumption for poor households. The income 
generated by the measures “non-business assets” and “take a loan or sell assets” is entirely 
used to mitigate the consumption reduction due to the crop loss, even if, as reported in tables 
3.9a and 3.9b, these measures have only a marginal role in compensating the income loss55. 
As noted above, the marginal propensity to consume out of extra labour income is about 0.5, 
and statistically lower than the one estimated for the other measures.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
53
 The marginal propensities to consume out of permanent income are 70% and 90% for medium and 
large farms respectively, and they are statistically different (F(1,2162)=3.69, Prob>F=0.055). 
54
 Test on coefficients:  
a) extra labour income=crop loss=permanent income=0.5: F(3,2162)=0.69, Prob>F=0.559 
b) extra labour income=crop loss=permanent income=0.7: F(3,2162)=4.80, Prob>F=0.002. 
55
 Coefficients on  “non-business assets” and “take a loan or sell assets” are non statistically different 
in consumption equation, hence we consider both measures together.  
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Table 3.10 
Expenditure equation estimates 
Variables Coef.  t 
ˆ
P
hY -small farms 0.45 6.28 
ˆ
P
hY -medium farms 0.71 7.71 
ˆ
P
hY -large farms 0.91 10.19 
3
ˆ
S
hY - small farms 0.63 3.03 
3
ˆ
S
hY - medium/large farms 0.08 0.87 
2 4
ˆ ˆ( )A Lh hX Xβ β+ -small farms 1.13 1.80 
3
ˆ
LS
hXβ - small farms 0.46 1.88 
Transitory positive income 1.20 5.70 
)1(*ˆ CLh −ε  0.13 1.22 
CLuh *ˆ  0.36 6.13 
members age 0-5 1.67 0.05 
members age 6-11 185.31 4.72 
members age 12-17 267.16 6.10 
members age 18-64 225.93 6.74 
members 65 year or over 126.16 2.02 
intercept 367.80 3.81 
R-squared= 0.33   
Number of obs= 2178     
The table records the results from equation (3.22). 
Dependent variable is 1993 non-durable household 
expenditure. Standard errors are robust 
 
 
3.7 Conclusions  
This chapter uses the 1993 round of the Indonesian Family Life Survey to explore two 
issues. First, we seek to explore which variables influence the adoption of ex-post income 
smoothing strategies and whether these strategies completely or partly recover the income 
reduction due to the shock. Quantitative measures of income shocks and households’ ability 
to cope with the shock are estimated for poor and non-poor households, and using these 
measures we can explore whether the increase in income due to income-smoothing strategies 
partially offsets, or exceeds, the income loss due to the shock. Our focus is on the labour 
supply response in the face of a crop loss. The second issue we explore is whether 
households smooth consumption relative to income and the role played by coping strategies 
(labour supply response in particular) in mitigating consumption reductions.  
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The descriptive analysis and the literature presented in the chapter suggest that the coping 
strategies adopted to overcome a crop loss, and the link between consumption and permanent 
or transitory income may be quite different between poor and non-poor households. Non-
poor households may have access to several coping mechanisms, such as borrowing or 
selling assets, and they may have enough resources to leave consumption unaffected in the 
face of a transitory shock. On the other hand, poor households have low endowment of assets 
and they may face borrowing constraints, thus needing to accumulate savings. In order to 
examine these issues, the analysis is conducted distinguishing between consumption 
behaviour of poor and non-poor households.  
 
The theoretical framework that underlines the analysis is a life-cycle model in which 
income is generated by farm profits and by off-farm labour income. Productive and 
unproductive assets, together with an exogenously determined amount of labour, enter as a 
determinant of farm profits, and the remaining amount of time can be allocated to either 
leisure or wage market. A negative shock reduces farm profits (and the amount of farm 
labour) and increases the marginal utility of off-farm labour income. The model predicts that 
the marginal utility of leisure and of consumption are both greater when households face 
credit constraints. This implies that in general constrained households consume less and 
work more than if they were unconstrained, and these effects are even more pronounced in 
the face of a negative shock.  
 
The empirical methodology follows a two-stage procedure. The predicted income for 
households that do not report a crop loss is estimated first. If the crop loss is exogenous, this 
predicted income is an appropriate estimate of the household’s income for all  households. 
For households that experienced a crop loss in 1993, the difference between the observed 
income and the predicted income is constructed. This difference is regressed on a set of 
variables that affect the magnitude of the income shock (e.g. farm assets), and the size of the 
income gains due to the labour supply response and other coping strategies. From that 
regression we construct measures of the income reduction caused by a crop loss and of the 
income gains due to coping strategies, and we can explore how much of the income loss the 
labour supply response and other strategies contribute to compensate. These measures are 
also used to examine the consumption choices of different households.  
In order to explore whether households smooth consumption relative to income, non-
durable household consumption is regressed on permanent income, the measures of crop loss 
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and income gains, and other household characteristics. We focus on the differences between 
constrained (small farms) and unconstrained (medium and large farms) households. 
 
Our results suggest that the income gain given by the extra labour supply response 
completely compensate the income reduction caused by the crop loss, while the role of non-
business assets and “take a loan or sell assets” is in general marginal in recovering the 
income loss. As regard consumption behaviour, there are two main differences between poor 
and non-poor households. First, while medium and large farms smooth consumption relative 
to income, this is not so for small farms: for the latter, the main components of transitory 
income (crop loss and the extra labour income) have an effect on consumption that is 
statistically significant and equal to the one associated with permanent income. This is not so 
for the income gain due to coping strategies other than labour supply: what poor households 
receive from taking a loan or selling assets is entirely used to mitigate the consumption 
reduction due to the crop loss, whereas the extra labour income due to the labour supply 
response is partly transferred into savings.   
The second distinction between poor and non-poor households concerns the marginal 
propensity to consume out of the relevant income measure: the former save about a half of 
their current income, whereas the latter consume a fraction of their permanent income close 
to one. This result may confirm the need for poor households, that are more likely to be 
excluded from financial markets, to rely on autarchic saving strategies. 
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Appendix 3A 
Following the Cameron and Worswick (2003)’s approach, household income is regressed 
on a set of variables that determine the permanent and transitory income components, where 
the transitory income is defined as the income reduction due to self-reported crop loss. The 
first column of table 3A.1 (CLS) reports the results from equation (3.8). In this framework 
the predicted measure of income loss includes also the income gains due to coping strategies. 
The second column (VLS) of table 3A.1 estimates the effect of the crop loss net of labour 
supply response. From these regressions we predict the household permanent income, and 
the size of the crop loss in the constant labour supply case (CLS) and in the variable labour 
supply case (VLS). Predicted income components are then used as regressors in the 
consumption equation, as reported in table 3A.2. 
Table 3A.1 
Income equation estimates 
 
CLS case VLS case 
Variables Coef. t Coef. t 
Income shock      
CL*farm assets*farm assets 
bottom25% 
-1.13 -1.69 -1.81 -2.40 
CL* farm assets* farm assets 25-
100% 
-0.01  -2.14 -0.02  -2.48 
LS*# members age 13-64 - - 158.60 1.86 
Positive transitory  income 
variables 
    
winnings 353.43  3.91 355.12  3.93 
gift 133.23 1.96 125.67 1.84 
Permanent income variables      
1992 farm assets 0.02 3.93 0.02 3.96 
1992 business non-farm assets 0.01 4.64 0.01 4.66 
1992 non-business assets 0.02 2.30 0.02 2.30 
pension 1182.01 3.84 1192.43 3.89 
Head employee 1126.65 8.18 1133.38 8.31 
Head self employed 141.64 1.49 145.86 1.56 
Head complete primary educ 64.57 1.16 64.50 1.16 
Head secondary educ 754.05 6.00 744.17 5.93 
Head high educ 1431.93 3.92 1421.86 3.88 
Nr. of income earner  176.24 4.52 173.64 4.68 
Household size  145.71 3.70 137.19 3.48 
Household size square -11.21 -3.08 -10.55 -2.91 
electricity in the village 81.03 1.55 82.57 1.58 
Intercept -318.46 -1.99 -307.86 -1.93 
Number of obs= 2183  
R-squared= 0.38 
The table records the results from income equations (3.8) and (3.11). Dependent variable 
is 1993 household income. Regressions include also provincial dummies. The selection 
terms that control for the endogeneity of the labour supply response are not statistically 
significant (they are jointly not statistically different from zero). Standard errors are 
robust. Household income and assets are in thousands of rupiah.  
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Table 3A.2 
1993 non durable expenditure equation estimates. 
 CLS case VLS case 
Variables Coef.  t Coef.  t Coef.  t Coef.  t 
P
hY  0.84 12.27 0.84 12.22 0.84 12.25 0.84 12.19 
S
hYˆ  0.62 1.69 - - 0.56 2.05 - - 
S
hYˆ - small farms - - 1.70 3.22 - - 1.05 3.33 
S
hYˆ - medium/large 
farms 
- - 0.21 0.45 - - 0.18 0.41 
Transitory positive 
income 1.24 4.93 1.25 4.98 1.24 4.93 1.25 4.96 
ε  0.32 6.54 0.32 6.53 0.32 6.54 0.32 6.53 
intercept 285.64 2.86 283.56 2.84 291.37 2.92 288.96 2.90 
         
F-Tests: 
1ˆ
0ˆ
=−
=−
smallYand
smallnonY
S
h
S
h   
 
F(2,2167)=0.96 
Prob>F=0.38 
 
F(2,2167)=0.10 
Prob>F =0.91 
R-squared= 0.33 
Number of obs= 2178  
This table reports the results of the expenditure regression. Regression includes also the number 
of household members in each age category. Standard errors are robust 
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Appendix 3B 
Table 3B.1 summarizes the sample characteristics for the main variables included in the 
income regressions presented in tables 3.5 and 3.8. The mean for dummy variables 
represents the proportion of that group: for example, 81% of the household heads work as 
self-employed, and 13% as private or government workers. 26% of the heads are illiterate 
and 35% did not complete the elementary level.  
Table 3B.1 
Sample means of variables included in the income regression 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Shocks 
1993 Crop loss 0.08 0.26 0 1 
1993 Labour supply 0.03 0.17 0 1 
“take a loan or sell assets” (1993) 0.03 0.16 0 1 
Household economy  
Household income 970.97 1506.37 -100 18464 
1992 farm asset 5551.32 15204.49 0 268025 
1992 business assets 399.60 7811.01 0 356650 
1992 illiquid non-business assets 3936.08 9829.80 0 275430 
1992 liquid non-business assets 190.53 628.64 0 9500 
whether a household member 
receives a pension 0.02 0.13 0 1 
whether the household receives 
winnings 0.17 0.38 0 1 
whether the household receives gifts 0.16 0.37 0 1 
# income earner other than the head 0.69 0.92 0 6 
Work status of the household head 
Head is inactive 0.05 0.21 0 1 
Head is employed 0.13 0.34 0 1 
Head is self employed 0.81 0.39 0 1 
Head is family worker 0.01 0.11 0 1 
Education of the household head 
Head unschooled 0.26 0.44 0 1 
Head incomplete primary 0.35 0.48 0 1 
Head completed primary 0.23 0.42 0 1 
Head secondary education 0.14 0.34 0 1 
Head high education 0.02 0.12 0 1 
Household size 4.59 2.01 1 16 
Electricity in the village 0.76 0.43 0 1 
The table reports the sample means of key variables used in the income equations 
reported in tables 3.5 and 3.8. Household income, expenditure and assets are in 
thousands of rupiah 
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The Effects of Risk and Shocks on School Progression in 
Rural Indonesia 
 
 
 
 
 
4.1  Introduction and literature review  
In developing countries where incomes are volatile and on average low, and financial and 
insurance markets are incomplete (Townsend, 1994; Morduch, 1990), ex ante risk and ex 
post shocks may have a large impact on child labour and child education. Many papers 
support the idea that, in poor countries, child time allocation may be used as a strategy to 
both insure ex ante against risk and to cope ex post with negative hardships in the face of 
incomplete insurance markets and credit constraints (Jacoby and Skoufias, 1997; Beegle at 
al., 2006; Baland and Robinson, 2000; Ranjan, 2001). Children may be used as means to 
amass a buffer stock, and/or they may be sent to work to earn money and support the family. 
Children may work as part-time family workers, helping their parents at home and in the 
fields. Moreover, children may drop out to save the costs of schooling. 
Focusing on the ex post responses to shock, many empirical and theoretical studies 
analyze the extent to which child time allocation provides a means to cope with transitory 
income shocks. Sawada and Lokshin (2001) find evidence of a positive effect of 
unanticipated shocks on child labour in rural Pakistan. Sawada (2003) shows that children’s 
propensity to drop out of school in rural Pakistan is related to transitory shocks. Beegle, 
Dehejia, and Gatti (2003; 2006) find that in Tanzania, crop shocks lead to a significant 
increase in the level of child labour, but that households with durable assets can mitigate 
these effects. Jacoby and Skoufias (1997) examine the extent to which income shocks affect 
school participation of children in rural India, and the role played by incomplete financial 
markets in determining child schooling decisions. Guarcello et al. (2003) analyze the effects 
of collective and individual shocks on household decisions concerning children’s school 
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attendance and labour supply in Guatemala. Their results suggest that credit rationing is a 
key determinant of the household’s decision to invest in the human capital of children. 
Jensen (2000) shows that school enrolment rates substantially decline in the presence of 
adverse agricultural conditions in Cote d’Ivoire. Thomas et al. (2004) find evidence that the 
1997 Indonesian crisis had negative effects on education of young children in poor 
households. Duryea et al. (2007) analyze the impact of household short-term economic 
shocks (unemployment of the household head) on schooling and employment transitions of 
young people in Brazil.  
Another strand of literature examines how ex ante risk affects education and child labour 
decisions. Kazianga (2005) shows that child time may be used as an ex ante measure to 
diversify risk in an uncertain environment. He finds that the less well developed are other 
formal or informal insurance mechanisms, the more is child labour used. Maitra et al. (2006) 
show that, in India, children serve as a buffer to deal with the uncertainty created by the 
labour market. Households may prefer neither to send the children to work nor to send them 
to school, instead keeping them idle to deal with uncertainty. Fitzsimons (2007) finds 
evidence that, in Indonesia, aggregate village components of risk negatively affect children 
education, whereas households are able to insure themselves against idiosyncratic risk 
without reducing child schooling. Jalan and Ravallion (2001) find no evidence that risk 
decreases child schooling in Rural China; indeed, they find that the coefficient on income 
risk is positive and significant at the 5% level. 
 
The use of child time as a risk management strategy, both ex ante and ex post, may have 
long run consequences. Children who are withdrawn from school may not be able to restart 
school or to recover the educational gap: in this way temporary schooling interruptions have 
lasting impacts. This issue is less well established in either the theoretical or the empirical 
literature. Jacoby and Skoufias (1997) find that eliminating the negative effect of shocks on 
child schooling would have only modest effects on children’s human capital attainment. 
Guarcello et al. (2003) observe that child labour has a high degree of persistence, because it 
is difficult to return to school. Duryea et al. (2007) point out the potential long-term 
consequences of short term shocks for children’s human capital.  
 
Few papers propose a theoretical treatment of child schooling choices in the presence of 
risk taking into account the irreversibility or state dependence of school attendance. De 
Janvry et al. (2006) develop a model of child schooling decisions in the face of income 
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shocks with a re-entry cost as an additional cost of schooling. This allows them to consider 
the dependence of child enrollment on previous schooling decisions. Using Mexican data, 
they find evidence that shocks force children to drop out of school with long run effects on 
children’s human capital given the state dependence of school attendance. They find that this 
state dependence is higher in secondary than in primary school, suggesting that school 
attendance is more flexible for children at the elementary than at the secondary level.  
 
The first contribution of this chapter is that it analyzes the role that both ex ante risk and 
ex post shocks play in determining parental decisions with regard to child schooling, 
differentiating by school levels. The key assumption of the model is that withdrawal from 
school is an absorbing state, that is children cannot re-enroll once they stop going to school. 
In this way, temporary interruptions in child schooling in the face of risk or short-term 
shocks have long term impacts on the child human capital. Given irreversibility of 
withdrawal from school, risk and uncertainty enter the schooling decision in different ways 
from that proposed by the literature (which suggests that income risk decreases child 
education, see Fitzsimons, 2007): in the face of household future income variability parents 
are more likely to send children to school in the current period to give them the option to 
continue with higher schooling levels in the future (and hence earn higher earnings when 
they become adults). When income is revealed the household may withdraw the child from 
school if this should prove necessary (but cannot re-enrol the child if he/she has been 
previously withdrawn). 
 
This chapter analyzes the progression decisions from one education level to another (in 
particular, from elementary to junior secondary school) using the Indonesian Family Life 
Survey. The focus on school transitions has been suggested by the low continuation rates in 
Indonesia after graduation, and in particular after the completion of the primary level. 
Moreover, differentiating the decision to attend school by school levels allows us to better 
capture the effects of the state dependence.   
 
The chapter is organized as follows. Section II presents some evidence on child schooling 
in Indonesia and descriptive analyses of the data. The theoretical model is presented in 
section III. Section IV discusses the empirical methodology and section V summarizes the 
results. Section VI concludes.  
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4.2  Evidence on child schooling in Indonesia 
This section first presents a brief picture of the educational system in Indonesia, showing 
how it is organized, and outlining the main problems and the main changes over recent years. 
Then data on child education are discussed, with reference to the 1993 round of the 
Indonesian Family Life Survey (IFLS1). The second part of this paragraph examines the 
main differences in enrolment rates with regard to gender, poverty status and level of 
schooling. Finally, data on school infrastructure and on household educational expenditure 
are briefly discussed.  
 
4.2.3 The Indonesian education system  
Over past decades, Indonesia has invested a large amount in the education system, 
improving both the quantity and quality of education. By 1984 the Indonesian government 
had fully implemented the six year compulsory education for primary school age children, 
and the 1994 law increased the compulsory basic education to nine years: six years of 
primary education (for ages 7-12) and three years of junior secondary education (ages 13-
15). Currently, the formal school system consists of the following levels:     
Table 4.1 
The Indonesian schooling system 
Level Year Age Cost of schooling 
Elementary 
school 
compulsory 
education 
(since 1984) 
1-6 7-12a Public schools are free; tuition fees for private schools 
Junior 
secondary 
school 
compulsory 
education 
(since 1994) 
7-9 13-15 Public schools are free; tuition fees for private schools 
Senior secondary school 10-12 16-18 
No free education. Partial 
government support for the 
senior secondary education 
Under 
graduate 13-16 19-22 
Post 
graduate 17-18 23-24 
Doctorate  
Higher 
education 
19-21 25-27 
No-free education. 
Government does not support 
attendance of public 
universities 
The table presents the Indonesian schooling system. 
a
 6 years olds can also be admitted 
Source: American Institutes for Research (2002). On-line source: 
http://www.ieq.org/pdf/2nd_Ed_Casestudy_paper.pdf 
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At the junior and senior secondary levels there are two curricula: academic and 
vocational. The public sector provides the greater part of the education services, and 
compulsory education is free, but there is a strong private education sector as well.  
 
The survey utilized in the empirical analysis of this chapter is from the first round of the 
Indonesian Family Life Survey (IFLS1), conducted in 1993. In that year, only the primary 
schooling level was compulsory, and since the early 1980’s government has made a major 
effort to achieve the goal of universal elementary education. These policies were largely 
successful in improving primary educational levels, but two aspects of the Indonesian 
educational system remained particularly problematic (Manning, 2000; UNDP, 2004): high 
drop out rates from both primary and secondary school (the drop out rate was nearly 20% in 
1993/94 for primary school, and 8% in junior secondary school in 1990/91), and low 
continuation rates from primary to junior secondary school (the continuation rate was close 
to 62% in 1993/94). These high drop out and low continuation rates have been seen as causes 
of adult illiteracy and reliance on child labour (Manning, 2000). A new policy was thus 
required to achieve universal education, and in 1994 compulsory basic education was 
increased to nine years. Currently, elementary education is almost universal: primary net 
enrolment ratios reached 93% in 2002 (figure 4.1), with no significant differences between 
rural and urban areas, between girls and boys, or across poverty quintiles (UNDP, 2004). As 
a result of the 1994 law, continuation rates from primary to junior secondary rose to nearly 
72% in 1999-2000, and the net enrolment ratio at junior secondary school increased from 
42% in 1992 to 62% in 2002 (figure 4.1), although with significant differences between rural 
and urban areas (lower in rural areas) and between poor and rich households. Recent policy 
interventions have significantly reduced dropout rates (only 3% at elementary level, and 4% 
at junior secondary level in 2000/01). In spite of this, a substantial proportion of children still 
fail to complete the nine year basic education cycle (UNDP, 2004), and children from poor 
families are more likely to drop out of school early and to be called upon to support their 
parents (Acedo, 2002). Manning (2000) reports that approximately 15%-20% of children 
aged 12-13 and 20%-30% of children aged 14-15 are not enrolled in school and may 
potentially be involved in the work force.  
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Figure 4.2. Net enrollment ratios, primary and junior secondary school 
0
20
40
60
80
100
1992 1995 1997 1999 2001
%
primary education
junior secondary
education
Source:  Susenas, UNDP (2004). Net enrollment ratio is the share of children of 
official age that are enrolled in school 
 
 
4.2.4 Data – Child education  
This sub-section discusses the main findings on child education in rural Indonesia, based 
on IFLS1 (1993) data and using individual, household and village sampling weights for the 
descriptive analysis. Most children start school at age 7, and only a few individuals are at 
school after age 17. This suggests a focus on the sample of children aged 7-17 years. 
Approximately 75% of Indonesian children in the 7-17 age group were attending school in 
1993. The number of years in education averaged four, with marginally statistically 
significant differences between girls and boys (slightly higher for boys). Table 4.2 provides 
further information on average values of child and household characteristics. To briefly 
summarize, the average values of schooling years were 3.3 years for the mother and 4.2 
years for the father (the length of the primary level was six years). Nearly all siblings aged 7-
12 years were attending school, while 60% of siblings aged 13-15 years were in school and 
less than one out of three of young adults aged 16-18 years were in school.  
As regards the economy of the family, farm earnings were the main income source for 
rural households. Farms were typically owned by the household head and in many cases 
were cultivated with the help of family members (children may have been involved in the 
family farm). On the basis of the survey, nearly half the households did not have an income 
earner other than the head.  
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Table 4.2 
Mean characteristics of households and children 
 
Weighted 
mean
a 
Standard 
Error 
Age of child  11.74 0.05 
Female child 0.48 0.01 
Child attending school 0.75 0.01 
Child years of schooling (completed) 3.93 0.05 
Years of schooling mother (if there is the 
mother) 3.24 0.08 
Years of schooling father (if there is the father) 4.39 0.10 
# sibling attending school aged 7-12 years/ # 
sibling aged 7-12 years 0.90 0.01 
# sibling attending school aged 13-15 years/ # 
sibling aged 13-15 years 0.61 0.02 
# sibling attending school aged 16-18 years/ # 
sibling aged 16-18 years 0.28 0.02 
Household owns house 0.93 0.01 
Log value of mthly per capita expenditure 10.29 0.02 
Household owns farm 0.63 0.01 
Household owns non farm business 0.32 0.01 
Head is self-employed 0.65 0.01 
Head is self-employed with the help of family 
worker 0.34 0.01 
Head is employee 0.27 0.01 
Number of income earners other than the head 0.79 0.02 
Number of children 4498  
Number of households  2239  
The table presents the main characteristics of the households and of the 
children. Per capita expenditure is in rupiah. 
a Household and individual sampling weights are used.  
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Looking at the primary activity of children during the week prior to the interview, the 
percentage of those that reported attending school is nearly 66% with significant differences 
between boys and girls (table 4.3; this information was only sought from children of ten or 
more years old56). A substantial proportion of children reported work or job search as their 
primary activity, and a similar percentage of girls reported doing housework. In Indonesia 
there is a considerable jump in work participation after 14 years (Fitzsimons, 2007) and 
hence the same data are presented for the 10-14 age group (table 4.4). The percentage of 
children that reported attending school as primary activity increases to about 79% but is 
slightly lower for girls. Among 10-14 years olds, approximately 9% reported work or 
looking for a job as their primary activity, with no significant differences between males and 
females. The proportion of girls that did the housework decreases compared with the age 10-
17 group, but is still substantial.  
Table 4.3 
 Primary activity during the week prior to the interview, children aged 10-17 yearsa 
 Male Female Male and female 
 Freq. Weighted % Freq. 
Weighted 
% Freq. 
Weighted 
% 
Working 227 14.0 189 12.6 416 13.3 
Job searching  77 5.5* 39 3.1* 116 4.4 
Attending school 1,149 66.9* 1,039 62.7* 2,188 64.9 
Housekeeping  13 0.9* 153 10.1* 167 5.3 
Other 184 12.4 159 11.6 342 10.0 
Total # of children  1,650 100 1,579 100 3,229 100 
The table reports the primary activity of children aged 10-17 years during the week prior to the 
interview.  
a
 this  question was only asked of children 10+ years old 
* the difference in the weighted proportions are statistically significant 
 
Table 4.4 
Primary activity during the week prior to the interview, children aged 10-14 yearsa 
 Male Female Male and female 
 Freq. Weighted % Freq. 
Weighted 
% Freq. 
Weighted 
% 
Working 65 6.2 64 5.7 129 5.9 
Job searching  27 3.1 18 2.3 45 2.7 
Attending school 913 80.6 861 77.2 1,774 79.0 
Housekeeping  7 0.6* 46 4.0* 53 2.3 
Other 97 9.5 97 10.6 194 10.1 
Total # of children  1,084 100 1,086 100 2,195 100 
The table reports the primary activity of children aged 10-14 years during the week prior to 
the interview. 
* the difference in the weighted proportions is statistically significant 
                                                 
56
 A survey by Asra (1993, 1996) suggests that the work of children under 10 years old is very small 
in Indonesia compared with those 10 plus years old. 
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We examine now in detail the school participation rates by gender, poverty status and 
school levels.      
 
Primary education 
Net enrolment ratios. Data from the IFLS show that in Indonesia the 1993 net enrolment 
ratio (NER) was approximately 87% (table 4.5), confirming the findings of other studies 
(UNDP, 2004). Achieving universal primary education has been a national goal since the 
early 1980’s, and these data show that ten years on, Indonesia achieved high levels of access 
to basic education for children aged 7 to 13 years. Looking at table 4.5, we can see that there 
is gender equity in access to primary education (the participation rate is only slightly higher 
for girls than for boys). Enrollment rates increase as per capita consumption expenditure 
(PCE) rises, both for males and females, even if the disparities between poverty terciles are 
not so marked.  
Gross enrolment ratios. Students may enroll late (over 7 years of age) or may repeat 
grades, with the consequence that they complete primary school when they are older than 
twelve. To account for that, Gross Enrolment Ratios (GER) for primary education are 
reported (table 4.5). If many children outside the official primary school age range are 
enrolled in primary school, the GER will exceed the NER by a large amount. Data show that 
in Indonesia there are many under-age and over-age children who attend elementary level, in 
particular for boys and among poor households.  
Table 4.5 
 Net and gross enrollment ratios in primary schools by PCC tercile and gender  
 NER (%) GER (%) 
 Male  Female Male and 
Female  
Male  Female  Male and 
Female 
Lower third 80.7 82.3 81.5 94.1 91.9 93.0 
Middle third  91.1 89.4 90.2 99.5 99.3 99.4 
Upper third  89.3 90.7 90.0 99.2 98.1 98.7 
All 87.0 87.4 87.1 97.6 96.4 96.9 
The table reports the net and gross enrollment ratios for elementary school. 
Net enrollment ratio (NER)= enrolled children in the age group 7-12 / total # of children 
in the age group 7-12 
Gross enrollment ratio (GER)= enrolled children / total # of children in the age group 7-12 
 
Junior secondary education 
Net and gross enrolment ratios. In 1993 junior secondary education was not 
compulsory, and there was a low continuation rate after the graduation from primary school. 
Table 4.6 reports NER and GER for the junior secondary level. In 1993 only approaching 
40% of the age group was enrolled in junior secondary school, with a lower participation rate 
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for girls than for boys (37% and 42% respectively). Data show considerable disparities 
between poverty terciles, with an NER for the top third of the PCC distribution more than 
twice than that of the lowest third. The gender gap was relatively low for poor and rich 
households, whereas it was high for the middle third. There is a significant jump in male 
junior secondary enrolment rates between the lower and the middle third of PCC 
distribution, while the corresponding jump for female enrolment is between the middle and 
the upper tercile57. The GER for junior secondary is about 50%. As for the NER, there are 
considerable differences by gender and household wealth.  
Table 4.6 
Net and gross enrollment ratios in junior secondary schools by PCC tercile and gender  
 NER GER 
 Male  Female Male and 
Female  
Male  Female  Male and 
Female 
Lower third 26.6 24.5 25.6 36.4 31.8 34.1 
Middle third  42.4 28.2 35.3 53.8 39.9 46.9 
Upper third  58.3 56.8 57.6 78.9 71.4 75.2 
All  42.4 36.5 39.5 56.4 47.7 52.0 
The table reports the net and gross enrollment ratios for junior secondary school. 
Net enrollment ratio (NER)= enrolled children in the age group 13-15/ total # of children in 
the age group 13-15 
Gross enrollment ratio (GER)= enrolled children/total # of children in the age group 13-15 
 
As discussed above, there is a small fraction of children not enrolled in primary school, 
and a considerable number of children not attending junior secondary level. Considering out-
of-school children, we may distinguish between children who have never enrolled in school, 
and those who have at some time been to school. This second group may be further divided 
between children who drop out before the completion of the school level, and children who 
stop going to school after graduation. These decisions may have different implications for 
the child’s human capital and the likelihood that he/she becomes literate when adult.  
Tables 4.7 reports the weighted percentages of children and young adults who are not 
enrolled in school, but have attended at some time, by age and gender. Less then 5% of 
children aged 8 through 11 years are not enrolled in school, with a small gender gap. After 
the age of 12 the percentage of children not enrolled in school increases (at that age children 
should have graduated from the primary level): about 11% of 12 year old and 24% of 13 year 
old children are not enrolled in school, as is the case for more than half children aged 15 to 
17 years. With increased age, the gender gap significantly rises, as girls are less likely to be 
                                                 
57
 A possible explanation is that households in the middle third of the PCC distribution were able and 
willing to send boys to junior secondary school, but were less willing to do so for girls. As in primary 
education, there was a large number of children aged younger than 13 or older than 15 attending 
junior secondary school. 
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enrolled in school. The distribution of out-of-school children by age suggests that the largest 
loss occurs at the transition points between school levels. To better describe this issue, table 
4.8 shows the distribution of out-of-school children, who have at some time been to school, 
according to the number of schooling years completed. More than half of out-of-school 
children aged 7-17 years, and who have at some time been to school, left school after 
graduation from primary level. The proportion of out-of-school children who completed less 
than six schooling years is nearly 27% for both boys and girls. This percentage increases to 
33% for poor households, compared with 21% of rich households. Rich households have a 
higher percentage of out-of-school children that completed junior secondary school. 
School progression rates at different educational stage can be further analyzed estimating 
the conditional survival function (we follow the procedure of Sawada and Lokshin, 2007). 
Let nk denote the number of children who have completed education at least at stage k-1 (the 
set is not right-censored at education level k-1). Among these nk students, define as hk the 
number of children who have completed education at least at level k, so that hk= nk+1. Then 
hk/nk is the fraction of students who progressed to a higher stage of education, conditional on 
having completed stage k-1; this is an estimate of the conditional survival probability at 
education level k. Results suggest that in 1993 the probability of continuation after the 
completion of the elementary school in rural Indonesia was 65% (as reported in section 
4.2.1, Manning (2000) and UNDP (2004) reported a continuation rate close to 62% in 
1993/94), and the probability of continuation to senior secondary school was 73%. 
 
Table 4.7 
School non-enrollment percentages,  by gender and age 
Child Age 
(yrs) 
Male 
(%) 
Female 
(%) 
Male and female  
(%) 
7 0.7 0.5 0.6 
8 2.6 1.4 2.0 
9 1.6 2.6 2.0 
10 3.0 3.5 3.2 
11 4.4 3.8 4.1 
12 12.1 11.0 11.5 
13 20.6 28.7 24.6 
14 34.6 43.8 38.8 
15 50.9 52.0 51.4 
16 63.9 73.4 67.9 
17 61.2 70.2 65.7 
The table reports the percentages of children that are not 
enrolled in school by age and gender. Percentages are 
computed using individual sampling weights and on the sub-
sample of children that have at some time been to school. 
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Table 4.8 
Distribution of out-of-school children according to schooling 
years completed and gender 
School level 
Number of 
years 
completed 
Male 
(%) 
Female 
(%) 
Male and 
female (%) 
Elementary – not 
completed <6 28.2 26.9 27.6 
Elementary – 
completed 6 58.9 62.1 60.5 
Junior secondary – 
not completed 7-8 4.3 2.3 3.4 
Junior secondary - 
completed 9 7.9 8.2 8.0 
Senior secondary  > 9 0.7 0.5 0.6 
TOT 100 100 100 
N 878   
The table reports the distribution of out-of-school children 
according to number of schooling years completed. Percentages are 
computed using individual sampling weights and on the sub-sample 
of children 7-17 years old that are not at school but have at some 
time been to school 
 
Table 4.9 presents some data on the time utilization of out-of-school children who have 
previously attended school, focusing on the sub-sample of children aged 10-14 years. Data 
suggest that being out-of-school does not necessarily mean working: some children neither 
go to work nor go to school (this category of children is referred to as “idle children” in the 
literature). The proportion of children involved in the labour force is statistically greater for 
boys than for girls, whereas girls are more likely to do housework and be involved in 
childcare. In considering the link between being out-of-school and working, it is also 
important to bear in mind that the direction of causation is not necessarily form child labour 
to being out-of-school but could also be that children work because they are unable to go to 
school (Probe report, 1999)58.  
 
 
                                                 
58
 IFLS2 (1997) asked parents why the child stopped going to school or has never been to school. 
Besides the motive “to help parents” and “could not afford”, other reasons were:  “child doesn’t want 
to go”, “child was not able to study”, “child was not accepted”. Similarly, the Probe report presents 
the situation of an eight-year old boy dropped out in class one because of being teased and beaten by 
other children; he spends the day working.  
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  Table 4.9 
Primary activity during the week prior to the interview, out of 
school children (aged 10-14 years) – weighted percentages  
 Male Female Male and female 
Working59 37.1* 26.6* 31.6 
Job searching  16.5 11.5 13.9 
Housekeeping  2.7* 20.3* 12.0 
Other 43.7 41.6 42.5 
Total  100 100 100 
Number of children 143 164 307 
The table shows the primary activity during the week prior to the 
interview of out of school children. Percentages are computed using 
individual sampling weights and on the sub-sample of children of 10-
14 years old that are not at school but have at some time been to 
school.  
* the difference in the weighted proportions is statistically significant 
Considering children who have never enrolled in school, the 1993 Indonesian data show 
that nearly 4% of males and 5% of females aged 7-17 years had never been to school (the 
gender gap is significant at the 10% but not at the 5% level), with significant differences 
between poor and non-poor households (table 4.10). These findings may partly reflect the 
fact that children may start school after age seven and hence the same data are presented for 
the 10-17 age group. The proportion of “never-enrolled” boys substantially decreases, in 
particular for poor households, suggesting that many poor households send their boys to 
school late. The proportion of “never-enrolled” girls decreases less than that of boys, and the 
gender gap becomes larger. There are significant disparities between poor and non-poor 
households for both males and females.  
Table 4.10 
Proportion of “never enrolled” children, by PCC tercile and gender (weighted %) 
 Age 7-17 Age 10-17 
 Male Female Male Female 
Lower third 8.4 
(0.010) 
10.1 
(0.010) 
3.8 
(0.009) 
8.1 
(0.015) 
Middle third  2.7 
(0.007) 
3.9 
(0.008) 
1.5 
(0.006) 
2.3 
(0.008) 
Upper third  1.6 
(0.005) 
2.5 
(0.006) 
0.3 
(0.003) 
1.6 
(0.006) 
All  4.3 
(0.005) 
5.5 
(0.006) 
1.8 
(0.004) 
4.0 
(0.006) 
The table reports the percentages of children that have never been to school. 
Percentages are computed using individual sampling weights. Standard errors in 
parenthesis.  
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 In Indonesia the minimum legal working age is 15, but the ILO convention was only ratified in 
1999 (Fitzsimons, 2003). 
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“Never-enrolled” children, aged ten or more years, may be involved in the labour force 
(nearly 30%), may be looking for a job or doing housework (25%), or may have other 
activities (45% report “other” as primary activity during the week prior to the interview). For 
households in the lower third of the PCC distribution, the proportion of “never-enrolled” 
children that work increases to 40%, while adding those that are looking for a job or doing 
housework, the proportion rises to 63%. As noted in table 4.9, children that have never been 
to school are not necessarily actively involved in work, including domestic work, and the 
need for child labour appears higher for poor than for rich households.  
 
4.2.3 Data - Infrastructural facilities: school availability and school quality 
An important issue in determining school attendance is the availability of school 
facilities. Educational policy in Indonesia has focused on the provision of basic elementary 
education for all, implementation of efforts to increase access to primary education together 
with improvement of education quality. According to IFLS data, in 1993 almost all rural 
villages had at least one elementary school (99%), and many of them (83%) had more than 
one school. Lack of schooling infrastructure emerges as a problem at the secondary level: in 
1993 nearly 65% and 85% of villages did not have a junior or a senior secondary school 
respectively, and very few villages had more than one such school. Poor infrastructure 
increases the cost of sending a child to secondary school, mainly as the result of 
transportation costs and the cost of room rental and meals. Moreover, parents may be 
reluctant to send their daughters  to school outside the village (as suggested by the Probe 
report, 1999, for India), reducing the possibility for girls to increase their educational levels.  
 
Table 4.11 
Number of schools in the villages 
 Weighted 
mean 
Standard 
Error 
# of primary schools 2.99 0.15 
Ratio of good primary schools 0.49 0.04 
# of junior secondary schools 0.50 0.08 
Ratio of good junior secondary schools 0.40 0.06 
# of senior secondary schools 0.19 0.05 
Ratio of good senior secondary schools 0.42 0.11 
# of villages with at least one elementary school 130  
# of villages with at least one junior secondary school 54  
# of villages with at least one senior secondary  school 24  
# of villages 132  
The table shows the number of schools in the village. Descriptive statistics are 
computed using the village sampling weights.  
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Even when school facilities are available at a convenient distance, their quality may be 
inadequate. As reported in table 4.11, nearly half of the elementary schools are considered of 
good quality by the head of the village, while the proportion of good schools decreases to 
about 40% at the junior and senior secondary levels. 
 
4.2.4 Data - Educational expenditure 
Several studies indicate that the costs of education play a major role in determining the 
choice of poor families to withdraw children from school. In Indonesia, basic public school 
is provided free, but this does not imply that parents bear no educational expenditures. 
Moreover, as noted above, the cost of attending secondary school is greater than that of 
primary school because many children will be obliged to go to school outside the home 
village. Table 4.12 reports the weighted averages of educational expenditure, distinguishing 
between expenditures for children inside and outside the household. Households devote 
nearly 12% of their total expenditure to education, with significant differences according to 
PCC terciles (the share is 7% for poor households, and 14% for rich households). 
 
Table 4.12 
Educational expenditure 
 Weighted 
mean 
Standard 
Error 
Total annual educational expenditure 289.7 17.5 
Annual educational expenditure for 
children inside the household 220.5 11.7 
Annual educational expenditure for 
children outside the household 69.8 12.2 
Share on total annual expenditure (by 
PCC tercile) (%)   
Lower third   7.0 0.004 
Middle third   8.0 0.004 
Upper third   14.0 0.006 
Average 12.0 0.003 
#  of households 2339  
The table reports weighted means and standard errors of educational 
expenditure. Household sampling weights are used. Annual 
educational expenditures are in thousands of rupiah. 
 
In the empirical strategy we will analyze in detail educational expenditure, estimating the 
cost of attending each level of school.  
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This section emphasized the low continuation rate after the graduation from the 
elementary level. Enrollment rates in junior secondary school are low, with large differences 
between poor and rich households. The theoretical and empirical model will therefore focus 
on the schooling decisions made at the transition points, and in particular on school 
progression at the point of the graduation from the primary level.  
 
4.3  The theoretical model 
The model developed in this section aims to analyze the determinants of the school 
progression in rural Indonesia, and in particular the role played by ex ante risk and ex post 
shocks. Consider a household in which there are one parent and one child (Basu and Van, 
1998).60 The parent earns an exogenous income ( ty , with t=1,2,3), which is not known by 
the household prior to the period in question, and decides on the child’s time use. We focus 
on the schooling decisions of children who have graduated from the elementary level. We 
can divide children’s life time into three periods: t=1,2,3. The first two periods are the child 
schooling phase (after the completion of the primary level), where 1 and 2 are respectively 
the junior and senior secondary school (each of them lasts three years). In the third period the 
child has become an adult, and his human capital depends on the decisions made in the 
schooling phase. As suggested in the paragraph 4.2, many children stop attending school 
after the completion of the primary level, and this makes the analysis of progression choices 
an important issue. Hence, this model focuses on the decisions the household faces at the 
transition points: continuation from elementary to junior secondary school (decision point 
t=1, at the beginning of period 1), and, conditional on an affirmative choice in that case, 
continuation from junior to senior secondary school (decision point t=2, at the beginning of 
period 2)61.  
If the child is enrolled in school, the parent pays an annual cost of schooling defined as 
p for junior secondary school and q p>  for senior school. If the child does not attend 
school, he may work and earn an income which depends on the highest education level 
completed (as well as on experience): wt is the income earned at time t if the highest level is 
elementary school, xt and zt are the incomes of junior and senior secondary graduates 
respectively. The key assumption of this model is the irreversibility of the decision to 
                                                 
60
 This may be simply a convention, we can think of the two parents as “one parent” and the children 
as “one child” (Basu and Van, 1998). In the empirical analysis, we will consider more than one child 
per household.  
61
 Sawada and Lokshin (2007) analyze the school progression in rural Pakistan. They develop a 
theoretical framework to model the sequential schooling decisions. 
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withdraw the child from school: once the child drops out, he cannot return to school. This 
implies that if the child stops attending school at the elementary level, this will be the highest 
grade completed at the end of the schooling phase, and for the remainder of his working life 
(period three), and hence he will earn a lower income than that he would have earned by 
continuing to attend school ( 3 3x w>  if the child has stopped after the junior school and 
3 3 3z x w> >  if the child has continued to senior school).    
To summarize the outcomes (all discounted) are: 
 
 Parent’s income Child’s income School Cost 
 t = 1 t = 2 t = 3 t = 1 t = 2 t = 3 t = 1 t = 2 
only 
elementary 
school 
y1 2y  3y  w1 w2 w3 0 0 
elementary + 
junior 
secondary 
school 
y1 2y  3y  0 x2 > w2 3 3x w>  p 0 
junior + senior 
secondary 
school 
y1 2y  3y  0 0 3 3
( )a z x+ >
 
p q
 
> p 
 
The tilde indicates a variable which is not known by the household prior to the period in 
question. We assume that adult incomes are random as is the child’s adult income after 
graduating from junior secondary school. School costs and incomes for those who have not 
completed junior secondary school are modelled as fixed. The outcomes assume that the 
child’s income and the cost of schooling are certain. These assumptions are made to simplify 
the analysis. The earnings of a senior secondary school graduate contains a term a which 
depends on ability. Ability is observed by the family when it makes education decisions but 
not by the econometrician, who is obliged to treat it as random, with distribution function 
F(a). Ability enters as a determinant of the adult income only if the child is graduated from 
the senior secondary school, i.e. we assume that ability affects productivity only at high 
levels of human capital.   
 
We suppose that household decisions can be characterized by a standard strictly concave 
utility function ( )u ⋅  which has total net household income as its argument. Following Jacoby 
and Skoufias (1997) and Fitzsimons (2007) we do not consider child leisure or child 
education directly in the utility function. Parents care about a child’s schooling as it 
contributes to household income. We suppose that the child continues to be a member of the 
household even when he becomes an adult, implying that the sum of adult’s (ex child) and 
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parent’s incomes enters in the utility function, and that the source of income does not matter. 
This assumes homogeneous preferences within the household (or that there is a benevolent 
dictator). A further assumption of the model is that there are no savings and borrowings (De 
Janvry et al., 2006)62. This implies that utility depends only on current income and costs. Our 
assumption is more reasonable than the polar alternative of full equalization of expected 
marginal utility over time (Fitzsimons, 2007). Intermediate cases are more difficult to 
analyze.  
 
The problem is solved as a dynamic programme. The household first evaluates the 
expected decision to attend  senior secondary school and then moves back to the earlier 
decision with respect to junior secondary schooling conditional on the anticipated senior 
secondary school decision. 
 
Consider first the decision to continue to senior secondary school conditional on having 
completed both elementary and junior secondary school. The household will do this if 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2 3 3 2 2 3 3u y q Eu y z a u y x Eu y x− + δ + + ≥ + + δ +   (4.1) 
where δ is the discount rate from period 3 to period 2. Note that y2 is known at the time 
this decision is made.  
For simplicity, suppose that income is stationary63 so s tE y y=  for all s < t and define 
( )u u y= . Similarly suppose 3 0sE z =  for s=1,2. Write the income deviations as 
( )1t ty y= + η  and ( )3 3 31 (1 )z a y= + ζ = λ + ζ . Assume 
3 2
2
3
0 1
,
0
N
η  ρθ      
σ      ζ ρθ θ      
∼ and 22 (0, )Nη σ∼ , and suppose that 3η  and  3ζ  are 
independent of 2η . Note that ( ) ( )2 2 2' ' " 1 'u y u yu r u+ η = − η  where "
'
yu
r
u
= − , the 
coefficient of relative risk aversion evaluated at .y y=  On this basis, we can expand the left 
hand side of equation (4.1) as  
( ) ( )2 2 21 'u y q u y r q u− + η − − η    
                                                 
62
 As noted in chapter two, only the richest households are able to accumulate savings and use them to 
cope with shocks. 
63
 This is consistent with the analysis conducted in chapters two and three, where we distinguish 
between permanent and transitory income. In a regression we will report in table 4C.4 (appendix 4C), 
the coefficient on 1993 income in a 1997 income regression is about 0.3, significantly smaller than 
one. This implies that there is some persistence in income shocks, but not a lot. 
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and  
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
21
3 3 3 3 3 32
21
3 3 3 32
2 2 2
' "
' 2 , "
' 1 2 '
2
Eu y z a u u E y y z a u E y y z a
u au Var y Cov y z Var z a u
r
u au yu
  + + + − + + + − + +   
 = + + + + + 
 = + − + ρλθ + λ σ + θ 
    
     
On this basis, we can expand the left hand side of equation (4.1) as 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) [ ]
( )
2 3 3 2 2
2 2 2
1 ' '
1 2 '
2
u y q Eu y z a u y r q u u au
r yu
− + δ + + + η − − η + δ +  
δ  
− + ρλθ + λ σ + θ 
  
 
Similarly, the right hand side of equation (4.1) is  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 212 2 3 3 2 2 2 3 2' 1 ' 'u y x Eu y x u u y r x u x u ryu+ + δ + + η + − η + δ + − δ σ    . 
It follows that the child will continue to senior school if  
 ( ) ( )( ) ( ) 2 213 2 2 21 2a x r q x r y δ − ≥ − η + + δ ρθ + λ λσ + θ  . (4.2) 
The left hand side of equation (4.2) is the discounted anticipated benefit from attending 
senior secondary school, i.e. net additional income. The right hand side contains two terms: 
the first is the financial cost of attending senior secondary school, adjusted for any deviation 
of period 2 marginal utility from its average level. The second term is the money equivalent 
of the utility cost of the uncertainty associated with adult (period 3) income. 
 
Suppose the population distribution of ability is distributed with mean zero and variance 
2ω 64. The probability Q that the child will attend senior secondary school, as evaluated by 
the econometrician, is then  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
2 21
3 2 2 2
2 22 1
3 2 2
Pr 1 2
1 2
.
Q a z z x r q x r y
r
z x q x r y
F
  = δ − + − ≥ − η + + δ ρθ + λ λσ + θ     
− η  − − + − ρθ + λ λσ + θ  δ
=  
ω 
 
(4.3) 
                                                 
64
 The distribution of abilities admits the possibility that a<0. This problem can be overcome by 
truncating the ability distribution at zero, or some fixed positive number. Truncation results in the 
introduction of an additional term in the denominator of the density function, required to ensure that 
the truncated distribution integrates to unity. The estimates reported in this chapter ignore this 
complication which in practice is likely to make very little difference. 
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where F(.) is the distribution function of a  
ω 
 and z is the mean of the ability variable a 
across the population. Equation (4.3) shows that the probability of a child attending senior 
secondary school, as evaluated by the econometrician, depends mainly on four factors: 
a) Positively on the difference in expected earnings ( )3a x−  from attending senior 
secondary school. 
b) Negatively on the full cost ( )2q x+ of attending senior secondary school.  
c) Positively on the proportional deviation η2 of the household’s period 2 income from 
its normal level. 
d) Negatively on the variance 2 2θ σ  of adult earnings of senior secondary school 
graduates relative to their own expectations. 
 
Now go back one period and consider the decision to attend junior secondary school. If 
the child is withdrawn from school at this stage, family utility is 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
1 1 2 2 2 2 3 3
21
1 1 1 2 3 21 1 '
u y w E u y w E u y w
u y r w w w r y u
+ + γ + + γδ +
 + γ + γδ + η + − η + γ + γδ − γ + γδ σ 
 

 (4.4) 
Instead, if the child continues at school, family utility is 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ){ } ( ) ( ){ }
1 2 2 2 3 3 2 3 3
1 2 2 2 3 3
2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3
max ,
max ,0
u y p E u y x u y x u y q u y z a
u y p E u y x u y x
E u y q u y x u y z a u y x
− + γ + + γδ + γ − + γδ + +  
= − + γ + + γδ +  
 + γ − − + + γδ + + − + 
    
 
   
 (4.5) 
The first set of terms on the right hand side of equation (4.5) show the benefit of 
attending junior secondary school. The final term gives the value of the option of continuing 
to senior secondary school. We may approximate  
 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
1 2 2 2 3 3
21
2 3 1 1 21 1 '
u y p E u y x u y x
u x x y r p r y u
− + γ + + γδ +  
 = + γ + γδ + γ + γδ + η − − η − γ + γδ σ 
 
 (4.6) 
Consider this final term: 
 
( ) ( ){ } ( ) ( ){ }
( ) ( )( ) ( )
2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3
2 21
3 2 2 2
max ,0
max 1 2 ,0 '
E u y q u y x u y z a u y x
a x r q x r y u
 γ − − + + γδ + + − + 
  γδ − − γ − η + − γδ ρθ + λ λσ + θ  
   

 
The two expressions inside the square brackets are equal to zero when 
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( )
( )
( )
( )
2 2
3 *
2
2 2
21
2
ya x
r r q x q x
 δ ρθ + λ λσ + θδ −  η = − + = η
+ +
  (4.7) 
*η  is the level of period two income which would leave the household indifferent 
between allowing the child to continue to senior secondary school or withdrawing. It follows 
that  
( ) ( ){ } ( ) ( ){ }
( ) ( )( ) ( ){ } ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
*
2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3
2 21
3 2 2 2 22
* *
2 21
3 2 22
*
3
max ,0
1 2
2 1
1
E u y q u y x u y z a u y x
a x r q x r y d
a x q x r y r q x
a x r
∞
η
 γ − − + + γδ + + − + 
 = γδ − − γ − η + − γδ ρθ + λ λσ + θ ϕ η η 
    η η  = γδ − − γ + − γδ ρθ + λ λσ + θ − Φ + γ σ + ϕ       σ σ    
  η
= γδ − − γ − σΛ  
σ  
∫
   
( ) ( )
*
2 21
2 2 2 1q x r y
    η
 + − γδ ρθ + λ λσ + θ − Φ      σ     
 (4.8) 
where ( ) ( )( )
.
.
1 .
ϕ
Λ =
− Φ
, the inverse Mills ratio, and ( ).ϕ  and ( ).Φ  are the standard 
normal density and distribution functions respectively65. Combining equations (4.4), (4.5), 
(4.6), (4.7) and (4.8), the child will attend junior secondary school provided  
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
2 3 1
* *
2 21
3 2 2
1 1 2 3
1
1 2 1
1
x x r p
a x r q x r y
r w w w
γ + γδ − − η  
       η η
 + γδ − − γ − σΛ + − γδ ρθ + λ λσ + θ − Φ        σ σ        
≥ − η + γ + γδ  
 (4.9) 
The left hand side of equation (4.9) contains two terms. The first is the net benefit from 
going to junior school if the child will not continue to senior school. Let us analyze the 
second term, which is multiplied by the probability 
*
1
  η
− Φ  
σ  
 of continuation, in greater 
detail. This represents the discounted net benefit of continuing to senior secondary school 
conditional of having completed junior secondary school.  ( )3a xγδ −  and ( )2q xγ +  are 
respectively the benefit and the cost of attending senior secondary school. 
                                                 
65
 This uses the result that, for 22 (0, )Nη σ∼ , 
*
*
d
∞
η
 η η ηϕ σ = σϕ  σ σ   ∫
 (Maddala, 1983, 
p.365). 
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( )
*
2r q x
  η
−γ σΛ +  
σ  
 is the expected reduction in the period two utility cost of sending 
the child to senior school in the event of a positive period two income shock (which reduces 
period two marginal utility)66. ( ) 2 212 2r y γδ ρθ + λ λσ + θ   is the utility cost of the period 
three income uncertainty associated with adult income. The right hand side of equation (4.9) 
is the wage associated with having completed only the elementary level.  
Rearranging equation (4.9) in terms of ability, we find that the child attends junior high 
school provided  
( ) ( )
( )
* * *
1
1 2 2 2
* *
2 2 *1
3 3 2
1 1 1
1 2
r
a p w x w q r q x
x w r y a
       − η η η η≥ + − Φ − − − Φ − σϕ +       γδ δ σ σ σ        
      η η
 − Φ − + − Φ ρθ + λ λσ + θ =       σ σ      
 (4.10) 
It follows that the probability of attending junior high school is  
 ( ) **Pr 1 aP a a F  = ≥ = −  
ω 
 (4.11) 
Note that equation (4.10) cannot be solved analytically since η* depends on a through 
equation (4.7). Ignoring this dependency, we conclude that the probability of the child 
attending junior high school depends on eight factors: 
a) Positively on the period 2 difference in earnings ( )2 2x w−  from attending junior 
secondary school, multiplied by the probability ( )*Φ η of non-continuation. 
b) Positively on the period 3 difference in earnings ( )3 3x w−  from attending junior 
secondary school, multiplied by the probability ( )*Φ η of non-continuation. 
c) Positively on the period 3 difference in expected earnings ( )3a w−  from attending 
both junior and senior secondary school, multiplied by the probability ( )*1− Φ η of 
continuation. 
                                                 
66
 Note that 
*
0 ∂ ησϕ > ∂σ σ 
.  Proof: 
2 2
* * * * * * * * *
'
2 1 0
                ∂ η η η η η η η η η
σϕ = ϕ − σϕ = ϕ + ϕ = ϕ + >                ∂σ σ σ σ σ σ σ σ σ σ                 
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d) Negatively on the full cost ( )1p w+ of attending junior secondary school.  
e) Negatively on the full cost ( )2q x+ of attending senior secondary school multiplied 
by the probability ( )*1− Φ η of continuation to senior secondary school.  
f) Positively on the proportional deviation η1 of the household’s period 1 income from 
its normal level. 
g) Positively on the standard deviation of the family’s period 2 earnings through the 
option of continuation to senior secondary school. 
h) Negatively on the variance 2 2θ σ  of adult earnings of senior secondary school 
graduates relative to their own expectations. 
A trivial extension of the model allows the household permanent income to be a 
determinant of the earnings of a senior secondary school graduates. We suggest that 
households with high permanent income are likely to be well-placed to find well paid jobs 
for their educated children, but cannot do much for drop-out children. This allows us to 
replace 3z  with 3 3z y+ κ  for some 0κ > . In this way the probability of attending senior 
secondary school depends positively on household permanent income, and the probability of 
attending junior secondary school is positively related to the permanent income interacted 
with the probability of continuation.  
  
To summarize, the model considers two sources of income uncertainty. The first is the 
household’s uncertainty with respect to the earnings of the child once graduated from the 
senior secondary school. What matters here is the variability of income of senior secondary 
graduates when they become adults (period three). Under the assumption of a concave utility 
function (i.e. risk aversion), an increase in uncertainty of future earnings decreases the 
expected adult utility (benefits) from senior secondary school. This uncertainty has hence a 
negative impact on the decision to continue to senior secondary school, and, consequently, to 
junior secondary school. The second source of income variability is the household’s 
uncertainty with respect to its income over the time the child may remain at school, hence for 
period two. Under the assumption of irreversibility, the probability of continuing to junior 
secondary school depends positively on the variance of period two household income, as 
seen by the household, through the option of continuing to senior secondary school in the 
event of a positive period two income shock.   
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Finally, this model shows the impact of shocks ex post. Under the assumption that there 
are no savings and borrowings, a negative income shock increases current period marginal 
utility, and hence the utility cost of schooling rises. Since there is no implication for future 
parental income, future marginal utility stays the same so the expected utility benefit of 
education is unaffected. Thus a negative shock decreases the probability of attending school 
(and the opposite holds for positive shock). Shocks are the ex post counterpart of ex ante 
uncertainty. It is the possibility of positive shocks, making education more affordable, that 
drives the positive effect of the variance of household income over the time the child will 
remain at school. We analyze both shock responses ex ante, to the anticipation of shocks, 
and ex post, to their realizations.   
 
4.4  Empirical strategy 
This section presents the empirical methodology used to estimate the school progression 
of children, based on the predictions of the theoretical model. In order to implement the 
model, we need information on schooling costs, wage levels by educational attainment, a 
measure of income shocks, and estimates of income uncertainty. The following sections aim 
to construct these variables, showing the methodology used and outlining the main results. 
The empirical model for schooling decisions is then discussed.  
 
4.4.1  Cost of schooling   
Total educational expenditure can be written as 332211 ihhhhhh NpNpNpE ++= , where 
phj is the cost of the school level j for the household h, and hjN is the number of children in 
the household attending education level j. Expenditure for the different levels of schooling is 
not directly observable but may be inferred from regressing total expenditure for education 
on the number of children attending each school level. The regression also controls for 
household income and province. We use the following model which is additive in a set of 
three multiplicative components, one for each level of schooling: 
 
'
3
1
hP
h h j hj
j
E y e Nγη β
=
= ∑  (4.12) 
where hE  is the total educational expenditure of family h, hy  is household income, P are 
province dummies, hjN  is the number of children attending school level j, and jβ  is the 
coefficient associated with hjN . The cost of sending an additional child to school level j is 
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given by 
'
ˆˆ
ˆhP
h jy e
γη β . Assuming constant economies of scale, that is assuming linearity of 
educational expenditure on the number of children attending school67, the marginal effect is 
also the average effect, and is our measure of the cost of schooling. 
 
As already noted, equation (4.12) includes household income, thus allowing the cost of 
schooling to vary across households. According to this formulation, households estimate the 
cost of the various levels of schooling as their expected expenditures given their incomes. 
Alternatively, one might view income-related expenditures as discretionary, implying that 
these expenditure components should be omitted from the cost variables. If this were the 
case, the estimated cost would become 
'
ˆˆ
ˆhP
jy e
γη β , where y  is the sample average income. 
We construct both estimates of the cost of schooling: the first conditional on household 
income, the second conditional on average income. 
 
Household income and the number of children attending school may both be endogenous. 
Potential instruments for household income are the education of the head and the value of 
non-business assets owned by the household the year before the interview. The numbers of 
children attending each school level can be instrumented with the predicted count variables 
estimated using Poisson regression models on the sub-sample of households with at least one 
child in the reference age group (children aged 7-12 for the elementary school, 13-15 for 
junior secondary school, and 16-18 for senior secondary school). Table 4.13 reports the 
number (and percentages) of households reporting different number of children (boys and 
girls) attending elementary, junior and senior secondary school for each sub-sample. The 
majority of households with at least one child in the secondary school age group do not have 
children attending school (53% and 74% of households with at least one boy in the reference 
age group do not send their male children to junior and senior secondary school respectively; 
percentages of households with zero girls attending secondary school are 61% and 79%). 
This confirms what was pointed out in section 4.2, that there is a low continuation rate after 
the completion of the elementary school, and more generally, that the largest loss in the 
number of children attending school occurs after the elementary compulsory level. 
 
                                                 
67
 The square number of children attending school is not statistically significant in the educational 
expenditure equation, thus rejecting the hypothesis of a quadratic relationship between expenditure 
and the number of children. 
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Table 4.13 
Number of children in the household attending school, by gender and school level 
Elementary school Junior secondary school Senior secondary school 
# boys # girls # boys # girls # boys # girls 
 
Freq % Freq % Freq % Freq % Freq % Freq % 
0 98 9.2 109 9.9 312 53.3 340 60.6 322 74.4 322 78.7 
1 746 70.1 770 69.9 251 42.9 204 36.4 101 23.3 77 18.8 
2 197 18.5 191 17.3 17 2.9 16 2.8 9 2.1 10 2.4 
3 22 2.1 31 2.8 2 0.3 1 0.2 - - - - 
4 2 0.2 - - 1 0.2 - - - - - - 
>4 - - - - 2 0.3 - - 1 0.2 - - 
Na 1,065 100 1101 100 585 100 561 100 433 100 409 100 
The table reports the number (and percentages) of households reporting different number of children (boys 
and girls) that attend each school level. 
a
 Number of households with at least one child (boys or girls) in the reference age group (i.e. there are 1065 
households with at least one boy in the age group 7-12) 
Because of the high percentage of zeroes in the number of children enrolled in secondary 
school, the count variables are estimated with the zero-inflated Poisson model (ZIP)68. The 
results of Poisson and ZIP models are reported in Appendix 4A (tables 4A.1 and 4A.2). The 
main results are summarized as follow. 
Household socio-economic variables. Household permanent income is statistically 
significant only for the number of girls attending junior school69. Indicators for the status of 
the house (whether the household utilizes electricity, owns a private toilet, and whether the 
main water source is located inside the house), have a positive and significant effect on the 
number of young adults attending senior secondary school. Ownership of a farm or non farm 
business may increase child work participation (Cockburn and Dostie, 2007), and hence 
decrease the likelihood that a child is in school. To control for that, dummies for having a 
farm or non-farm business are included in the count models. Results show that having a farm 
has a negative and significant impact only on the number of girls attending elementary 
school.  
                                                 
68
 The ZIP model responds to the failure of the Poisson model to account for excess zeros by changing 
the mean structure to allow zeros to be generated by two distinct processes. The ZIP assumes that 
there are two latent groups. An individual in the Always-0 Group (group A) has an outcome of 0 with 
a probability of 1, while an individual in the Not Always-0 Group (group B) might have a zero count, 
but there is a nonzero probability of a positive outcome. The membership in group A is modeled 
through a logit or probit model (Long and Freese, 2001). 
69
 Permanent income is estimated regressing household income on a set of variables that determine the 
permanent component, as discussed in chapters two and three. The wage of children in the reference 
age group are subtracted from household income.  
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Household characteristics. The role of household composition is analyzed including the 
number of children and young adults in the household; to capture possible different impacts, 
children are divided in four age categories, corresponding to the pre-school period (age 0-6) 
and to three school levels (age 7-12, age 13-15, and age 16-18). The number of males and 
females in the reference age group is clearly highly significant in the count model for males 
and females respectively; the number of older children in general has a positive and 
significant effect in the count models.  
Finally, dummies for the religion of the household is included as additional regressors: 
living in a Christian family increases the number of household members attending the senior 
school.  
Head and spouse education. The number of boys and girls attending junior secondary 
school are positively related to the education of the head and the spouse of the head 
respectively. The number of girls attending the elementary level negatively depends on 
having a household head that is illiterate or that completed only the elementary level. 
Educational dummies are not statistically significant in the count model for senior school.  
As suggested in section 4.2, lack of school infrastructure emerges as a problem at the 
junior and senior secondary education levels. The numbers of elementary, junior and senior 
schools in the village are included in the count models. They are positive and significant in 
the count models for the female sample (for elementary and junior school), suggesting that 
parents may be more reluctant to send girls to school outside the home village (as pointed 
out by the Probe report, 1999, for India).  
 
Estimates from the Poisson and zero inflated Poisson models are then used as instruments 
for the number of children attending school in the educational expenditure equation70. Table 
4A.4 (Appendix 4A) reports the results of equation 4.12, and table 4A.5 summarizes the 
estimated costs of schooling, by level of school and gender. Both set of estimates, 
conditional on household and on average income, are presented. As stated in section 4.2, 
elementary school is provided free (there are no school fees), but this does not imply that 
parents bear no educational expenditures. As expected, schooling costs are higher for higher 
education levels (there are school fees at junior and senior levels and many children are 
                                                 
70
 Table 4A.3 reports the actual and predicted number of children attending school. Both the Poisson 
and the zero-inflated Poisson (ZIP) estimates are reported for junior and senior secondary school. The 
Vuong test of ZIP versus standard Poisson supports the ZIP model for senior secondary, but not for 
junior secondary school. Estimates from the ZIP models are used as instruments for the number of 
children attending junior and senior secondary. 
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obliged to go to school outside the home village, as noted in section 4.2). Estimates show a 
higher cost for girls than for boys, especially for secondary school. 
 
4.4.2 Income levels by education 
If the child does not go to school, he may work and earn an income which depends on his 
education and experience. As suggested in the theoretical section, incomes may be classified 
by level of school completed and by experience as follows:  
Grade completed Junior 
secondary (3 years) 
Senior 
secondary (3 years) 
Rest of the life 
(37-42 years) 
Elementary  
Years of 
schooling >=6 & <9 
1w  
Experience <= 
3yrs 
2w  
3<Experience 
<= 6yrs 
3w  
Experience > 
6yrs 
Junior secondary  
Years of 
schooling >=9 & 
<12 
- 
2x  
Experience <= 
3yrs 
3x  
Experience > 
3yrs 
Senior secondary  
Years of 
schooling >=12 & 
<15 
- - 3z  
Children who have completed only the elementary school will earn 1w  and 2w  
respectively for the three years corresponding to junior and senior secondary school, while 
the income earned for the rest of the life is 3w . Assuming 55-60 years as the retirement age 
(Leechor, 1996), and in view of the fact that the official age at which children should 
complete primary school is 12 years, the length of “rest of life” is approximately 37-42 
years. Similarly, children who have graduated from junior secondary school will earn an 
income defined as 2x  and 3x  respectively for the first three years of work (the time they 
would otherwise have spent at senior school) and for the remainder of their working life.  
Predicted child incomes follow from an income regression for all household members 
older than 10 years that report work information71. We run separate regressions for males 
and females, including educational dummies to estimate returns to schooling, and allowing 
the return to education to vary across provinces. The income equation can be written as:  
                                                 
71
 Adult household members (the household head and the spouse, if present, are selected, and up to 
three other members) were randomly selected and asked to provide detailed individual employment 
information, on both farm and off-farm work (Book 3). For all the other household members not 
interviewed in Book 3 and older than 10 years, the head reports whether the individual works, which 
type of work he/she does, and the total net wages (other than from the farm or non-farm business). 
Appendix A shows the survey questions used to construct individual labour income in detail. 
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2
0 1 2
1 1
ln *
J P
i i i jp ji pi
j p
y esper esper D Pα α α β
= =
= + + +∑∑  (4.13) 
where the dependent variable is log monthly income, esper and esper2 is experience and 
experience square, jiD  are educational dummies, and piP  are provincial dummies. In the 
absence of information on actual experience, esper is replaced by “potential experience”, 
measured as 7i iage schooling years− − , assuming people start school at the age of 7.  
Equation (4.13) is first estimated without the province interaction terms and including all 
the dummies to identify 1w , 2w , 3w , 2x , 3x  and 3z  (the Heckman procedure is used to 
control for sample selection). The income equation is defined as 
2
0 1 2ln
J
i j ji J i J i
j
y D esper esperα α α α+ += + + +∑ , where jiD  are dummies to identify the 
educational-experience categories. The sample is all household members older than age 10 
that report information on labour income. Since women and men may face different labour 
supply decisions, as well as different returns to schooling, we run the model separately for 
males and females. Table 4.14 reports the number of observations by gender and education-
experience categories. 
Table 4.14 
Number of observations by gender and education-experience categories 
Grade completed Junior secondary Senior secondary Rest of the life 
Male N=36 N=58 N=732 
Elementary  
Female 1
w  
N=38 2
w  
N=38 3
w  
N=255 
Male  N=23 N=210 Junior 
secondary Female  2
x  
N=12 3
x  
N=69 
Male   N=299 Senior 
secondary Female   3
z  
N=126 
Sample: all household members older than age 10 interviewed in the sections “labour 
income” 
Because of the small number of observations for cells 1w , 2w , and 2x , coefficients on 
these dummies are not precisely estimated in the income regression. For females, we cannot 
reject the hypothesis that coefficients on dummies for 1w , 2w , 3w , 2x , 3x  are equal (F(4, 
1426) = 1.41, Prob>F = 0.23). We therefore generate a single dummy for females graduated 
from elementary and junior secondary school, for any experience level. This suggests that it 
is only senior secondary school attendance that substantially increases female income. For 
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males we cannot reject the hypotheses that returns to junior school are equal for the first 
three years of work and for the rest of the life (F(1, 2625) = 0.14, Prob>F=0.71), and that 
returns to elementary school are the same for the sub-groups 1w  and 3w (F(1, 2625) = 0.67, 
Prob>F=0.41). The coefficient on the dummy for 2w  is found to be lower than 1w  and 3w  at 
the 10% but not at the 5% level. This finding may be not very reliable given the small 
number of observations. We hence restrict the coefficients on the three dummies for 
elementary education to be equal for the male sample; a single dummy for junior secondary 
school graduates is included.  
Equation (4.13) is then estimated, where returns to education vary across provinces. Table 
4B.1 (Appendix 4B) reports the results of the selection model (Heckman procedure). 
Dummies for different levels of completed schooling are included, with no schooling acting 
as the omitted category (i.e. there is no constant term in the regression equation). Off 5982 
females and 5534 males, we observe the log monthly income for 1437 and 2636 working 
individuals (females and males respectively). The large proportions of zeros, especially for 
the self-employed sector, suggests that monthly income may contain an important seasonal 
component. To control for this, the selection equation includes the dummies for the month of 
interview. Results of the selection equation are summarized as follows. 
Household characteristics. The number of children (in particular those aged 0-5) and 
young adults in the household is significantly and negatively correlated with the probability 
of women being in the labour force. The presence of infants in the household does not 
significantly affect the probability of observing income for males, while the number of 
children aged 6-14 years has a negative and significant effect. 
Individual characteristics. Married woman are significantly less likely to work than non 
married woman, while being married increases the probability of working for males. 
Education plays an important role in determining labour supply decisions, for both men and 
women, but with a higher magnitude for females (marginal effects of education are higher 
for females than for males). Experience increases the probability of working, and it has a 
non-linear effect. 
Month of interview. In rural areas income may have a strong seasonality component. 
Reported monthly income is the income earned the month before the interview. Results show 
that being interviewed in the last months of the year (September-December) significantly 
increases the probability of reporting monthly income with respect to being interviewed in 
January.  
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Once we have defined the selection equation, the income regression permits calculation 
of the returns to schooling. Log individual monthly income is regressed upon experience, 
experience squared, and educational dummies interacted with provinces (table 4B.1). The 
impact of experience is greater for females than for males, but females have also a higher 
negative coefficient on experience squared. Returns to education are higher for men than for 
women, and they are highest in West Java (where Jakarta is located) and (for men) in the 
province of South Kalimantan.     
 
The coefficients on education and experience estimated from the income regression are 
used to construct predicted earnings by gender, provinces and school level72.  
 
4.4.3 Measures of risk and shocks 
We have set out to consider both the ex post and ex ante effects of risk on education. The 
former are related to income shocks, the latter to income variability. An income shock at 
time t is defined as the difference between the actual household income at time t and the 
expected household income estimated as permanent income73. The following income 
equation is estimated74: 
 0 1
P
h h hy Xα α ε= + + , (4.14)  
where hy  is actual household income and 
P
hX  is a set of variables that determine the 
permanent income component. PhX  includes the value of household assets, dummies for 
whether the household owns a farm or non-farm business, dummies for the occupation type 
of the household head, the education of the household head, the number of income earners in 
the household, household size and household size squared. Provincial dummies are also 
included as regressors. Fitted residuals are our measure of income shock75,76:  
                                                 
72
 We do not differentiate between income of children working on the family farm and income from 
wage employment. In Indonesia, as in many developing countries, most children do not work for a 
wage, but as unpaid family workers in the family farm or business. Moreover, in many developing 
countries, labour markets are imperfect. It is therefore difficult to infer children’s contributions to 
household income by using observed market wages and self-reported farm or business profits (Menon 
and Perali, 2006). A shadow wage approach may be more suitable in evaluating the income 
contribution of child labour, and we will consider this approach in future extensions of this work.     
73
 Permanent income is lifetime expected income, and may be taken as an appropriate measure of the 
expected household income 
74
 The procedure used to construct permanent income is similar to that proposed in chapters two and 
three 
75
 The use of cross-section data instead of panel data does not resolve problems of unobservables 
included in the residual.       
Chapter 4 
 
130 
 
ˆ ˆh ht hy yε = − , (4.15) 
where ˆhy  is the estimated permanent income component. Shocks may be positive and 
negative77.   
The results of equation (4.14) are reported in table 4C.1 (Appendix 4C). Because the 
household income includes child income, the measure of shocks are computed using 
household income minus child wages as dependent variable in (4.14). Columns A and B of 
table 4C.1 report the results of the income regression without considering the wage if 
children aged 12-14 years and 15-17 years respectively. Results are in line with the standard 
income equation estimates. Residuals from column A are used in the probit model for junior 
secondary school, and residuals from column B are used in the model for senior secondary 
school. 
 
We measure uncertainty through income variances. There are two income variances in the 
model: the variance of life-time incomes of senior high school graduates relative to their 
expectations, which relates to the variance of 3η , and the variance of income over the period 
that the child remains at school, as seen by the household, which relates to the variance of 
2η . The former is estimated following a two stage procedure: 
1. Individual adult income is regressed on individual characteristics for the sub-sample 
of adults who have completed at least the senior secondary school: 
 0 1i i iy X uβ β= + +  (4.16) 
2. The square of predicted residuals ˆiu  from this regression is regressed on iX , 
2
iX  
and cross products. The fitted value from this regression is the measure of the variance of 
income of senior high school graduates ( 2ˆ iΨ ).  
The estimation outcome is discussed in Appendix 4C: the income variance is conditional 
on senior secondary school graduation and on provincial, gender and race dummies (as a 
proxy for the race we use a dummy that equals one if the individual speaks Indonesian at 
home). The coefficients are estimated on the sample of adults graduated from senior 
secondary school. They are employed to calculate the income uncertainty of children once 
they become adults (they are applied to the decisions to attend junior and senior school). The 
                                                                                                                                          
76
 The model identifies income deviation as 
ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ
h ht h
h
h h
y y
y y
ε −η = = . We consider both measures of 
shock in the empirical strategy.  
77
 Differently from chapter two and three shocks. 
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assumption here is that the distribution of income of current adults conditional on being a 
senior secondary graduate (and on provincial, gender and race dummies) is the same as that 
of children when they become adults. This may be a strong assumption. 
 
The second source of risk is estimated as the variance of the household period two 
income deviations 2η . We assume that households base expectations of their future income 
distribution on current information. We hence measure future income variability as the 
variance of 1997 income conditional on 1993 information, included 1993 income. Note that 
1997-1993 is four years (the junior secondary school lasts three years), and is therefore the 
appropriate horizon over which to look. This justifies conditioning on 1993 household 
information. As before, a two stage procedure is used. 
1. We first regress future household income on present income and household 
characteristics: 
 
97 93 93
0 1 2h h h hy y Z uβ β β= + + +  (4.17) 
where 97hy  and 
93
hy  are the 1997 and 1993 household income and 
93
hZ  is a set of 1993 
household characteristics78. OLS residuals are predicted ( huˆ ).  
2.  The square of predicted residuals 2ˆhu  is regressed on a constant and all first 
moments, second moments and cross products of the original regressors (as in the White test 
for heteroscedasticity): 
 h
k
i
k
j
jhihijh ZZu νδδ ++= ∑∑
=1
9393
0
2
ˆ , 
where in this notation 93hZ  includes the 1993 household income 
93
hy . The predicted value 
from stage two ( 2ˆ hσ ) is the measure of the household specific risk, relative to period two 
income. Results are reported in appendix 4C.    
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93
hZ  includes the value of assets (non business assets, liquid and illiquid), the household size and 
the number of schooling years completed by the household head. 
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4.4.4  Schooling decisions 
Sections 4.4.1-4.4.3 defined the empirical strategies used to construct the cost of 
schooling, wage levels by education, and the measures of risk and shocks. These predicted 
variables are now used as regressors in the probit models for school attendance79 (recall that 
ability is observed by the household but not by the econometrician).  
Children and young adults are divided in two cohorts: children who have graduated from 
elementary school, aged less than 15 years, and junior secondary graduates aged less than 18 
years. The progression to junior secondary school is estimated on the first sub-sample, while 
the continuation to senior school refers to the second cohort. In those cases in which a 
household has children in both cohorts the same income variable will define 1η  for the child 
in the younger cohort and 2η  for the child in the older cohort. 
The equation for senior school may be written as:  
 
2 1
2
0 1 2 2 3 3 4 2 5
0 3
( ) ( )
T
t t
iS i i i i h i i
t t
s X q x a x
−
= =
= α + α + α + δ +α − δ +α η + α Ψ + ν∑ ∑  (4.18) 
where iSs  is the school attendance at senior secondary school, iX  is a set of children and 
household characteristics; 2( )iq x+  is the total cost of attending senior secondary school, 
with q  the cost of the senior school and 2ix  the income the child will earn if he/she does not 
go to school. 3( )i ia x−  is the difference in expected earnings from attending senior 
secondary school. Both expected earnings and cost are discounted ( δ  is the discount factor), 
and T is the length of the working life. The deviation of the household’s period 2 income 
from its expected level is defined as 2hη , while 2iΨ  is the variance of life-time incomes of 
senior high school graduates. All regressors with the exception of those included in iX  are 
estimates, consequently coefficient standard errors may be biased (Davidson and 
MacKinnon, 2004).  
 
The decision to continue with the junior secondary school after the completion of 
elementary level is analyzed by estimation of two set of models. First we estimate a reduced 
form equation that includes all the regressors suggested by the model but without 
interactions and restrictions, and then, subsequently, a restricted version of the model. The 
reduced form can be written as: 
                                                 
79
 At this point we are taking the distribution function of ability to be normal. Therefore we estimate 
probit models for school decisions. 
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2 5 5
0 1 2 1 3 2 4 2 2
0 3 3
1 1
2 2
5 3 3 6 3 7 1 8 9 10
6 6
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) (1 )
t t t
iJ i i i i i
t t t
T T
t t
i i i i h h i iS h
t t
s X p w q x x w
x w a w v
= = =
− −
= =
= α + α + α + δ + α + δ + α − δ
+α − δ + α − δ + α η + α σ + α Ψ + α − Φ +
∑ ∑ ∑
∑ ∑
(4.19) 
where iJs  is the school attendance at junior secondary school, iX  is a set of children and 
household characteristics; 1( )ip w+  is the total cost of attending junior school and it is the 
sum of the cost of schooling (p) and the opportunity cost given by child’s earnings ( 1iw ). 
Similarly 2( )iq x+  is the total cost of attending senior secondary school. The differences in 
earnings from attending junior secondary school are given by 2 2( )i ix w−  for period two and 
by 3 3( )i ix w− for period three; the difference from attending both junior and senior 
secondary school is defined as 3( )i ia w− . 1hη  is the deviation of the household’s period one 
income from its expected level, 2hσ  is parent’s future income variability and 
2
iΨ  is the 
individual earnings variability of senior secondary school graduates. Finally, iSΦ  is the 
probability of non-continuation to senior secondary school after the completion of the junior 
level. All regressors except iX  are estimates. iSΦ  is the predicted probability implied by the 
estimated equation for continuation to senior school. This predicted probability is estimated 
for the sample of children graduated from the junior secondary school, but is applied to the 
data for children graduated from the elementary school, and hence for the junior secondary 
decisions.   
The restricted model for the junior secondary school includes all interactions with the 
probability of continuation, or non-continuation, to the senior school, as suggested by the 
theoretical model. 
 
2 5 5
0 1 2 1 3 2 4 2 2
0 3 3
1 1
2 2
5 3 3 6 3 7 1 8 9
6 6
( ) ( )(1 ) ( )
( ) ( )(1 )
t t t
iJ i i i iS i i iS
t t t
T T
t t
i i iS i i iS h h i h
t t
s X p w q x x w
x w a w v
= = =
− −
= =
= α + α + α + δ + α + − Φ δ + α − Φ δ
+α − Φ δ + α − − Φ δ + α η + α σ + α Ψ +
∑ ∑ ∑
∑ ∑
 (4.20) 
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4.5 Probit model estimates  
Table 4.15, 4.16 and 4.17 present the set of probit models that estimate the probability of 
attending senior and junior school respectively for the sub-sample of children and young 
adults that completed the previous school level. To better capture the continuation decisions 
made at the time of the interview, the samples for the junior and senior school are restricted 
to children aged 14 years or less, and 17 years or less respectively80. Equations (4.18), (4.19) 
and (4.20) include predicted earning levels by education as regressors. In section 4.4.2 we 
found that returns to elementary and junior school (that determine w and x respectively) are 
not statistically different for girls, whereas for boys 2 3i ix x=  and 2 3i iw w= . Hence in 
equation (4.19) and (4.20) we have a single variable ( )i ix w−  discounted from t=3 to the 
end of the working life. Difference in earnings and the cost of schooling are discounted using 
a discount factor of 0.95δ =  per annum (Zimmerman and Carter, 2003). 
We first comment on the results of the probit model for senior school decisions (table 
4.15). The probability of attending senior school decreases with the number of younger 
siblings aged 13-15 in the house81, and if the household head and the spouse are illiterate82. 
As suggested by other papers, we find that the ownership of a farm decreases the likelihood 
that a child is in school, because this increases the child’s work participation (Cockburn and 
Dostie, 2007). Other control variables are the number of good senior schools in the village (a 
positive and significant effect) and the religion of the household (children living in a Muslim 
or Christian household are more likely to attend senior school compared to household with 
other religions83).  
As regard the variables predicted by the model, the difference in earnings from attending 
senior secondary school (a-x3) contributes to a higher continuation probability, as suggested 
by the theory. The deviation of the household’s income from its expected level ( ˆt ty y− ) has 
                                                 
80
 Children should start junior and senior secondary school at the age of 13 and 16 respectively.  As 
noted in section 4.2, this chapter focuses on the sample of children 7-17 years old. 
81
  Traditionally the first child drops out school or is not enrolled in school to provide education 
opportunities for the younger children. Our results suggest this may be the case. In future work  we 
propose to introduce a birth order variable.  
82
  Having an illiterate spouse in the household has a higher negative marginal effect than having an 
illiterate head. The education of the head and the spouse is considered instead of that of parents 
because some children do not report to have a mother or a father in the household. In most cases the 
head and the spouse are the father and the mother of the child.  
83
 “Christian” and “Muslim” have similar marginal effects (0.445 and 0.49 respectively). 
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a positive effect with z=1.45 (not statistically significant at the 10% level)84. The total cost of 
senior school, the variance of adult earnings of senior school graduates (it has a negative 
effect, as predicted by the model, and z=-1.00), and the household permanent income, are not 
statistically significant. The probability of continuation to the senior school is predicted from 
this probit regression (setting shocks to zero), and used in the probit model for junior 
secondary school (it is included as additional regressor in the reduced form model, and it is 
interacted with other variables in the restricted form, as suggested by the model). 
Looking at the unrestricted probit model for junior secondary school attendance, the 
variables included in the theoretical model that are statistically significant are the residual 
from the income regression, the parent’s income variance and the household permanent 
income. All three have a positive effect on the probability of a child attending junior school. 
Moreover, the higher is the probability of continuation to senior secondary school, the higher 
is the probability of attending junior secondary school. Among the other control variables, 
the number of siblings 13-15 years old and 16-18 years old have a positive and significant 
effect (the former at the 10% but not at the 5% level). It is interesting to note that at lower 
levels of schooling, school progression of a child is positively associated with the number of 
siblings of the same age or older (Sawada and Lokshin, 2007), while at higher levels of 
schooling (see the results of senior secondary school) the probability that the child attends 
school decreases with the number of younger siblings. 
Table 4.17 presents the restricted probit for the decision to continue to the junior 
secondary school. The restricted model includes the interaction terms with the probability of 
continuation or non-continuation to the senior school. According to this specification the 
total cost of junior school 1( )ip w+  is negative and significant at the 10% but not at the 5% 
level. The deviation of the household income from its expected level (the predicted residual 
from the income regression) has a positive and significant effect85, as does the predicted 
variance of the household income. The higher is predicted permanent income, interacted 
with the probability of continuation, the higher becomes the probability of the child 
                                                 
84
 Following the notation of the model, we re-estimated the probit model using 
ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ
h ht h
h
h h
y y
y y
ε −η = =  
instead of ˆ hε . The estimated coefficient is 0.296, and the z statistic becomes 1.20.   
85
 Following the notation of the model, we re-estimated the probit using 
ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ
h ht h
h
h h
y y
y y
ε −η = =  
instead of ˆ hε . The income deviation is no more significant, with a coefficient of 0.059 and z=0.74. 
Estimated coefficient is similar for the unrestricted model.    
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attending junior secondary school. All the other variables included in the theoretical model 
have the predicted sign, but are not statistically significant86. As in the reduced form, the 
number of older siblings in the household (aged 16-18) has a positive and significant effect.  
Table 4.15 
Probit model for senior secondary school 
Variables coeff z Marginal 
effect 
z 
# of children in the house age 0-6 -0.310 -1.68 -0.121 -1.68 
# of siblings age 7-12   -0.089 -0.57   -0.035 -0.57 
# of siblings age 13-15   -0.800    -3.40  -0.312 -3.40 
# of siblings age 16-18    -0.151    -0.55   -0.059 -0.55 
Spouse of the head is illiterate*   -1.362     -2.76   -0.500 -3.44 
head is illiterate*   -0.786   -1.63  -0.305 -1.75 
Difference in earnings (a-x)    0.038 3.46   0.015 3.47 
Total cost of senior school/1000    0.057   0.18   0.022 0.18 
ˆt ty y−  (excluding income of 
children age 15-17)    0.184      1.45   0.070 1.46 
Variance of adult earnings of senior 
secondary school graduates  -0.354    -1.00  -0.139 -1.00 
Household permanent income 
(excluding income of children age 
15-17) 
   0.112      0.65   0.041 0.65 
household owns a farm*    -0.672 -1.77   -0.248 -1.89 
household religion: islam* 1.332 2.12 0.491 2.56 
household religion: cristian* 2.101 2.18 0.444 6.71 
# good senior school in the village    1.707    2.15   0.667 2.18 
Intercept 1.451 1.31   - 
Pseudo R-squared 0.45 
Log pseudo-likelihood -50.974 
N 135 
The table reports the results of equation (4.18). Dependent variable is a dummy that 
equals one if the child is attending school. The sample is children graduated from 
the junior school. Provincial dummies are included as additional regressors. The 
cost of schooling is conditional on household income. Household income is in 
millions rupiah.  
(*) dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
                                                 
86
 The variance of adult earnings interacted with the probability of continuation to senior school is not 
significant, but the estimated coefficient is positive (estimated coefficient=0.197, z=0.65). 
Chapter 4 
 
137 
 
Table 4.16 
Probit model for junior secondary school – reduced form 
Variables Coeff. z Marginal 
effect 
Difference in earnings (x-w)  -0.003 -0.33 -0.001 
Difference in earnings (a-w) 0.014 0.54 0.005 
Total cost of junior secondary school 
(p+w)/1000 0.438 0.08 0.172 
Total cost of senior secondary school 
(q+x)/1000 -0.993 -0.34 -0.388 
Residual from income regression ( ˆt ty y− ) 
(excluding wage of children 12-14) 
0.266 2.68 0.104 
Sigma2 (parent’s income variance) 0.067 2.53 0.026 
Variance of adult earnings of senior 
secondary school graduates  
-0.107 -0.37 
-0.042 
Estimated permanent income ˆty  
(excluding wage of children 12-14) 
0.321 2.22 0.125 
Probability of continuation to the senior 
secondary school   
0.796 2.62 0.311 
# siblings age 13-15 0.362 1.77 0.142 
# siblings age 16-18 0.255 1.91 0.100 
intercept   0.579 0.84 
- 
Pseudo R-squared 0.18 
Log pseudo-likelihood 
-175.383 
N 311 
The table reports the results of equation (4.19). Dependent variable is a dummy that 
equals one if the child is attending school. Sample: children graduated from the 
elementary school, aged 12-14 years. Provincial dummies are included as additional 
regressors. The cost of schooling is conditional on household income. Household 
income is in millions rupiah. Income variance is divided by one million. Whether the 
head and the spouse of the head are illiterate, the number of younger siblings in the 
household, the religion of the household, whether the household owns a farm, dummy if 
the child is female and the number of schools in the village are found to be non 
statistically significant (their significance is joint tested). 
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Table 4.17 
Probit model for junior secondary school – restricted model 
Variables Coeff. z Marginal 
effect 
Difference in earnings (x-w)* iSΦ  0.004 0.66 0.002 
Difference in earnings (a-w)*(1- iSΦ ) 0.016 0.81 0.006 
Total cost of junior secondary school 
(p+w)/1000 -1.107 -1.71 -0.433 
Total cost of senior secondary school 
((q+x)/1000)*(1- iSΦ )  
-0.073 -0.26 
-0.029 
Residual from income regression ( ˆt ty y− ) 
(excluding wage of children 12-14) 
0.224 2.32 0.089 
Sigma2 (period two income variance) 0.079 2.67 0.031 
Variance of adult earnings of senior 
secondary school graduates 
-0.025 -0.10 
-0.010 
Estimated permanent income ˆty *(1- iSΦ ) 
(excluding wage of children 12-14) 
0.514 2.66 0.201 
# siblings age 13-15 0.312 1.57 0.122 
# siblings age 16-18 0.253 1.91 0.099 
intercept  0.857 1.34 
- 
Pseudo R-squared 0.18 
Log pseudo-likelihood 
-175.583 
N 311 
The table reports the results of the restricted probit model for junior secondary 
decisions (equation 4.20). Dependent variable is a dummy that equals one if the child 
is attending school. Sample: children graduated from the elementary school, aged 12-
14 years. Provincial dummies are included as additional regressors. iSΦ  is the 
probability of non-continuation to the senior secondary school. The cost of schooling is 
conditional on household income. Household income is in millions rupiah. Income 
variance is divided by one million. Whether the head and the spouse of the head are 
illiterate, the number of younger siblings in the household, the religion of the 
household, whether the household owns a farm, dummy if the child is female and the 
number of schools in the village are found to be non statistically significant (their 
significance is joint tested). 
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4.6 Conclusions  
The use of child time allocation as a response to transitory income shocks is well 
established. Many papers document the adverse effects of negative shocks on child education 
and child labour in the face of credit constraints. Few papers have analyzed the impact of ex 
ante risk on children human capital investments. To our knowledge, this is the first study that 
combines both issues analyzing the role of ex ante income risk and of income shock 
occurrence on child education, and, in particular, on school progression from a school level 
to another. The data used in this chapter are from the Indonesian Family Life Survey (mainly 
the 1993 round). The decision to focus on school progression (that is to analyze the choices 
to enroll at school after the completion of the previous school level) is motivated by the 
finding that in 1993 in Indonesia there were low continuation rates from primary to junior 
secondary school.  
 
The first difference of this study with respect to previous literature regards the sources of 
risk which we take into account. Fitzsimons (2007), who analyzes the same dataset we use in 
this chapter, equates risk with the variability of parental income when children become 
adults. She measures both the household-specific and the village-level component of 
variability using information on past incomes. Her assumption is that households base 
predictions of future volatility on the observed volatility of their past earnings streams. We 
suppose that children’s adult earnings, conditional on being graduated from senior secondary 
school, are random drawing from the provincial income distribution for senior secondary 
school graduates.  
Our chapter examines two different sources of uncertainty: the variance of life-time 
incomes of senior high school graduates relative to their expectations, and the variance of 
household income deviation over the time the child will potentially remain at school. The 
latter component is estimated as the variance of future household income conditional on 
current household characteristics, assuming that households base expectations of future 
variability on current information.   
The second contribution of our model is that it takes into account the irreversibility of 
withdrawal from school: children withdrawn from school cannot re-enroll, and hence they 
lose the opportunity to continue to further levels of schooling and achieve higher earnings 
when they become adults. State dependence of school attendance has also been modeled by 
de Janvry et al. (2006), who include a re-entry cost as an additional cost of schooling. There 
are two main differences relating to our model: first, we consider a “strong” version of state 
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dependence (irreversibility), while de Janvry et al. model re-entry imposing an additional 
cost. Second, de Janvry et al. focus on the implications of state dependence for the impact of 
income shocks on child education and child labour, while we analyze both shock responses 
ex ante, to the anticipation of shocks, and ex post, to their realizations 
  
We have developed a model of household school progression decisions in the face of risk 
and shocks under the assumption that there are no savings and borrowing, and that children 
continue to form part of the household once they become adults. The model predicts that 
household uncertainty with respect to the earnings of the adult (ex-child) once graduated 
tends to discourage school attendance, while household uncertainty with respect to its own 
income over the time the child may remain at school should increase school participation. 
This second effect arises out of irreversibility: in the face of household income variability 
parents are more likely to send children to school to give them the option to continue with 
higher schooling levels in the future (and hence earn higher earnings when they become 
adults). Finally, as regards ex post responses to shocks, under the assumption that there is no 
saving and borrowing, negative (positive) shocks are predicted to reduce (increase) the 
probability of school progression.  
 
We estimate school progression by estimating probit models for both junior and senior 
secondary school on different cohorts: the sample for junior attendance is those children 
graduated from the elementary school, aged less than 15 years; the probit for senior school is 
estimated on the sample of junior secondary graduates with aged less than 18 years. Results 
suggest that Indonesian rural household adjust child schooling in the face of risk and shocks. 
Children are more, or less, likely to attend school in response to positive, or negative, income 
shocks, at both junior and senior secondary school stages. As predicted by the model, we 
find that the probability of attending junior secondary school depends positively on the 
variance of household income over the time the child will remain at school, through the 
option of continuation to senior secondary school. Household uncertainty with respect to the 
earnings of the adult (ex-child) once graduated has the predicted negative sign in both probit 
regression models, but is not statistically significant.  
The model also predicts that schooling costs and returns to schooling affect progression 
decisions. The difference in earnings from attending senior school contributes to a higher 
continuation probability to senior secondary school, while the corresponding variable is not 
statistically significant for the junior progression decisions. The total cost of junior school 
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has a negative and significant effect (at the 10% level) on the probability of attending the 
junior level. Finally, the probability of the child attending junior secondary school depends 
positively on the predicted household permanent income, and on the probability of 
continuation to senior secondary school.  
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Appendix 4A - Cost of schooling  
Table 4A.1 
Poisson model. Dependent variable: # of children in the household 
attending elementary school 
 Male Female 
Household socioeconomic status    
Predicted permanent income (excluding 
wage of children age 7-12) 
-0.032 
(0.026) 
-0.014  
(0.028) 
Utilize electricity 0.058* (0.028) 
0.001 
(0.026) 
Water source inside the household  0.039 (0.037) 
-0.016 
(0.039) 
Own toilet  -0.001 
        (0.028) 
-0.014 
        (0.029) 
own farm  0.029 (0.032) 
-0.068* 
        (0.031) 
own non-farm business 0.025 
        (0.034) 
0.028 
        (0.036) 
Household characteristics   
# household members age 0-6 -0.003 
        (0.014) 
0.023 
        (0.014) 
# females age 7-12 -0.076** 
        (0.023) 
0.586*** 
        (0.023) 
# males age 7-12 0.530*** 
        (0.024) 
-0.039 
        (0.024) 
# household members age 13-15 0.124*** 
        (0.028) 
0.098*** 
        (0.022) 
# household members age 16-18 -0.040 
        (0.032) 
0.006 
        (0.026) 
Islam 0.011 
        (0.051) 
0.075 
        (0.050) 
Christian  0.066 
        (0.072) 
-0.009 
        (0.083) 
Hindu 0.047 
        (0.072) 
0.062 
        (0.081) 
Head and spouse education    
Head illiterate  -0.105 
        (0.157) 
-0.292* 
        (0.134) 
Head attended only elementary school 0.006 
        (0.147) 
-0.251* 
        (0.126) 
Head attended only junior secondary 
school 
0.016 
        (0.137) 
-0.187 
        (0.115) 
Head attended senior secondary school 0.089 
        (0.127) 
-0.181 
        (0.112) 
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Spouse illiterate -0.023 
        (0.075) 
-0.085 
        (0.093) 
Spouse attended elementary school 0.033 
        (0.072) 
-0.017 
        (0.088) 
Spouse attended junior secondary school 0.048 
        (0.078) 
-0.070 
        (0.090) 
Spouse in HH 0.040 
        (0.082) 
0.079 
        (0.095) 
Village characteristics    
# of elementary school in the village -0.002 
        (0.008) 
0.018* 
        (0.008) 
Constant -1.003*** (0.288) 
-0.475** 
(0.172) 
Observations 
(sub-sample of households with at least one 
child aged 7-12) 
1065 1101 
Log pseudo-likelihood  -1160.58 -1196.81 
Measures of fit   
   OLS R2 0.379 0.436 
   McFadden's R2 0.045 0.052 
   McFadden's Adj R2 0.022 0.030 
   Maximum Likelihood R2 0.099 0.114 
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
The table reports the results of the Poisson model that estimate the number of 
children attending elementary school. The sample are households with at least 
one child aged 7-12. High education is the omitted category for education o the 
head and of the spouse. Permanent income is in millions rupiah. Dummies for 
the occupation of the household head are included as additional regressors 
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Table 4A.2 
Zero-inflated model. Dependent variable: # of children in the household attending 
junior and senior secondary school 
 
 
Junior secondary Senior secondary 
 Male Female Male Female 
Household socioeconomic 
status  
    
Predicted permanent income 
(excluding wage of children in 
the reference age group) 
0.001 
(0.071 ) 
0.116* 
(0.046) 
-0.121 
(0.1094) 
-0.019 
(0.1095) 
Utilize electricity - - 0.716*** (0.213) 
1.495*** 
(0.334) 
Water source inside the 
household  - - 
0.407* 
(0.202) 
0.487* 
(0.200) 
Own toilet  - - 0.323+ (0.168) 
0.498** 
(0.184) 
own farm  -0.263 (0.240) 
-0.160 
(0.217) 
-0.649+ 
(0.362) 
-0.041 
       (0.277) 
own non-farm business 0.048 
  (0.104) 
0.009 
 (0.123) 
0.136 
   (0.206) 
-0.419+ 
  (0.238) 
Household characteristics     
# household members age 0-6 -0.011 
  (0.056) 
-0.183** 
(0.064) 
-0.057 
 (0.122) 
-0.170 
(0.137) 
# household members age 7-
12 
0.009 
(0.057) 
0.064 
 (0.071) 
0.035 
 (0.105) 
0.022 
(0.138) 
# household members age 13-
15 - - 
0.050 
  (0.106) 
-0.036 
 (0.122) 
# females age 13-15 -0.084 
 (0.130) 
0.479** 
 (0.166) - - 
# males age 13-15 0.489*** (0.056) 
-0.058 
(0.141) - - 
# household members age 16-
18 
0.249*** 
(0.065) 
0.099 
(0.081) - - 
# females age 16-18 - - -0.228 (0.218) 
0.844*** 
(0.222) 
# males age 16-18 - - 0.547*** (0.131) 
-0.011 
 (0.221) 
Islam -0.146 (0.159) 
-0.260 
 (0.168) 
0.016 
  (0.278) 
0.137 
  (0.310) 
Christian  -0.129 (0.231) 
0.149 
   (0.238) 
0.814* 
  (0.374) 
0.950** 
 (0.356) 
Hindu -0.248 (0.266) 
0.021 
 (0.262) 
0.701+ 
 (0.376) 
0.411 
  (0.459) 
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Head and spouse education      
Head illiterate  -1.404*** 
  (0.298) 
-0.279 
 (0.292) 
-0.774 
 (0.622) 
-0.597 
  (0.637) 
Head attended only 
elementary school 
-0.932*** 
   (0.263) 
-0.054 
   (0.241) 
-0.428 
  (0.509) 
-0.296 
  (0.551) 
Head attended only junior 
secondary school 
-0.501* 
 (0.207) 
0.388+ 
 (0.212) 
-0.036 
 (0.466) 
-0.135 
 (0.535) 
Head attended senior 
secondary school 
-0.478** 
(0.185) 
0.084 
 (0.211) 
0.618 
 (0.453) 
0.181 
(0.464) 
Spouse illiterate -0.361 (0.233) 
-1.027*** 
 (0.231) 
0.074 
 (0.556) 
0.126 
 (0.588) 
Spouse attended elementary 
school 
0.069 
(0.191) 
-0.403* 
 (0.157) 
0.476 
  (0.499) 
0.694 
 (0.504) 
Spouse attended junior 
secondary school 
0.183 
(0.206) 
-0.501** 
(0.191) 
0.743 
 (0.558) 
0.648 
 (0.633) 
Spouse in HH 0.140 
  (0.220) 
0.522* 
  (0.219) 
-0.583 
  (0.505) 
-0.985+ 
 (0.539) 
Village characteristics      
# of junior school in the 
village 
0.070 
 (0.049) 
0.102* 
 (0.049) - - 
# of senior school in the 
village - - 
-0.023 
  (0.122) 
0.165 
   (0.139) 
Constant -0.478 
 (0.470) 
-0.911+ 
 (0.502) 
-1.617* 
  (0.645) 
-3.821** 
(1.176) 
Observations 
(sub-sample of households with 
at least one child aged 7-12) 
585 561 433 409 
Log pseudo-likelihood  -471.03 -409.35 -230.20 -167.31 
Measures of fit     
   OLS R2 0.304 0.184 0.3098 0.3104 
   McFadden's R2 0.103 0.076 0.198 0.278 
   McFadden's Adj R2 0.048 0.009 0.090 0.144 
   Maximum Likelihood R2 0.172 0.117 0.235 0.276 
Vuong test of zip vs. standard 
Poisson:             
z=0.26 
Pr>z=0.396 
z=0.28 
Pr>z=0.389 
z=1.42 
Pr>z=0.078 
z=1.94 
Pr>z=0.026 
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001   
The table reports the results of the zero inflated Poisson models that estimate the number 
of children attending junior and senior secondary school. The sample are households with 
at least one child aged 13-15 for junior secondary and 16-17 for senior secondary. High 
education is the omitted category for education of the head and of the souse. Permanent 
income is in millions rupiah. Dummies for the occupation of the household head are 
included as additional regressors. 
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Table 4A.3 
Actual and predicted numbers of children attending school, by school levels 
 Mean s.d. Min Max 
Actual values 1.131 0.609 0 3 # girls attending 
elementary school Predicted – Poisson 1.132 0.408 0.667 3.757 
Actual values 1.141 0.597 0 4 # boys attending 
elementary school Predicted – Poisson 1.142 0.374 0.577 3.706 
Actual values 0.423 0.557 0 3 
Predicted – Poisson 0.424 0.249 0.074 2.035 # girls attending junior sec. school 
Predicted – ZIP 0.424 0.247 0.070 1.935 
Actual values 0.521 0.685 0 7 
Predicted – Poisson 0.521 0.418 0.115 7.173 # boys attending junior sec. school 
Predicted – ZIP 0.567 0.495 0.097 7.967 
Actual values 0.228 0.471 0 2 
Predicted – Poisson 0.228 0.307 0.009 2.523 # girls attending 
senior sec. school 
Predicted – ZIP 0.228 0.321 0.004 2.382 
Actual values 0.287 0.564 0 6 
Predicted – Poisson 0.287 0.370 0.025 5.411 # boys attending 
senior sec. school 
Predicted – ZIP 0.282 0.306 0.017 2.759 
The table reports the actual and predicted values of the number of children attending 
school. Predicted values are from the Poisson and Zero inflated Poisson models.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 4 
 
147 
 
 
 
 
Table 4A.4 
Educational expenditure regression 
Number of children attending school ( jβ ) Coeff. t 
# male attending elementary school 130.58 5.60 
# female attending elementary school 135.65 5.92 
# male attending junior secondary school 206.71 4.47 
# female attending junior secondary school 385.00 4.88 
# male attending senior secondary school 435.80 5.69 
# female attending senior secondary school 794.78 8.62 
Income interaction effect (η ) Coeff. t 
Household income 0.35 4.20 
N =1974 
R-squared = 0.11 
The table reports the IV estimated coefficients from equation 4.21. Dependent 
variable is the total household annual educational expenditure. Provincial dummies 
are included in the regression. Household income is instrumented with head’s 
educational dummies and the value of household non-business assets. The number 
of children in the household attending school are instrumented with the predicted 
numbers obtained from Poisson and Zero inflated Poisson models. The sample is 
households with at least one child attending school.  
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Table 4A.5 
Descriptive statistics of predicted cost of schooling 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Conditional on household income 
Male-elementary 105.13 47.90 30.34 355.51 
Female-elementary 109.21 49.76 31.52 369.31 
Male-junior secondary 166.42 75.83 48.04 562.79 
Female- junior 
secondary 
309.94 141.23 89.47 1048.17 
Male-senior secondary 350.84 159.87 101.27 1186.48 
Female-senior secondary 639.84 291.55 184.69 2163.81 
Conditional of average income  
Male-elementary 117.50 29.18 71.30 171.82 
Female-elementary 122.06 30.31 74.07 178.48 
Male-junior secondary 186.01 46.19 112.87 271.99 
Female- junior 
secondary 
346.43 86.04 210.22 506.57 
Male-senior secondary 392.14 97.39 237.96 573.41 
Female-senior secondary 715.16 177.61 433.97 1045.74 
# households=2288 
The table reports the predicted costs of schooling, by level of school and gender. The 
first box presents household specific estimates that are conditional on household 
income (
'
ˆ ˆ
ˆ
hP
h jy e
η γ β ), the second shows the predicted values calculated using the 
average income (
'
ˆ ˆ
ˆ
hP
jy e
η γ β ). These latter estimated varies by province, gender and 
school level.  
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Appendix 4B - Income levels by education 
 
 
 
 
Table 4B.1 
Individual income equation: Heckman selection model 
 Female Male 
Dependent variable: log income (robust se in parenthesis) 
North Sumatra 1.913*** (0.437) 4.160*** (0.264) 
West Sumatra 1.731*** (0.401) 4.480*** (0.243) 
South Sumatra 1.846*** (0.522) 3.665*** (0.257) 
Lampung 1.501** (0.469) 3.716*** (0.258) 
West Java 1.960*** (0.392) 4.013*** (0.210) 
Central Java 1.525*** (0.373) 3.803*** (0.242) 
Di Yogyakarta 1.449*** (0.433) 3.862*** (0.294) 
East Java 1.774*** (0.375) 4.192*** (0.230) 
Bali 1.858*** (0.426) 4.193*** (0.255) 
West Nusa 
Tenggara 
1.658*** (0.436) 3.832*** (0.281) 
South 
Kalimantan 
1.785*** (0.446) 4.320*** (0.282) 
Male: dummy 
elementary 
school*provincial 
dummies 
 
Female: dummy 
elementary or 
junior secondary 
school*provincial 
dummies 
South Sulawesi 1.490*** (0.389) 4.194*** (0.330) 
North Sumatra - 4.233*** (0.316) 
West Sumatra - 4.742*** (0.344) 
South Sumatra - 4.025*** (0.292) 
Lampung - 4.019*** (0.346) 
West Java - 4.512*** (0.287) 
Central Java - 4.612*** (0.292) 
Di Yogyakarta - 4.075*** (0.351) 
East Java - 4.668*** (0.246) 
Bali - 4.569*** (0.494) 
West Nusa 
Tenggara 
- 4.599*** (0.312) 
South 
Kalimantan 
- 4.836*** (0.322) 
Male: dummy 
junior secondary 
school*provincial 
dummies 
South Sulawesi - 4.596*** (0.492) 
North Sumatra 2.930*** (0.417) 4.822*** (0.262) 
West Sumatra 3.211*** (0.322) 4.669*** (0.302) 
South Sumatra 2.454*** (0.408) 4.801*** (0.350) 
Lampung dropped 4.167*** (0.276) 
West Java 3.912*** (0.408) 4.818*** (0.219) 
Central Java 2.895*** (0.363) 4.672*** (0.245) 
Di Yogyakarta 3.402*** (0.374) 4.571*** (0.334) 
East Java 3.142*** (0.303) 4.684*** (0.217) 
Bali 2.604*** (0.467) 4.749*** (0.233) 
West Nusa 
Tenggara 
3.063*** (0.428) 4.699*** (0.224) 
South 
Kalimantan 
2.991*** (0.383) 5.046*** (0.213) 
Dummy senior 
secondary 
school*provincial 
dummies 
South Sulawesi 3.656*** (0.305) 4.888*** (0.219) 
Experience   0.096*** (0.013) 0.028* (0.011) 
Experience square  -0.001*** (0.000) -0.0004* (0.000) 
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 Female Male 
Dependent variable: log income (robust se in parenthesis) 
Selection (robust se in parenthesis) 
Non business assets/1000 -0.002 (0.000) 0.001 (0.000) 
married -0.308*** (0.048) 0.660*** (0.067) 
unschooled -1.607*** (0.271) -0.977*** (0.177) 
incomplete primary -1.541*** (0.267) -0.803*** (0.169) 
highest grade completed: elem -1.367*** (0.266) -0.647*** (0.168) 
highest grade completed: jrsec -1.254*** (0.271) -0.559** (0.173) 
highest grade completed: srsec -0.421 (0.273) 0.012 (0.175) 
exper 0.096*** (0.005) 0.098*** (0.005) 
exper2 -0.001*** (0.000) -0.002*** (0.000) 
# household members age 0-5  -0.122*** (0.025) -0.026 (0.025) 
# household members age 6-9 -0.023 (0.030) -0.083** (0.031) 
# household members age 10-14 -0.064* (0.025) -0.063* (0.025) 
# household members age 15-17 -0.093* (0.036) 0.002 (0.034) 
Month of interview: September   0.235** (0.086) 0.663*** (0.084) 
Month of interview: October       0.237** (0.076) 0.614*** (0.074) 
Month of interview: November   0.438*** (0.073) 0.586*** (0.074) 
Month of interview: December   0.192** (0.069) 0.227*** (0.068) 
Intercept -0.194 (0.271) -0.994*** (0.176) 
Mills (robust se in parenthesis) 
lambda  0.539** (0.192) -0.868*** (0.127) 
N    5982 5534 
Censored 4545 2898 
Uncensored 1437 2636 
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
Table reports the results of equation (4.13). Dependent variable is log monthly income.  
Sample: all individuals aged 10 years or old with information on labour. Dummies for  
“illiterate” and “high education” are included in the income regression, with no 
schooling acting as the omitted category. In the selection equation omitted categories 
are “high education” for educational dummies and “January” for the month of 
interview. 
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Appendix 4C – Measures of risk and shocks 
 
1) Measure of shocks 
 
Table 4C.1 
Household income equation 
 A 
Household income 
excluding the wage of 
children 12-14 years old 
B 
Household income 
excluding the wage of 
children 15-17 years old 
Variables Coeff. t Coeff. t 
1992 farm assets 0.010 1.32 0.010 1.33 
1992 business non-farm 
assets 0.019 2.30 0.019 2.30 
1992 non business liquid 
assets 0.029 1.22 0.029 1.22 
1992 non-business illiquid 
assets 0.023 4.28 
0.023 4.30 
Household owns a farm 
-40.886 -0.42 -24.533 -0.25 
Household owns a non-
farm business 514.629 7.02 519.468 7.12 
Household head does not 
work 536.514 1.75 602.842 1.97 
Household head is  
employee 838.371 3.00  910.185 3.27  
Household head is self-
employed 192.166 0.70 247.471 0.90 
Head primary education 177.365 3.27 194.101 3.62 
Head junior secondary 
education 934.074 5.96 945.656 6.03 
Head senior secondary 
education 1696.077 7.95   1711.204 8.03   
Head high education 2896.955    6.32   2886.849    6.31   
Nr. of income earner 
(other than the head) 143.110  4.05   119.823  3.45   
Household size  41.248 0.52   34.949 0.44   
Household size^(2) 0.949 0.14 1.501 0.21 
Intercept 
-195.811 -0.52 -248.610 -0.67 
Number of obs= 2239 
R-squared=  0.30 
The table records the results from equation (4.14) and estimate the predicted household 
income. The dependent variable is 1993 household income excluding the child wage. 
Whether the household head works as family worker is the omitted category for the 
working status of the head. Whether the head has no education is the reference 
category for head’s education. This regression includes provincial dummies. Both 
income and assets are measured in thousands of rupiah. The standard errors are robust.  
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2) Income variability of senior secondary school graduates  
Table 4C.2 
Income regression for senior secondary school graduates 
Variables Coeff. t 
Dummy male 0.246 2.12 
Dummy language (1 if language spoken at 
home is Indonesian) 
0.462 2.69 
intercept  4.334 22.07 
Adj R-squared 0.016 
N 491 
The table reports the results of equation (4.16). The dependent variable 
is the log of individual monthly income, the sample is individuals 
graduated at least from the senior secondary school. Provincial dummies 
are included.  
 
Table 4C.3 
Regression to estimate the adult income variance  
Variables Coeff. t 
Dummy male -0.418 -0.44 
Dummy language (1 if language 
spoken at home is Indonesian) -0.165 -0.08 
Prov1 1.576 2.90 
Prov2 1.322 3.31 
Prov3 1.316 0.94 
Prov4 1.037 0.93 
Prov5 0.692 1.12 
Prov6 1.894 4.07 
Prov7 1.060 2.07 
Prov8 0.529 1.07 
Prov9 1.878 3.00 
Prov10 1.711 2.83 
Prov11 1.015 1.15 
Prov12 0.705 0.98 
Adj R-squared 0.28 
F(33,458) 6.79 
N 491 
The dependent variable is the square of fitted residuals from 
equation (4.16). The sample is individuals graduated at least 
from the senior secondary school. Cross products are included 
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3) household income variability over the time the child will remain at school 
Table 4C.4 
1997 income equation  
Variables Coeff. t 
1993 household income 0.259 9.37 
Non business liquid assets 0.069 4.90 
Non business illiquid assets 0.018 4.29 
# schooling years completed by the 
household head 50.210 3.97 
Household size -0.675 -0.03 
Intercept 713.26 5.18 
Adj R-squared 0.12 
F(5,1866) 53.05 
N 1872 
The table reports the results of equation (4.17). The dependent variable 
is 1997 household income.  
 
Table 4C.5 
Regression to estimate the variance of income deviation  
Variables Coeff. t 
1993 household income 1539.851 1.68 
Non business liquid assets 5911.259 3.17 
Non business illiquid assets 134.091 0.71 
# schooling years completed by the 
household head 
572175.500 1.51 
Household size -388563.900 -0.46 
1993 household income^2 0.044 0.99 
Non business liquid assets^2 -0.042 -5.22 
Non business illiquid assets^2 0.001 1.16 
# schooling years completed by the 
household head^2 
-51297.520 -2.37 
Household size^2 33426.4 0.50 
Adj R-squared 0.052 
F(20,1851) 6.09 
N 1872 
The table reports the results of the second stage of the procedure to 
estimate the variance of household period two income deviation. The 
dependent variable is the square of predicted residuals from table 4C.4. 
Cross products are included as additional regressors. 
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Appendix 4D – Overall probability of attending senior secondary school 
The overall impact of uncertainty on schooling decisions is complicated. Further this 
impact comes through a number of distinct channels. In this appendix, we focus on the 
impact of uncertainty on the decision to attend senior secondary school. Only those children 
who have graduated from junior secondary school are able to continue to senior school. 
Conditional on graduation, the continuation decision will depend on the income realization at 
that time (period 2). The uncertainty associated with income at this date will also impact the 
decision to attend junior secondary school. In order to evaluate the total impact of period 2 
income uncertainty on attendance at senior secondary school, we need to control for both 
these effects. 
 
The total probability of attending senior school may be estimated as  /s s j jp p p= ⋅ , 
where /s jp  is the probability of attending senior school conditional on having completed the 
junior level, and jp  is the probability of continuation to the junior school. In order to 
consider how probabilities change if income guarantees were in place over the schooling 
period (so no period two uncertainty and no period two shocks), we calculate the following 
probabilities. The first is defined as:  
 1 1 / 1s s j jp p p= ⋅  
where 1 /s jp  is the conditional probability predicted by estimating (4.18), and 1 jp  the 
probability predicted from the probit regression model defined in (4.20). 1 /s jp  depends upon 
both income uncertainty and shocks. The second measure is calculated setting both period 2 
shocks and period 1 uncertainty with respect to period 2 shocks to zero: 
 2 2 / 2s s j jp p p= ⋅  
where 2 /s jp  is calculated using the estimates reported in Table 4.15 with 2 0hη =  (i.e. 
without considering period two shocks), and 2 jp  is predicted using the coefficients reported 
in table 4.17 and setting 2hσ =0 (where 2hσ  is the variance of 2hη , i.e. period two income 
uncertainty). 2 sp  still depends upon period one shock ( 1hη ) and period three income 
uncertainty ( 2iΨ ).  
The following graph shows the kernel density estimates for the two probabilities: the 
solid line represents 1 sp , the dashed line 2 sp . As we can see, the overall probability of 
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attending senior secondary school is lower if we set both period two income risk and shocks 
to zero. This difference is largely due to the impact of period two income uncertainty (setting 
only 2hη  to zero does not significantly change the predicted probability).   
 
Figure 4D.1: Overall probability of attending senior secondary school  
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Although this result appears paradoxical, it is a direct consequence of our model 
specification. The option value effect of an increase in the uncertainty with respect to 
period 2 income on the decision to attend junior high school is always positive, so a 
reduction in this uncertainty must increase both junior and senior secondary school 
enrollment. By contrast, the impact of the period 2 income shocks themselves on 
continuation depends on whether these shocks are positive or negative. Families who 
experience positive shocks are more likely to allow their children to continue to 
senior secondary school and the contrary is the case with those families who 
experience negative shocks. While the impact of these shocks on the conditional 
continuation probabilities can be large in particular instances, given our linear 
specification, they are likely to balance out over the entire population. In order to be 
confident that the effects illustrated by the kernel density functions are in deed valid, 
we need to look more thoroughly at possible nonlinear shock impacts. 
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5.1 Summary 
This dissertation investigated the way in which potential and actual shocks affect 
household economic conditions and choices. We focused on three main issues. First, we 
explored which strategies are chosen for different types of shocks. Second, we investigated 
which are the specific mechanisms adopted in the face of the most common shock (crop 
loss), and the consequences on consumption. Finally, we analyzed the consequences of risk 
and shocks on a particularly important household decision: how much to invest in children 
education. 
The source of data used in this dissertation is the Indonesian Family Life Survey, mainly 
the 1993 round. A large amount of information on household economic conditions (income 
sources, consumption, types of assets), and household and individual characteristics were 
collected, as well as a detailed section on shocks experienced by the household during the 
five years prior to the interview. The questionnaire asked households to report a list of 
adverse events: the death and sickness of a household member, crop loss, unemployment, 
household or business loss due to a disaster, unanticipated drop in the price of crop products. 
The coping strategies included in the survey are: taking an extra job, taking a loan, sell 
assets, family assistance, use of savings, and cutting expenditures. 
 
Chapter one reviewed the theoretical and empirical literature regarding households’ 
behaviour in the face of risk and shocks in developing countries. The theoretical framework 
that underlines the analysis is an intertemporal model of consumption and asset investment 
choices, that accounts for the fact that poor households, especially in developing countries, 
may have no access to perfect credit markets, and they may find it hard to save. Moreover, 
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the vast majority of people living in poor areas do not rely on wage income, rather on farm 
profits, for which the availability of some productive assets becomes crucial.  
Both the literature review and the descriptive analysis of Indonesian data highlighted that 
household responses to shocks depend on the nature of the shock (whether demographic or 
economic, idiosyncratic or common,…), and on household characteristics. In particular, we 
found that informal arrangements (for example family assistance) are important means to 
overcome demographic and idiosyncratic shocks, while they are marginal as a response to 
economic hardships. On the other hand, households are more likely to use the labour supply 
responses to cope with economic and common shocks. In general, relatively few households 
draw down savings as a coping strategy. A characteristic that has important consequences on 
the way in which households respond to shocks is clearly household’s wealth (and the 
presence of liquidity constraints that may be related to it). Indonesian data show that poor 
and non-poor households differ in the choices of coping strategies: the former are more 
likely to use the labour supply response, while rich households are more likely to sell assets 
(for demographic shocks) and to use savings. This result is in line with the finding of the 
theoretical and empirical literature that when liquidity constraints are binding, households 
need to rely on autarchic savings, both to build a buffer stock of assets and to self-finance 
profitable investments.  
Since households may use more than one strategy to cope with the same shock, the 
econometric treatment of these choices requires models that allow for non-exclusive and 
dependent multiple responses. In chapter two we developed two models that take into 
account these specificities. In the first and simpler specification, the Poisson-multinomial, 
households first choose the number of responses to a specific shock, and then the specific 
choices are identified to maximize household utility conditional on the former choice. The 
second specification, the threshold-multinomial, generalizes the standard multinomial logit 
model by supposing that agents will choose more than one response if the utility they derive 
from other choices is “close” to that of the utility-maximizing choice. Both these models are 
an advance over the standard Marginal Logit Model (MLM) approach in that they see 
respondents as comparing responses with each other rather than with a common benchmark. 
A disadvantage of the Poisson multinomial model is that it inherits the IIA property from 
multinomial logit. Both the MLM and threshold multinomial models, which make the 
number of responses endogenous to the respondent’s decision process, are less vulnerable to 
this problem. We found the both Poisson and threshold multinomial models outperform the 
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Marginal Logit Model (MLM). Choice between the two multinomial models is less clear but 
the data appear marginally more favourable to the threshold model.  
Chapter three adds to the literature on self-protection coping strategies investigating 
whether rural Indonesian households smooth income following a crop loss (i.e. whether they 
adopt strategies, labour supply adjustments in particular, to recover the income reduction due 
to the shock), and how much consumption smoothing is achieved through income smoothing 
strategies (i.e. how much of the increase in income is transferred onto consumption). In 
particular, we sought to examine two issues. First, which variables influence the adoption of 
income smoothing strategies and whether these strategies completely or partly recover the 
income reduction due to the shock. Quantitative measures of income shocks and household’s 
ability to cope with the shock (mainly through labour supply response) were estimated for 
poor and non-poor households. Using these measures we explored whether the increase in 
income due to income-smoothing strategies partially offsets, or exceeds, the income loss due 
to the shock. Second, this chapter investigated whether households smooth consumption and 
the role played by different coping strategies in mitigating consumption reductions. The 
analysis was conducted distinguishing between consumption behaviour of poor and non-poor 
households.  
Our results suggest that the income gain given by the extra labour supply response 
completely compensate the income reduction caused by the crop loss, while the role of non-
business assets and “take a loan or sell assets” is in general marginal in recovering the 
income loss. As regard consumption behaviour, there are two main differences between poor 
and non-poor households. First, while medium and large farms smooth consumption relative 
to income, this is not so for small farms: for the latter, the main components of transitory 
income (crop loss and the extra labour income) have an effect on consumption that is 
statistically significant and equal to the one associated with permanent income. The second 
distinction between poor and non-poor households concerns the marginal propensity to 
consume out of the relevant income measure: the former save about a half of their current 
income, whereas the latter consume a fraction of their permanent income close to one. This 
result may confirm the need for poor households, that are more likely to be excluded from 
financial markets, to rely on autarchic saving strategies. 
The final issue examined in this dissertation regards household investments in children 
education in the face of risk and shocks. We made three contributions to the analysis of these 
choices. First, the role of both ex ante risk and ex post income shocks on child schooling is 
considered. Second, we examined two different sources of uncertainty: household 
  Conclusions 
 
160 
uncertainty with respect to the earnings of the adult (ex-child) once graduated, and 
household uncertainty with respect to parental income over the time the child may remain at 
school. Third, we proposed a model that accounts for the irreversibility of the decision to 
withdraw a child from school. The key assumption of the model is that once the child drops 
out, he/she cannot return to school. In this way, temporary interruptions in schooling in the 
face of risk or short-term shocks have long term impacts on the child human capital. The 
model predicts that household uncertainty with respect to the earnings of the adult (ex-child) 
once graduated tends to discourage school attendance, while household uncertainty with 
respect to parental income over the time the child may remain at school increases school 
participation. The latter effect arises out of irreversibility: in the face of household income 
variability parents are more likely to send children to school to give them the option to 
continue with higher schooling levels in the future (and hence earn higher earnings when 
they become adults). Finally, as regards ex post responses to shocks, under the assumption 
that there is no saving and borrowing, negative (positive) shocks are predicted to reduce 
(increase) the probability of school progression.  
Results substantially confirm the predictions of the model. Our findings show that 
Indonesian rural household adjust child schooling in the face of risk and shocks. Children are 
more, or less, likely to attend school in response to positive, or negative, income shocks, at 
both junior and senior secondary school stages. The probability of attending junior secondary 
school depends positively on the variance of household income over the time the child may 
remain at school, through the option of continuing to senior secondary school. Household 
uncertainty with respect to the earnings of the adult (ex-child) once graduated has the 
predicted negative sign in both probit regression models, but is not statistically significant. 
These results underline that the impact of uncertainty on schooling decisions is more subtle 
that suggested by much of the existing development literature.  
 
In summary, three sets of main conclusions emerge from this dissertation. First, we have 
learned that when facing a shock, households choose risk coping strategies by comparing 
responses with each other rather than with a common benchmark. In such a situation of non-
exclusive and dependent multiple responses, the widely used Marginal Logit Model (MLM) 
suffers from a number of limitations. The two models we developed to take into account 
these specificities appear to outperform the MLM in describing these type of choices.  
The second main conclusion relates to the evidence that the choices between different 
coping strategies markedly differ between poor and non-poor households. In the face of 
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shocks, the former appear to behave in a very different way. In general, rich households 
smooth consumption relative to income, whereas the need to accumulate savings to both 
build a buffer stock of assets and self-finance profitable investments leads poor people to 
rely more on ex post income smoothing strategies (taking an extra job) and to use part of this 
extra labour income to preserve their level of assets, even reducing consumption if 
necessary.  
Finally, it is necessary to deepen our knowledge of the long-run consequences of shocks, 
particularly with respect to the human capital formation of children. We found that the 
impact of uncertainty on schooling decisions is more subtle than suggested by much of the 
existing development literature. Taking into account that withdrawal from school is an 
absorbing state, that is children cannot re-enroll once they stop going to school, temporary 
interruptions in child schooling have long term impacts on the child human capital. Given 
irreversibility of withdrawal from school, in the face of household income variability parents 
are more likely to send children to school to give them the option to continue with higher 
schooling levels in the future (and hence earn higher earnings when they become adults). 
 
5.2 Further Research  
Chapter three constructed quantitative measures of the income reduction caused by the 
crop loss and of the income gain due to the labour supply response. A further question to be 
assessed in future work is whether there is persistence of both shock and coping strategy: do 
crop loss and labour supply responses continue to affect future income?  As discussed in 
chapter one, a variety of theories explain why transitory income shocks may persist. Many of 
these theories document the link between risk management strategies (both ex ante and ex 
post) and long-run effects. For example, ex ante strategies may lead poor households to 
choose safe but low return activities, while households may be forced ex post to sell 
productive assets or to take children out of school. All these effects may induce poverty 
persistence. To my knowledge, there is no study that examines possible long-run effects that 
come from the labour supply responses: the extra income obtained through the shocks-
induced labour supply may persist far into the future, and perhaps longer than the shock.  
The starting point of this analysis will be the paper of Newhouse (2005). Using the 
Indonesian Family Life survey, Newhouse (2005) estimates the persistence of transient 
income shocks (measures by rainfall shocks) to farm households in rural Indonesia. In his 
model, income shocks persist because current consumption choices affect future level of 
assets, which in turn affects future income. He finds that, on average, thirty percent of 
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income shocks remain after four years, negative shocks persist no longer than positive ones, 
and there are no significant differences in the shock persistence between rich and poor.  
 
A second future research question is to analyze the impact of risk and shocks on child 
labour. Chapter four examined the effects of risk and shocks on child education, but this does 
not allow me to infer the implications for child labour. As discussed in chapter four, and as 
suggested by the literature (Ravallion and Wodon, 2000; Probe report, 1999), the trade-off 
between schooling and working may not be one-to-one, and out of school does not mean 
necessarily at work. In developing countries children often work part-time, and in many 
cases as family labourers at home or in the fields. Even a part-time job may be enough to 
exclude children from the schooling system, but in some cases children may combine work 
and study (in many developing countries school day is short) (Probe report, 1999). An 
interesting extension of chapter four will be to include school and labour choices in the 
analysis and examine the effects of risk and shocks on child time allocation, to account for 
the fact that children may both attend school and work (de Janvry et al., 2007). 
 
A third and final issue I plan to analyze is the intra-household allocation of resources in 
the face of shocks. In chapter three I examined consumption smoothing in the face of a crop 
loss, but without considering how variations in consumption are distributed across household 
members. As suggested by Dercon (2002), the failure to cope with risk is not only reflected 
in household consumption, but there are also intra-household consequences. Some household 
members may be more vulnerable than others in the presence of risk: this is partly addressed 
in chapter four, where child schooling decisions in the face of risk and shocks are analyzed. 
This chapter adopted a unitary approach to characterized household choices, and did not 
examine the intra-household bargaining between parents over the child’s time allocation. A 
possible extension would be to examine child time use in the face of risk using a non-unitary 
approach. Many papers find that parents may have different preferences regarding children’s 
human capital investments, and the general finding is that the mother cares more than the 
father about children (Haddad, Hoddinott and Alderman, 1997). Thomas (1990) finds that in 
Brazil the higher is the mother’s bargaining power the healthier are the children. Duflo 
(2003) shows that income from pensions has a positive impact on girl’s nutrition if the 
income earner is a women, and in particular the mother of the mother. Thomas, Contreras 
and Frankenberg (2002) show that mother and father’s bargaining power have different 
effects on children’s health outcomes, and in particular, sons are healthier than daughters 
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when the mothers are more powerful. An unexpected result comes from Basu and Ray 
(2002). They analyse the relationship between the allocation of power in the household and 
child labour, and find that as the woman’s power increases, the child’s labour will first fall 
and then rise. The idea is that as the power of one spouse increases, he/she will control 
household income, included the income earned by the child, and hence will have a greater 
benefit from the child’s labour. The authors’ conclusion is that children are better protected 
in households where the power is more balanced. 
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Survey questions and selected variable definitions 
 
 
A.1  Individual and household income, 1993 and 1997 
1993 household income  
Annual household income has been constructed as the sum of four components:  
 
Table A.1 
Components of household income 
Component Level 
1) net profit generated by the farm and non-farm business  Household 
2) asset income (for non-business assets) Household  
3) individual wages  Individual 
4) household non labour income Household  
 
1) Net profit generated by the farm and non-farm business.  
The household head was asked to report the approximate amount of net profit generated 
by the farm or non-farm business during the 12 months prior to the interview. If respondents 
did not know the net profit, they were asked to estimate the total revenue received by the 
household from the farm or non-farm business and the approximate amount spent by the 
household for the farm business. Net profit can be constructed subtracting the expenses from 
the gross income. 
2)  Asset income (for non-business assets). 
The household head estimated and reported the total income from the rent/lease/profit-
sharing of each type of non-business assets in the 12 months prior to the interview.  
3)  Individual wages. 
Appendix A 
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Adult household members (the household head and the spouse, if present, are selected, 
and up to three other members) were randomly selected and asked to provide detailed 
individual employment information. Private or government workers were asked to report 
their net salary or wage from both primary and additional job during the 12 months prior to 
the interview. For all the other household members not interviewed as main respondents and 
older than 10 years, the head reported the individual net income/wages (other than from the 
farm or non-farm business). The sum of individual (main and non-main respondents) wages 
is the total household income from the wage employment sector.  
4)  Household non labour income. 
The household head was asked to estimate the non-labour income received by the 
household during the 12 months prior to the interview. Sources of income are: pension, 
scholarship/student loan, insurance claim, winnings (from rotating credit associations, 
lotteries, etc), gift from family, friend or charities, and other.  
 
1993 individual labour income (used in the analysis conducted in chapter 
four) 
Individual labour income consists of earnings or profits reported by individual 
respondents or by the head of the household.   
Main respondents (adult household members, mainly the household head and the spouse, 
if present, and up to three other selected members): 
self-employed workers were asked to report the net profit/gross income they gained in the 
12 months prior to the interview (monthly profits are reported too). The gross income was 
reported if respondents did not know their net profit. Private or government workers were 
asked what was the net salary or wage during the 12 months prior to the interview. 
Other household members (non-main respondents): 
as said above, for each household member over the age of ten and not interviewed in the 
individual book (as main respondent), the household head reported whether he/she worked to 
earn income/wage/salary, what was the main work status, and the net income/wage/salary 
earned from his/her work (other than from the farm or non-farm business) during the 12 
months prior to the interview.   
 
1997 household income  
Farm and non-farm profit, non labour income and asset income are defined as in 1993 
survey. The questionnaire on individual labour income is not available in 1997.   
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A.2  Household expenditure, 1993 and 1997  
1993 
This dissertation uses the household expenditure measure created by IFLS users. Total 
household expenditure is the sum of all expenditures on food and non-food items. Food 
expenditure includes the value of food purchased, the value of household consumables that 
were self-produced, and the value of food received from other sources outside the household. 
Several food items are reported. The questionnaire asked for food expenditures during the 
week prior to the interview; the original variable is then converted to monthly value.  
Non-food items include electricity, water, fuel and the like, personal toiletries, household 
items, recreation and entertainment, transportation, clothing, medical costs, ritual 
ceremonies, charities and gifts, taxes, household supplies and furniture and other expenses 
like the purchase of cars, television sets, beds, livestock and the like. Expenditures of child’s 
education (for children inside and outside the household) are reported.  Non-food 
expenditures are collected as monthly or annual value.  
Non-durable expenditure (used in chapter three) is constructed subtracting the value of 
household supplies, furniture and “other expenditures” (like purchase of car, television, beds, 
etc) from total household expenditure.  
 
1997 
The 1997 survey ( IFLS2) asked the same questions on household expenditure as in 1993.  
The total household expenditure is constructed as the sum of all consumption items. 
 
A.3 Household assets, 1993 and 1992  
Total household assets is the sum of 1993 total (market) value of farm, business non-farm 
and other non-business assets owned by the household, as reported by the head of household.  
Farm assets are: farm land, hard, stem plants, house or building used for the farm business, 
livestock/poultry/fish pond, vehicles, tractor, heavy equipments, small tools, other assets.  
Business non-farm assets are: land and buildings other that those used for a farm business, 
vehicles, ships/boat, other vehicles, office equipments, supplies, other assets. 
Non business assets are: house occupied by the household, buildings, land and animals not 
used for farm or non-farm business, vehicles, household appliances, savings/certificate of 
deposit, stocks, receivables, jewellery,  other assets.  
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For each asset the value of any asset purchased and sold during the 12 months prior to 
the interview is reported. These variables are used, together with the 1993 value of assets, to 
generate the value of assets owned by the household the year prior to the interview (1992).  
 
A.4 Household economic shocks, 1993 
IFLS1 provides some questions regarding events that have affected the household and 
caused economic hardship during the five years prior to the interview. 1993 questionnaire is 
as follow: 
Table A.2 
Questionnaire for household economic shocks, 1993 
Type of economic 
hardship  
Has this 
household gone 
through […] 
within the past 
5 years? 
When did […] 
happen? 
What measures 
where taken to 
overcome the 
economic 
hardship of […]? 
What was the 
approximate 
cost in rupiah to 
overcome […] 
during the past 
5 years? 
Death of a 
householder 
1.yes 
3. no 
Year    ___ 
Month ___ 
A B C D E F  
G H I J K L M 
1. value 
8. DK 
Sickness of a 
householder that 
necessitated 
hospitalization or 
continuous medical 
treatment  
1.yes 
3. no 
Year    ___ 
Month ___ 
A B C D E F  
G H I J K L M 
1. value 
8. DK 
Crop loss 1.yes 3. no 
Year    ___ 
Month ___ 
A B C D E F  
G H I J K L M 
1. value 
8. DK 
Household/business 
loss due to fire or 
other disasters 
1.yes 
3. no 
Year    ___ 
Month ___ 
A B C D E F  
G H I J K L M 
1. value 
8. DK 
Unemployment of a 
householder 
1.yes 
3. no 
Year    ___ 
Month ___ 
A B C D E F  
G H I J K L M 
1. value 
8. DK 
Cut in household 
income due to 
falling price of crop 
1.yes 
3. no 
Year    ___ 
Month ___ 
A B C D E F  
G H I J K L M 
1. value 
8. DK 
 Code for measures used to overcome the shock: 
A. A householder’s extra job 
B. A householder’s loan from family or friend/employer 
C. A householder’s loan with crop as collateral 
D. A householder’s loan with other assets as collateral 
E. Selling next harvest in advance (below market value) 
F. Selling food (rice) supply 
G. Selling cattle/poultry 
H. Selling jewelry  
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I. Selling other assets 
J. Using savings 
K. Getting money from family/relatives, friend or employer 
L. Getting assistance (in the form of goods) from family/relatives, friend or employer 
M. Cutting household expenses 
Responses have been aggregated to six indicators: extra job (A), loan (answers B, C, D), 
asset sale, (answers E, F, G, H, I), family assistance (K, L), use savings (J) and cut expenses 
(M).  
 
A.5 Years of schooling, 1993 
The number of years of schooling has been constructed from respondent’s report of 
highest level of school attended and the highest grade completed within level. Elementary 
education is typically six years, junior and senior secondary education are three years.  
 
A.6 Working status, 1993 
Respondent is define as a worker whether he/she reported “working/trying to 
work/helping to earn income” as the primary activity during the week prior to the interview. 
The respondent is defined as a worker even if he/she reported working for at least one hour 
during the past week, or having a job or business but temporary not working, or working at a 
family owned business during the past week. Working respondents were then asked to report 
their work status, for both primary and additional job: 
1. self-employed (without help) 
2. self-employed (with help of householders/temporary workers) 
3. self-employed (with help of regular workers) 
4. government worker/employee 
5. private worker/employee 
6. family worker 
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A.7 IFLS Provinces 
In 1993, about 7200 households were interviewed in 13 provinces representing 83% of 
the Indonesian population. Indonesia is a country with a high variation in culture, geography 
and economic conditions. The relevant feature of the IFLS sample is that the 13 provinces 
included in the survey are able to capture this heterogeneity. The table reports the codes and 
names of IFLS provinces.  
Table A.3 
IFLS Provinces, codes and names 
Code Name 
12 North Sumatra 
13 West Sumatra 
16 South Sumatra 
18 Lampung 
32 West Java 
33 Central Java 
34 Di Yogyakarta 
35 East Java 
51 Bali 
52 West Nusa Tenggara 
63 South Kalimanatan 
73 South Sulawesi 
 
Figure A.1: IFLS Provinces  
 
On-line source: http://chd.ucla.edu/IFLS/index.html  
 
 
 
